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HESIOD'S REJUVENATION

THE relationship between the proverbial '*Ησιόδειον γῆρας*'¹ and the epigram attributed to Pindar²

*Χαῖρε δὶς ἡβήσας καὶ δὶς τάφου ἀντιβολήσας,
‘Ησιόδος’, ἀνθρώποις μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης*

seems to have excited little comment since H. G. Evelyn-White discussed it in *C.Q.* xiv (1920), pp. 126–8. His solution, to which T. A. Sinclair (ed. *Works and Days*, p. xl) and Schmid-Stählin (*Gesch. d. Gr. Lit.* I. i, p. 252 n. 5) are attracted, assumed that the proverb is based upon the epigram and that the latter contains a reference to the tale that late in life Hesiod outraged his hosts' sister at Oenoe and became thereby the father of Stesichorus. 'That is to say, a "Hesiodic old age" is a lively vigorous age, in which *ἡβὴ* reasserts itself.' As in his earlier *ἡβὴ* Hesiod became the father of Mnaseas (Schol. *Op.* 268), so this liaison in his old age enables the poet to describe him as *δὶς ἡβήσας*, passing through two periods of youthful vigour.³ By this argument the scandal is made at least as old as Pindar.

It is easy enough to sever the thread of this argument by denying Pindaric authorship. Two lines of verse are really not enough for Evelyn-White's analysis of the language to bridge the gap between similarity and identity, while Professor Hadas, who considers the couplet 'almost certainly Pindaric' (*Ancilla to Classical Reading*, p. 151), has not divulged his reasons. 'Natürlich sollte der Bööter dem Bööter gehuldigt haben', said Wilamowitz (*Die Ilias u. Homer*, p. 407 n. 2), and we must reckon with this possibility. But does Evelyn-White's conclusion follow even if one shared his confidence that Pindar penned the couplet? It seems to me to depend on two doubtful arguments:

- (i) That Goettling's explanation can be shown to be unlikely.
- (ii) That a statement by Symmachus 'seems to give the true link between proverb and epigram'.

Goettling, in his edition of Hesiod (pp. xvi–xvii), declared the two to be of different origin. *δὶς ἡβήσας* implies that there were two Hesiods, to account for the two tombs;⁴ with this epigram the Vatican compiler associated the proverb, failing to see that the latter derives from the passage generally assigned to the *Precepts of Chiron* (fr. 171 Rzach), in which Hesiod discusses the longevity of crow, stag, raven, phoenix, and Nymphs. Admittedly Goettling confused the issue in talking of Hesiod as 'qui de longinuitate uitae (*γῆρᾳ*) hominum, corniculum, ceruorum cet. agit' (my italics), but I am surprised that Evelyn-White

¹ Proverb. Vat. iv. 3 (Bodleian 884, Gaisford, *Paroemiogr. Gr. App.* IV, 92; Leutsch-Schneidewin, i. 456), citing Aristotle's *'Ορχομενίων πολυτεία* (fr. 565 Rose); Suid. s.v. *τὸ Ησιόδειον γῆρας*.

² Suidas, loc. cit.; Tzetzes, *Prolegg. comm. in Hes. opera*, p. 17 Gaisford.

³ Evelyn-White might have compared the words of the Chorus to Trygaeus,

shortly to marry Opora: *γέρων αὖθις νέος ὁν πάλιν* (Aristophanes, *Pax* 860 f.), but it seems that there is another reason to seek for this (see Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, pp. 90–93).

⁴ Whether these were at Naupactus and Orchomenus (Paus. 9. 38) or Ascrea and Orchomenus (Plut. *Comm. on Hes.* 26) is not clear.

could feel that the suggestion was adequately countered by the remark (p. 127):

"*Ησιόδειον γῆρας* must have been a proverb, for which there was little call if it is based on Hesiod, fr. 171, for that passage estimates the life of the Nymphs in terms of phoenixes, stags, crows and old men: ἀνδρῶν γηράντων, I take it, means only ‘old men’ and not ‘extremely old men’."

There is of course no suggestion in the fragment that the life span of man is significant (and Goettling errs in loosely suggesting it), but ancient familiarity with the passage and the lively debate in, for example, Plutarch's day over the length of a Hesiodic generation¹ do suggest that the longevity of the other creatures mentioned in the passage had called forth a great deal of discussion. Now when we find Pollux (*Onom.* 2. 16) stating that in the language of comedy (*τὰ κωμικὰ σκώμματα*) there were used as synonyms for ‘aged’: *ὑπέρ τὰς ἐλάφους βεβιωκάς, ἡ τὰς κορώνας, ἡ τὰς Νύμφας ἵσηλαξ*, what is more natural than that ‘*Ησιόδειον γῆρας* should mean ‘an old age to be expressed in Hesiod's fabulous terms’? For whether one starts from 30 or 108 years (or any other ancient estimate) as the value of a generation, the resultant life cycle for the Nymphs is greater than any such calculation of longevity elsewhere in Greek literature, rivalling the wildest ancient surmises on the length of the Magnus Annus. Suidas clearly knows the proverb as *ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπεργήρων* and this, I suggest, is its proper meaning.

The reference in Symmachus which Evelyn-White regards as a link between proverb and epigram is quoted in the truncated form: ‘Hesiodium ferunt posito senio in uirides annos redisse’ (*Epist.* 7. 20). Inasmuch as rejuvenation itself implies a return *in uirides annos*,² it cannot be said that Symmachus' words automatically suggest a reference to Hesiod's sexual potency. This conclusion becomes still more apparent when the quotation is considered in context. Attalus, Symmachus' correspondent, has recently acquired a villa at Tibur, on a charming site on high ground commanding a panoramic view of the surrounding plains.

Frequentare has sedes Orchomenias dixerim deas, atque eas sedulo adnixas, ut te conciliarent aedibus suis dominum. Perge igitur ut facis, et uictis aeuo redde nouitatem. Multo hoc factu promptius, quam quod Hesiodium ferunt posito senio in uirides annos redisse.

The surroundings remind Symmachus of Helicon, and so he pays Attalus the pretty compliment of being a subject of the Muses' interest. Attalus is then urged to continue ‘renovating the old’; we hear at any rate of a new bath

¹ Hesiod himself takes it for granted that there is a recognized length for a *genea*, but there was much uncertainty later. In passing, it should be said that Evelyn-White errs in opposing Roscher's restoration of *ter senos* for the received *ter binos* in the first line of Ausonius' translation of the Hesiodic passage (Ecl. Bk. 7. 5). His reason is that Ausonius' 96 may represent three complete generations and Nestor may have been before the poet's mind. But in his Grifus (Lib. 16), where Ausonius refers again to Hes. fr. 171, Nestor appears in this way (11–

12):

ter noua Nestoreos impleuit purpura fusos
et totiens trino cornix uiuacior aeuo.

It would be odd if Ausonius called one generation a *Nestoreus fusus* at this place, and used the same idea for three generations at Ecl. Bk. 7.

² Wilamowitz, *Die Ilias u. Homer*, p. 407 n. 2, finds a reference to the rejuvenation story here. With Symmachus' language cf. Claud. *Phoenix* 50–52: O senium positure . . . renasci . . . pubescere.

installed, so wonderful that 'torris unus ad iusti caloris pabulum satisfacere narratur' (7. 18). This Attalus will find easier to do than the reputed accomplishment of Hesiod-rejuvenation. Clearly, all that the context requires is a comparison between Attalus making old things new in the Muses' domain and old Hesiod being restored to youth by the gift of the same divinities. Furthermore, if an argument based on degrees of difficulty has any validity, it seems to me more likely that Symmachus should compare rejuvenation, which Theognis declared impossible¹ and others the rarest of divine favours,² rather than the preservation of sexual virility, of which examples continually occur.

The idea that Hesiod had been rejuvenated at the hands of the Muses appears in an unequivocal form in at least two places:

- (a) *Hesiodes poeta . . . cum iam per aetatem senesceret, in Helicona, montem Aoniae, subiit ibique a Musis coronam cum floribus et frondibus dicitur accepisse, qua indutus caput iuuenis factus est. (Schol. Bern. Verg. Ecl. 6. 65—repeated with inferior readings by Schol. Bern. 165 ad 6. 70, on which see Savage, Harvard Stud. Class. Phil. xxxvi. 113.)*
- (b) *Hesiodo, qui Ascreus fuerat (de uico Boeotiae) quem dicuntur Musae (pascentem pecus) raptum de monte Parnasso poetam fecisse munere calamorum. (Cui etiam bis pueritiam de senectute praestitisse dicuntur. Ideo ait, quos ante seni.) (Serv. ad Verg. Ecl. 6. 70, with interpolations.)*

Both of these passages are commentaries on the part of Silenus' song in which he sings of Gallus' visit to Helicon under the guidance of the Muses, and (*Ecl. 6. 67–71*):

Vt Linus haec illi diuino carmine pastor
floribus atque apio crinis ornatus amaro
dixerit: 'hos tibi dant calamos, en accipe, Musae,
Ascreo quos ante seni, quibus ille solebat
cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos.'

The interpolator in Servius (and probably also the Berne Scholiast) finds support for his belief in Virgil's work itself, construing *quos ante seni* (sc. *dederunt*) as 'which they gave to the Ascrean, who was up to that time an old man'. At first glance it might seem likely that both Scholiasts had fancifully invented the idea of Hesiod's rejuvenation from this passage, for the interpolator does not object to Servius' failure to distinguish between the laurel branch which appears in Hesiod's account of his commissioning and the pastoral pipes which Virgil intrudes into the story, while the Berne Scholiast introduces a crown of flowers and leaves which could be a faulty reminiscence of Linus' garland in line 68. However, Symmachus too talks of Hesiod, 'quem poetica lauro Camoenalis familia coronauit' (*Epist. 1. 53*), and the association of Hesiod with a crown is likely to be a general mistake without specific reference to the text of the sixth Eclogue. I notice the resurgence of the error

¹ 1009–11: οὐ γὰρ ἀνηβάν | δις πέλεται
τρόπος θεῶν σύδε λέων θεατάρου | θητοῖς
ἀνθρώπουσι. Cf. Bacchyl. 3. 88.

² Cf. Eur. *Heracleidae* 796: νέος μεθέστρηκ'
ἐκ γέροντος αἴθις αὖ. Iolaus is restored to
youth for one day by Zeus and Hebe so
that he may defeat Eurystheus. A great

amount of material has been collected by
E. S. McCartney, 'Longevity and Rejuvenation
in Greek and Roman Folklore',
Michigan Academy of Science, Art and Letters v
(1925), pp. 37–72 (without mention of
Hesiod's case).

recently in a study of early allegory by R. M. Grant (*The Letter and the Spirit*, London, 1957, p. 2).¹

That the Servian interpolator had not derived the idea of rejuvenation from Virgil seems clear from his phrase *bis pueritiam de senectute praestitisse*, which reflects the language of the 'Pindaric' epigram. And the description of the Muses as *Orchomeniae deae* is not so common as to preclude the idea that Symmachus also is specifically alluding to the Aristotelian tradition in which the epigram is associated with the reburial of Hesiod's remains by Orchomenus. Now the idea that *δις ἡβήσας* implied rejuvenation was natural enough. The phrase is applied to Pelops (*Lyc. Alex.* 156) and Jason (*μέροψ δίστητος*, Dosiadas *βωμός* 2) and *δις ἀνηβάν* is used in the same sense by Theognis (1009–10) and Synesius (*Epist.* 123, Migne, *P.G.* 66. 1504—with reference to Aeson). Porphyry the aged charioteer is reproached at *Anth. Pal.* 15. 44. 6: *ώς δὲ δις ἡβήσας μάνευε ἐν σταδίοις*. None of these examples requires us to believe that the author of the epigram intended us to find a reference to Hesiod's renewed lease of sexual virility. But they do show how natural it would be to read rejuvenation into the epigram. Certainly the Croisets (*Hist. de la litt. grecque*, i. 475 n. 4) and Puech (*Pindare*, iv. 237 n. 1) are astray in talking of 'a story of Hesiod's resurrection'. If the author had said that Hesiod died twice (cf. *Anth. Pal.* 13. 59. 3–4, of Jason), it might be possible to relate the *δις ἡβήσας* and *δις τάφου ἀντιβολήσας* in this way, but being buried twice is rather a different matter, for there are other ways of explaining the existence of two graves than by assuming, as Goettling did, that two Hesiodes were under discussion, or again that two deaths of the same Hesiod are called for.

At the same time one wonders whether in fact the author of the epitaph intended to refer to a rejuvenation legend at all. Hesiod's life is presented by the ancients in two phases: Hesiod the shepherd and Hesiod the master poet, with his commissioning by the Muses as the connecting-link. As Lucian puts it, *ὅλιγα φύλλα ἐκ τοῦ Ἐλικάνων λαβὼν αὐτίκα μάλα ποιητῆς ἐκ ποιμένος κατέστη* (*Rhet. Praecept.* 4).² It is taken for granted by the ancients that Hesiod entered the second phase at a venerable age, among those *qui grandes natu cygneum nescio quid et solito dulcissima morte cecinerunt* (Jerome, *Epist.* lii. 3). Further it was a commonplace of antiquity that *δις παιδεῖς οἱ γέροντες* (cf. the examples given by Rogers at Aristophanes' *Clouds* 1417, to which many additions could be made), and this, I suggest, was the starting-point of the author of the epigram. Hesiod was one old man who did not revert to a second childhood; he was active in both phases of his life. Hence he 'reached his prime twice'.

If then there is good reason for belief that Symmachus is merely reproducing

¹ For crowning by the Muses see Lucr. 1. 118–19 and 929–30; A. R. Anderson, 'The Olive Crown in Hor. Carm. I: vii, 7', *Univ. of Wisconsin Class. Stud.* (No. 3, 1919), pp. 106–15. A similar idea seems to lie behind the frequent mistranslation of *δάφνη* in Hes. *Theog.* 30 as 'olive' (e.g. by Evelyn-White, Mair, Mazon, and Sperduti, *T.A.P.A.* lxxxii [1950], p. 222). I am inclined to believe that Theocritus has assisted this error by a Hesiadic reminiscence in his Seventh Idyl, where Lycidas offers Simichidas as a prize in a singing competition a crook of wild olive, *οὐνέκεν ἔσοι, πᾶν ἐν'*

ἀλαθείᾳ πεπλασμένον ἐκ Διὸς ἔρνος (43–44); cf. 129 *ἐκ Μουῶν ἔωντίον*). Cf., for a similar error, J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 102, where Lucian (*adv. Induct.* 3) is declared to have credited the Muses with the gift of 'a crown of myrtle'; the text reads *ἀντὶ τῆς δάφνης* (cf. 2 *κλῶνα δάφνης*).

² Himerius, with the usual rhetorical flourish, talks in terms of mass production: *ἔνθα δὴ (on Helicon) καὶ τοὺς ποιμένας αἱ Μόναις ποιητὰς ἐργάζονται*, *Or.* 47. 76 f. Colonna (cf. 66. 45 ff.).

a widely held view (whether erroneous or not) that the Pindaric epigram asserted that Hesiod had been rejuvenated, there remains no convincing evidence that Hesiod's death and Stesichorus' birth were already subjects of scandal in Pindar's day.¹

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¹ We are told that in his *Polity* of the Orchomenians Aristotle (*a*) reproduced the epigram (Proverb. Vat.) and (*b*) said that Stesichorus was the son of Hesiod and Clymene (Tzetzes). A suspicion that these two items may have been connected there is certainly natural, but it would be rash to claim that the only legitimate connexion could be: 'The Orchomenians say that Stesichorus was the fruit of the union of Hesiod and the outraged girl and that this

was the reason why "Pindar" cast Hesiod's epitaph in this form.' For the two details could have been associated in simple chronological sequence, without the involvement of any question of exegesis. This seems to me more likely in view of the discussion above of the most likely connotation of δις ἡβήσας. It is of course still possible for Evelyn-White's supporters to derive some comfort from Thuc. 3. 96, but there also the absence of detail makes the passage a dubious ally.

ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF AESTHESIS IN THE *DE ANIMA*

THE details of Aristotle's argument in the *De Anima* have received little attention in recent years, and fresh consideration of certain aspects of it may well be rewarding. The purpose of the present paper is to consider Aristotle's treatment of the concept of aesthetics, and his account of the physiology of the senses will therefore be a secondary matter.

Aristotle's discussion of aesthetics is, in an important sense, transitional. Some of the ways in which this is so are evident from a reading of Bks. 2 and 3 of the *De Anima* with a little supplementation from other works; and I might say in passing that, if the present considerations show anything, they suggest that Bk. 3 was written after Bk. 2, or at any rate certainly not before it as Ross seems to suggest in the introduction to his edition of the *Parva Naturalia*. (Ross's view is, I suspect, based, like Jaeger's, upon the platonizing tendencies which he sees in Aristotle's treatment of *nous*; but I think that in fact this treatment was an inevitable result of his whole approach to the mind—something which is pure *ἐνέργεια* is required for the various *δινάμεις* to be actualized.) The sort of thing which is relevant is the contrast between the tentative characterization of aesthetics as *ἀλητικῶς τις* in Bk. 2 (415^b24 and 416^b34) and his explicit denial of this in Bk. 3 (431^a5) as a result of the intervening discussion.

But Aristotle's account is transitional not only in the sense that there is a trend in his actual discussion, but also in the sense that he is trying to develop a new view of aesthetics, or one with new emphases, and at the same time to free himself from the influences of his predecessors. Many hard things have been said recently about Aristotle as a historian of philosophy,¹ but I think that there have been few philosophers with so keen a sense of the history of his subject. The consequence is that he continually finds it difficult to shake off the bonds which attach him to an older point of view. This is nowhere more true than in his account of aesthetics.

My point may be put in this way: the word *αἰσθητός* is a word of fairly wide application (it is certainly the widest term in Aristotle's quite extensive vocabulary for dealing with the subject under consideration). It covers both what we should call 'perception' and also what we should call 'sensation'. There has always been a tendency (natural but incorrect) on the part of philosophers to assimilate perception to sensation, and where, as in Greek, there is no distinct terminology, it is only too easy not to make the distinction at all. To perceive something, however, is not merely to have sensations (indeed we do not speak of having sensations when we are perceiving).² The faculty of sense-perception is that faculty by means of which we are able to characterize or identify things as a result of the use of our senses. It is reasonable, therefore, to connect perception with judging, as Aristotle does, although it is incorrect to identify it with judging, as he also does. To say of a man that he sees a flag as a Union

¹ Particularly by H. Cherniss. See, e.g., his *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*. For a criticism of the views of Cherniss now see W. K. C. Guthrie, 'Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy', *J.H.S.* lxxvii. 35 ff.

² See my 'The Visual Field and Perception', *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, Supp. xxxi. 114 and 123, and cf. G. Ryle's 'Sensations' in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 3rd Series (ed. by H. D. Lewis).

Jack is akin to saying that he takes it to be a Union Jack, and this in turn is akin to saying that he judges it to be a Union Jack (although this would need qualification). On the other hand, to say of a man that he sees a Union Jack *simpliciter* is not to say that he judges anything.¹

Most of the Pre-Socratic accounts of aesthesis are causal accounts of how sensations are produced. In Plato some sense of the inadequacy of this general view of aesthesis becomes evident. The discussion of the hypothesis that knowledge is aesthesis in the *Theaetetus* is not concerned with perception in our sense of the word.² For aesthesis is spoken of at 152 c as a direct acquaintance with something such that error is impossible. Such a view results from an assimilation of perception to sensation. Socrates' rejection of this hypothesis is to be taken *not* as a rejection of the view that knowledge is sometimes to be derived from perception, but as a rejection of the view that knowledge consists in aesthesis in this special sense. Plato's statement that what we should call empirical knowledge requires judgement as well as aesthesis in this sense culminates in Aristotle in the view that aesthesis is essentially concerned with judgement—even, as I have already indicated, that it is a form of judgement. Only, this is combined with the view that it is a form of change, in the sense that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition (cf. 424^b17) of perception that something should be said to *πάσχειν* something. The difficulties involved in reconciling these two points of view result in certain incoherencies in Aristotle's treatment of aesthesis, despite his bringing to bear much of the logical apparatus which he constructed in order to deal with philosophical problems (e.g. his use of the distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*). It is necessary therefore to sort out the different strands in Aristotle's approach to the subject.

Two further general points must first be made:

(1) It is important to see that Aristotle's approach is not epistemological, or at any rate not so in the traditional sense. He is not concerned with questions such as 'What does perception give us in the way of knowledge?', nor is he very much concerned, if at all, with such questions as 'What is it in general that we perceive?' It is true that he does hold the view that mistakes are impossible with respect to the special sensibles, but nothing is built upon this which makes it feasible to suggest that he is concerned with the 'search for certainty'. Plato was concerned with this, but the matter affected Aristotle in a different way, namely in his search for first principles for the sciences, and not at all in his treatment of aesthesis. Hence it is quite wrong to classify Aristotle's views about perception in terms of one or other epistemological view. He is not a naïve realist, as Ross suggests,³ in that for him such issues did not arise. But his approach is nevertheless philosophical (whatever else it is) in that he clearly attempts to give an account of the *concept* of aesthesis. He is concerned with the logic of our talk about perception, or, to be more exact, of Greek talk about aesthesis.

(2) Aristotle has at his disposal quite a large selection of terms for a discussion of the subject—*αισθησις* (the most general term which may be used to cover also some of the following), *τὸ αἰσθητικόν*, *τὸ αἰσθανόμενον*, *τὸ αἰσθητήριον*, *τὸ αἰσθῆμα*, *τὸ αἰσθητόν*, as well as similar words in connexion with the special

¹ For an analogous point see my *The Republic*, *Phil. Quart.* viii, no. 30 (Jan. 1958), 14–23.

² I have discussed this point in more detail in my paper 'Eikasia in Plato's

³ Aristotle, p. 132.

senses. One might suppose therefore that Aristotle had constructed a technical vocabulary which would be adequate for his discussion. In fact one finds that he does not always live up to the distinctions which one would have taken him to have drawn. It is not just that he does not live up to the implications of 408^b13 ('It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with the soul.')—though of course he does not live up to them. Rather it is also the case that he presents certain typical doctrines with respect to aesthesis using now one of the terms, now another. For example (and I shall consider these examples in more detail later), both *ἡ αἰσθησις* and *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* are said to be receptive of sensible form without the matter, and again *ἡ αἴσθησις*, *τὸ αἰσθητήριον*, and *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* are all said to be potentially what *τὸ αἰσθητόν* is actually. It is not enough to say¹ that the organ and the faculty are said by Aristotle at 424^a24 ff. to be one and the same under different aspects. If there are inconsistencies or deviations from a pattern these ought to be explained.

I shall now try to answer five questions:

- (1) What is it that is said to be receptive of sensible form without the matter and what is meant by this?
- (2) What is it that is said to be potentially what the aestheton is actually and what is meant by this?
- (3) Why does Aristotle say that the special objects of the senses are not subject to error?
- (4) What is the relation between the special sensibles and the common sensibles?
- (5) Why does Aristotle assign the degrees of fallibility which he does assign to the different forms of perception in 428^b18 ff.?

These questions are not, of course, entirely distinct, and the answer to each one of them will bear upon the others. The first two are closely connected.

(1) Aristotle begins his account of aesthesis, as I have already remarked, by tentatively accepting the view which he had inherited, namely that it is a form of change, and in particular that it is a form of *τὸ πάσχειν* (415^b24, 416^b34, cf. *Phys.* 244^b10). This is, strictly speaking, not true of perception, although it may conceivably be true of sensation. I think that Aristotle became aware of this fact to some extent at least. Hence his becoming more and more insistent on the connexion of aesthesis with judgement. There are a few passages in Bk. 2 of the *De Anima* in which the word *κρίνειν* (or its derivatives) is used in connexion with aesthesis (418^a4, 422^a21, 424^a5), but there are many more in Bk. 3 (425^b21, 426^b10 ff., 427^a20, 428^a3, 431^a8, 20, 432^a15); and at 431^a9 aesthesis is compared with assertion (cf. *Met.* 1010^b18). Perhaps the most clear account of aesthesis in this light is to be found in *An. Post* 99^b35, though there are passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* also which presuppose the same point of view (e.g. 1113^a1). But Aristotle does not completely see that this necessitates the drawing of a distinction between sensation and perception (except by inventing new terminology such a distinction would be impossible in Greek). Hence he tries to modify the older account. We are now said to *πάσχειν* something in aesthesis, either by receiving the sensible form without the matter

¹ As does R. D. Hicks in his edition of the *De An.* commenting on 424^a17.

or by something in us becoming what the sense-object is. In sense-perception the *ἐνέργεια* both of the sense and of the object coincide.

Of the passages which talk of receiving sensible form the first (424^a17) says that it is *ἡ αἰσθητός* which does this. But this commits Aristotle to nothing, in that there are passages where *αἰσθητός* is used of the sense-organ (e.g. 417^a3) as well as those in which it is used of the faculty. Indeed, the other two passages which contain certain references to this dogma (425^b23, 435^a22) explicitly mention the sense-organ as receptive. Aristotle uses the word *αἰσθητός* where he wants to be neutral or where he has no need to be precise, but it is clear that the general view is that it is the organ which receives the form. It is not at all clear what this is supposed to mean. Presumably it is meant that the sense-organ somehow becomes qualified by the quality of the object, and there are cases where this would make sense, e.g. that in which the sense-organ becomes warm by coming into contact with a warm object. But there are equally cases in which it does not seem to make sense at all, e.g. the eye does not become white when we perceive a white object. Themistius (56. 39, Heinze) says that, properly speaking, the aesthesis is not affected for this very reason; but then neither is the sense-organ. Commenting on this view of Aristotle's Ross says:¹ 'It is only if reception of form means *awareness* of form that it is a true description of perception; and the description of the organ as becoming *qualified* by the form of its object is irrelevant. The phrase "receptive of form" covers a radical ambiguity.' The truth is rather that the description of the organ as becoming qualified by the form of its object is relevant in certain cases, e.g. that already mentioned, and it is this together with the wish not to reject previous views completely which makes Aristotle put forward the view under consideration. The tendency to generalize from particular cases will become more evident from a consideration of the second way of explaining the form of *τὸ πάσχειν* involved in aesthesis.

(2) In different passages Aristotle says that *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* (e.g. 418^a3), *τὸ αἰσθητήριον* (e.g. 422^a7), and *ἡ αἰσθητός* (431^b22) are all potentially what *τὸ αἰσθητόν* is actually. Ross, summarizing *De Sensu* 438^b21² (*δὲ γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ ὄσφρητος, τοῦτο δυνάμει τὸ ὄσφραντικόν*) says that it is the *sense-organ* which is potentially what the act of smelling actually is. The passage in question is extremely confused, especially as regards the terms used, but it is clear that despite the use of *ἡ ὄσφρητος* instead of *τὸ ὄσφραντόν* it is a version of the doctrine in question. It is likewise clear from the context, despite Liddell and Scott, that with *τὸ ὄσφραντικόν* has to be supplied the word *αἰσθητήριον*. Hence Ross's interpretation is clearly correct. But that it is correct *in this instance* does not mean that it is correct as a general account of the Aristotelian doctrine, i.e. it may not be the case that it is always the sense-organ that is said to be potentially what the sense-object is actually. What of the undoubtedly passages in the *De Anima* where Aristotle uses the term *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* in such a way that there has to be supplied some such phrase as *μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς* (cf. 410^b25 and 431^b26)? As I said earlier, Hicks, commenting on 424^a17, maintains that at 424^a24 Aristotle says that the faculty and the organ are the same under different aspects, and hence that there is no need to distinguish them. (It is worth noting that both Hicks and Beare, the Oxford translator, tend generally to translate *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* as 'faculty': this is perhaps a natural translation and

¹ Op. cit., p. 137.

² Edition of the *Parva Naturalia*, pp. 188 and 193.

I have myself tended to follow it, but it does involve interpretation, and in the circumstances it might perhaps be better to use a more literal translation.) In fact in the passage in question Aristotle says that it is the *δύναμις* that is the same as the organ (although their being is not the same), and in *27 he interprets this as *τὸ αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι*, adding that it is *λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις*. Given Aristotle's general view of the soul this *δύναμις* may be equated with *τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς*. Hence, if this latter phrase must be translated as 'the sensitive faculty', it may be concluded that in this passage Aristotle is saying that the faculty is the organ's capacity for functioning, so that the organ cannot be physically distinguished from the faculty. Nevertheless, seeing that the organ and the faculty are also said to be different in respect of *τὸ εἶναι*, it seems to make a big difference logically whether the one or the other is said to be potentially what the sense-object is actually.

A solution to this problem may be arrived at via the consideration that here again Aristotle has been led to generalize from cases where it is sometimes appropriate (at any rate from his point of view) to talk in this way to cases where it is not. Aristotle continually supposes that what may be said of one sense may be said of the others (another view which he inherited), and this is clearly not the case. In particular, vision is different in certain respects from the other senses. Despite what Aristotle says about colour, we do not ordinarily talk in such a way as to make it plausible to suggest that there is a special object of vision, as there is of hearing and the other senses. Colour is not related to vision as sound is to hearing. The notion of sound already contains a connexion with the notion of hearing, but the same is not true of the notions of colour and vision. Aristotle himself shows some sensitivity to this point at 426*11, where he says that whereas we (i.e. the Greeks) have words for the *ἐνέργεια* of *ἀκοή* and *φόβος*, namely *ἀκουσία* and *φόβησις* respectively, in the case of vision there is the word *ὄρασις* for the *ἐνέργεια* of *ὄψις*, but there is no word for the *ἐνέργεια* of *χρῶμα*. He goes on to say that the same is true analogously for taste. Nevertheless, he draws no inference from this: he still goes on to say that the *ἐνέργεια* of the sense-object and of the faculty are one and the same, as a general doctrine, whereas it would seem not to be true of vision, whatever is the case with regard to the other senses. I suspect that the reason for this catholic treatment is the assumption that all perception is a form of *τὸ πάσχειν*.

To return to the question of Aristotle's use of different terminology in different passages, and the reason for this. In the *De Sensu*, ch. 2, where Aristotle is concerned with the constitution of the sense-organs with respect to the four elements, he argues to the nature of the sense-organ from the nature of the sensible only in the case of smell, taste, and touch. I do not wish to concern myself here with Aristotle's views about the physiology of the sense-organs: suffice it to give as an example the view in 438^b26 that, as odours are linked with fire by way of smoke, it is appropriate that the organ of smell should be near the brain. For being cool there it is potentially warm. Furthermore, in this passage of the *De Sensu* it is only in the case of smell that he says that the organ is like the sensible, and in the context of the physiological story one can see why he says this. To allot elements to the eye and the ear, on the other hand, he employs other arguments, unconnected with the nature of the sense-object. In the *De Anima* he again says only of smell, taste, and touch that the organ is potentially like the sense-object. The physiology is not in all respects the same

as that of the *De Sensu*, but nevertheless it is the physiology which provides the reason for saying these things about smell, taste, and touch. It is not a sufficient reason for saying these things about vision and hearing. Nevertheless, within these limits Aristotle has produced some sort of argument for saying that in some cases the *sense-organ* is potentially what the sense-object is actually.

On the other hand, hearing may be linked with at any rate smell in another way. We talk of both sounds and smells as *emitted* from objects, and, as Aristotle says at 425^b26, our actual hearing and the noise's actual sounding may be said to be the same (although their being is not the same). This means that it is impossible (logically) that there should be anyone hearing without there being a sound to hear (and perhaps, though this would require some justification, vice versa).¹ This, being a logical point, has nothing to do with any physiological theory such as that which Aristotle gives in *De Sensu*, ch. 2. Hence it has nothing to do with the sense-organs or with any change in them. For this reason also it is independent of Aristotle's attempt to explain how it is that aesthesis is a form of *τὸ πάσχειν*; indeed the passage beginning at 425^b26 does not, on the face of it, fit easily into this scheme of things. Yet it is clear from the context that it is meant to and that Aristotle thinks that he can use the logical point to that end. This is a mistake.

The conclusion to which this points is not that the sense-organ becomes like the sense-object (for the ear does not become noisy), but that the sense or the faculty does so. The *ἐνέργεια* of the sense-object is in this case internal to the sensing, i.e. to the *ἐνέργεια* of the faculty (426^a16). We speak in this way of hearing a sound, tasting a taste, and smelling a smell; but there is nothing internal in this way to seeing (it will not do to invoke sights here, for sights are not emitted). So, once again, while a sense can be given to Aristotle's formula in certain cases, it is not, despite his general assertion of it, true in general. It is not true of vision either that our sense-organs are qualified by the form of the sense-object so as to become like it, or that the sense and the object have the same *ἐνέργεια* (i.e. that there is something internal to seeing). Colour is not on a par with sound or smell. (This is a point about the logic of our talk about vision and hearing, given that the facts are what they are; it is conceivable that the logic would be different if the facts were different, e.g. if sounds were very complex and colours as simple in structure as sounds are now.)

Hence Aristotle's attempt to explain how it is that aesthesis is a form of *τὸ πάσχειν* fails on any account. (a) It is not true that in all cases the sense-organ becomes like the sense-object. (b) To say that the faculty becomes in actuality the same as the actuality of the sense-object is to make a logical point which has no bearing on the thesis connecting aesthesis with *τὸ πάσχειν*. (c) Even this last formula is inapplicable to vision. The next move might be to distinguish between sensation and perception, but ordinary Greek, I think, makes the drawing of such a distinction difficult, if not impossible.

(3) The same sort of difficulty arises with respect to my third question—why Aristotle says that the special objects of the senses are not subject to error. The first treatment of this point in the *De Anima* (at 418^a12 ff.) says that error is here *impossible*. The remaining passages, those in Bk. 3 at 427^b12, 428^a11,

¹ Nevertheless, hearing and sounding require different definitions. The one must be defined in terms of the other, as I shall indicate later. Aristotle's view here may well

be a logical version of the 'Empedoclean' theory of perception given in the *Theaetetus* 155 d ff.

430^b29, plus *De Sensu* 442^b8 and *Met.* 1010^b2, are content to say that error never arises,—whilst 428^b18 ff. says that it arises as little as possible. Whatever be the case with regard to the passages in the *De Sensu* and the *Metaphysics* (and these passages do not seem to go along with either Bk. 2 or Bk. 3 of the *De Anima* exclusively), I think that the difference between the two sets of passages in the *De Anima* has something to do with the increasing stress on the role of judgement in aesthesis which is to be found in Bk. 3, and also with a certain twist in that account given there of the role of judgement. It is true that at 418^a14 (in the Bk. 2 passage) the verb *κρίνει* is used (*ἀλλ' ἐκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων*), but here as elsewhere in Bk. 2 it is the sense which is said to judge or discriminate. It is only in Bk. 3 that there is talk of *our* judging (425^b21, 426^b14 ff., 428^a3) or the *soul's* judging (427^a20).¹ Another point is that at 418^a15 as an example of incorrigibility Aristotle gives *οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδὲ ὅτι φόφος*, whilst at 428^b21, after the qualification there put on incorrigibility, Aristotle gives *ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ φεύδεται*. . . . Apart from the difficulty of translating so as to make clear exactly what Aristotle means to say by *ὅτι χρῶμα* and *ὅτι λευκόν*, it is to be noted that in the first passage the generic word *χρῶμα* is used, whilst in the second passage the specific word *λευκόν*. In the context of the assertion that it is not possible for one sense to 'perceive' another's objects (418^a11, cf. *Met.* 1010^b14 ff.) it seems reasonable to take the first passage to assert that vision cannot be deceived as to whether it is concerned with colour *as opposed to, say, sound*, while the second passage opposes whiteness to, say, blackness; and in this case mistakes are clearly possible even if they are infrequent. It is colour that is, according to Aristotle, internal to sight, as is sound to hearing, but not whiteness or loudness respectively. Hence it seems that the necessary incorrigibility which Aristotle asserts in the first passage is a consequence of the logical connexion which he takes to exist between sight and colour, hearing and sound, and so on. In the second passage the freedom from error is contingent only because there is no logical connexion between seeing and whiteness.

Nevertheless in the context the consequences which Aristotle draws from the thesis about the necessary connexion between a sense and its object are incompatible with the talk about judging. For, as I have tried to make clear, the thesis about the necessary connexion is for Aristotle part of an attempt to explain how it is that aesthesis is a form of *τὸ πάσχειν*. And if it is this it cannot also be a form of *τὸ κρίνειν* (for the latter is active, i.e. a form of *τὸ ποιεῖν*, not passive); and if this is so questions of truth and falsity, correctness and incorrectness do not arise. In Bk. 3, 6, Aristotle says that in the case of the *nous* which is concerned with indivisibles (i.e. that which involves no judgement) there is no falsehood; but he should have said that questions of truth and falsity do not arise, and in so far as he stresses the parallel in 430^b29 between this form of *nous* and the perception of the special sensibles the same thing should be true of the latter. Aristotle again reveals himself at a transitional stage between two views. (I might also say in passing that the necessary connexion between sense and sensible, where there is one, says nothing in fact for incorrigibility. What is necessarily true is that if I am hearing I am hearing a sound; but nothing follows from this as to the possibility of making mistakes. There is a conceptual gap between logical necessity and incorrigibility.

¹ I do not think that this indicates an earlier dating of Bk. 3, for the slip is quite natural. Cf. D. J. Furley, Review of Ross, *Parva Naturalia*, C.R. vi (1956), p. 226.

Nevertheless talk of the *senses* judging is one of the things that tempt one to believe that incorrigibility does follow from the necessary connexion.)

When, therefore, Aristotle maintains the absolute incorrigibility of the senses with regard to the special sensibles, it is because (*a*) he assimilates perception to sensation and tends, because of the confusion between the two, to say of the latter that in this case there is no falsehood, rather than that questions of truth and falsity do not arise; (*b*) he sees a necessary connexion between sight and colour, etc., and from this infers that there is incorrigibility there also, a conclusion to which he is helped by his talking of the senses judging. When he comes to talk of ourselves judging he sees that there is no absolute incorrigibility, a conclusion to which he is helped by changing his example, so that the special sensible is no longer generic like colour, but specific like whiteness.

(4) There is a well-known difficulty in Aristotle's account of *κοινὴ αἰσθητις*, which can be brought out by asking how 425^{a15} (*ἀν ἐκάστη αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμενα κατὰ συμβεβηκός*) is to be reconciled with 425^{a27} (*τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ηδη ἔχοντες αἰσθηταν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός*). On the face of it there is a contradiction, and one way of dealing with it would be a way favoured by Simplicius (182. 38–183. 4), that of maintaining that in the first passage Aristotle is not giving his own views, i.e. he is saying that there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensibles *such that* we perceive them by each sense *per accidens*. Is this interpretation correct? Much here turns upon the translation of *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. There is a tendency to translate it by 'indirectly' (cf. Hicks, ad loc., and the Oxford trans. on 425^{a27}), and I am sure that this is incorrect. To translate it thus would be to give the discussion an epistemological slant which Aristotle's general discussion of aesthesis does not possess. It seems that *καθ' αὐτό* and *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* mean here what they mean elsewhere in Aristotle (cf. *An. Post.* 1. 4). For something to be a *καθ' αὐτό* *αἰσθητόν* of a sense it must be the case either that an account of the sense involves of necessity a reference to the sense-object or vice versa. I have indicated earlier that this is the case where there is an internal connexion between a sense and its object, as is the case with hearing and sound, and that Aristotle thinks that this holds true of all the senses. It is clear that an account of a particular sense does not involve reference to any of the common sensibles, nor does an account of any common sensible involve reference to any one sense. Hence 425^{a15} could be given its natural interpretation, i.e. that we perceive the common sensibles incidentally with respect to the special senses. In this, given his use of the terms 'essential' and 'incidental', Aristotle is surely right; and he is equally right in saying that we perceive the son of Cleon or the son of Diares incidentally, in that the definition of a sense does not involve reference to these people nor does a definition of the latter involve reference to any sense. This does not mean that we perceive people indirectly, and indeed if anything is to be given the status of indirect perception it will be the perception of sweetness by sight which he discusses at 425^{a22}. But this is not indirect in any epistemological sense. (It must be admitted that Aristotle seems to draw the erroneous conclusion that we make mistakes about the incidental sensibles *because* they are incidental, but that is another matter.)

It still remains to give a sense to the second statement about *κοινὴ αἰσθητις* at 425^{a27}. The course of the intervening argument is as follows: Aristotle begins by arguing that the common sensibles have no special sense-organ: he then goes on, naturally enough, to say that they have no special sense. It does

not follow that they have no sense at all. He argues next that if there were a special sense for them, we should perceive them either (*a*) as we perceive the things which we perceive indirectly, e.g. sweetness by sight, or (*b*) as we perceive the incidental sensibles—and in neither case is this so. But, he says, we have a common aesthesis for the common sensibles, and they are essential to it.

The *κοινά* might be *καθ' αὐτό* either because the definition of the *κοινή αἰσθησις* involves reference to them or because the definition of them involves reference to it. That the former is the case seems *prima facie* plausible because Aristotle has so far given no account of *κοινή αἰσθησις* other than that it perceives the *κοινά*; but he does go on to give it other functions and it might of course be defined by reference to them. Perhaps therefore one ought to look elsewhere. In the passage following the one already considered (425^b4 ff.), in dealing with the question why we have more than one sense, Aristotle refers to the common sensibles as *τὰ ἀκολουθῶντα*, and farther on again he says that colour and size accompany each other. Every coloured object, that is, has some size. This, as Ross says,¹ is sufficient to distinguish the common sensibles from the incidental sensibles, for not every coloured thing is the son of Cleon. But to give this as an explanation of the *οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός* in ^a28² (as I think that Ross means to do) would be a mistake; for the point there is *not* that the common sensibles are not incidental to the special sensibles, but that they are not incidental to the common sense. Thus while it is true that we do not perceive motion, size, etc. (according to Aristotle), as we perceive sweetness by sight or as we perceive the son of Cleon by sight, and while these common sensibles are not internal to any special sense, it remains true that no sufficient content has been given to the assertion that they are internal to a common sense; unless we take it that Aristotle's point is that, not being internal to any special sense but, on the other hand, not being incidental to all forms of perception, they must be internal to something. Hence the introduction of a common sense. But this would clearly be unsatisfactory, in that the only form of perception so far defined is that peculiar to the special senses, and in consequence *no meaning* has been given to the notion of not being incidental to *all* forms of perception. For this to have meaning we should have to be given an independent account of all forms of perception, and Aristotle does not give us this. In other words, if we are *not* given an independent account of the common sense we are given no reason for assuming the existence of one such as may then be defined in terms of the common sensibles: whilst if we *are* given an independent account there is no need to define it in terms of the common sensibles.

It would seem necessary, therefore, if Aristotle's argument is not to be considered merely as confused, that the common sensibles should be shown to be *καθ' αὐτό* to the common sense because a definition of *them* demands reference to *it*, as seems to be the case with regard to sound and hearing, and, according to Aristotle, colour and sight (as well as the other way round). Yet at first sight this does not seem plausible; for it is not obvious that the definitions of size, motion, etc., demand reference to any form of perception. Nevertheless, if Aristotle made the mistake with regard to colour he might well have made it here also. I tried to bring out the point with respect to sound and colour that

¹ Aristotle, p. 140.

² i.e. in that the connexion between special sensible and common sensible is not incidental.

there is a conceptual connexion between hearing and sound, but not between sight and colour (but only, if at all, between sight and perceived colour, for in this case the connexion is one of definition). But once given that any quality of an object may be internal to a sense, there is no reason for not holding that this is true of all qualities (it is to be noted that perception of the incidental sensibles is not perception of a quality but perception of—if one may talk in this way—something's identity). And it may be that there is a special temptation to think in this way about the common sensibles; for it may be argued that if what is perceived by sight and touch alike, e.g. size, is the same, there must be some common sense to which it is the same. But such an argument is plausible only if one thinks of qualities as perceived by a *sense*, and this, it is clear, Aristotle tends to do, if only because he has inherited a view of sense-perception which considers sense-perception as consisting solely of some interaction between a sense or sense-organ and an object.

(5) The order of fallibility appropriate to the perception of the special sensibles, the incidental sensibles, and the common sensibles given at 428^b18 ff. is puzzling on any account, in that it is not clear why Aristotle supposes that the perception of the common sensibles is more fallible than that of the incidental sensibles. Granted that both of these are *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* to the special senses, Aristotle has already given reason for saying that the common sensibles are *καθ' αὐτό* to the common sense, while the incidental sensibles are not *καθ' αὐτό* at all. If there is any connexion for Aristotle between being *καθ' αὐτό* and being free from error, the order ought to be such that the common sensibles come before the incidental sensibles. The commentators give little explanation of this point.

It seems to me that in this passage in general Aristotle is being empirical, or at any rate that the empirical facts are forced upon him. But what are the grounds for his conclusion? They are, I think, based upon the same considerations which led him to qualify the incorrigibility attributed to the perception of the special sensibles in this passage—to wit, that whereas in earlier passages he refers to generic qualities like colour, here he refers to specific qualities like whiteness. It is noticeable that the specific qualities which are subsumable under the generic qualities comprising the common sensibles are relative, e.g. bigness, smallness, quickness, slowness (these to be contrasted with the qualities of size, movement, etc., given at 425^a16). In other words, they are qualities typical of those which Plato relied upon at, for example, *Rep.* 479 b to show the unreliability of the world of the senses. I think that it was reflection upon these specific common sensibles which led Aristotle to his conclusions about the unreliability of our perception of them. There are standards for determining whether something is of a certain colour (cf. again *Met.* 1010^b2 ff. and 1063^a1 ff.), and there are likewise standards, only of a more complicated kind, for determining whether something has a certain identity, e.g. is the son of Cleon. But there are not standards in the same sense for determining whether something is big or many, for the decision must be relative. Hence there is a greater possibility of dispute and so, it might be inferred (though the validity of this inference is open to doubt), greater possibility of error over the common sensibles than over the incidental sensibles, and this despite the fact that the former are *καθ' αὐτό*, the latter *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. This is sufficient to refute those who wish to read into the discussion epistemological issues and to translate these terms 'direct' and 'indirect'; for

on this translation it would seem to follow that direct perception (the perception of the common sensibles) would be more subject to error than indirect perception. And this is extremely paradoxical.

In sum, I have tried to show that Aristotle's account of aesthesis is transitional and that most of the difficulties which arise for him arise from that very fact. The resulting uneasy compromise between two opposed views of aesthesis was handed down to his successors.

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PLATO'S COSMOGONY (*TIMAEUS* 27 D ff.)¹

In his paper on 'The Disorderly Motion in the *Timaeus*'² published seventeen years ago Professor Gregory Vlastos remarked: 'So much has been written on this vexed issue that one hesitates to reopen it.' Still more must I hesitate today; yet the issue is of such importance and interest to Platonic students that I hope to be forgiven for setting down certain considerations which aim at reinforcing Vlastos's main conclusions, but which have not, so far as I am aware, been given the weight that they seem to deserve.

The issue before us is indeed somewhat wider than the title of Vlastos's paper would suggest: what we have to decide, if we can, is whether or no Plato really means us to believe that this *κόσμος*, this ordered world that we know, came into being at a certain point of time, both in respect of the body and of the soul whose conjunction make it what he calls a visible living creature (*ὅπατὸν ζῶον*, 30 d); and if he did mean us to believe that, whether we can reconcile his picture of a pre-cosmic state of things in disorderly motion (*κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως*, 30 a) with other dialogues, namely *Phaedrus* and *Laws*, in which soul in general is asserted to be the cause of all motion, and (in the *Phaedrus* at least) ungenerated.

As is well known, there have been, from the very first age of Platonic study, two directly opposed opinions on the main point. Aristotle³ seems to regard it as plain, incontrovertible fact that Plato described the universe as having come to be; whereas his contemporary Xenocrates, the third Head of the Academy, held⁴ that the account put into the mouth of Timaeus ought to be interpreted as analysis of the world's existing structure in the guise of a story of its construction in the past, Plato's object being to facilitate exposition (*διδασκαλίας χάρου*).

It is clear that the view of Xenocrates held the field at least down to the time of Plutarch (who is plainly conscious of being in a minority in opposing it in his valuable essay),⁵ and perhaps even down to Proclus, who still supports it after his own fashion; though indeed there were, according to Proclus,⁶ 'many other Platonists' who sided with Plutarch and Atticus (a second-century Platonist); and in modern times the prevailing trend has been the same; there have indeed been distinguished scholars of this and the last century on the side of Aristotle and Plutarch, such as Th. Martin, Th. Gomperz, Brochard, and Rivaud; but it is safe to say that opinion today is mostly behind the two great English Platonists, A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford, whose commentaries on the *Timaeus* have superseded earlier editions.

I should first make it clear that I do not propose to support Plutarch in anything beyond his main contention, that the world really had, according to Plato, a temporal beginning; for I think he is demonstrably wrong on

¹ This article was found among the papers of the late Professor Hackforth. The typescript appeared to be ready for printing, but it is not known whether any final alterations were intended.

² C.Q. xxxiv (1939), pp. 71 ff.

³ *De caelo* 280^a28: cf. *Met.* 1072^a2.

⁴ Ibid. 279^b32 ff. That *τούτος* here refers to Xenocrates and his followers we are told by Simplicius and the scholiasts quoted by Vlastos, p. 73.

⁵ *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*.

⁶ In *Timaeum* i. 276 (Diehl).

important points, notably in holding that the pre-cosmic chaos was moved by an evil or irrational soul, and that there is a close parallelism between the structure of the world's body and that of its soul, the latter like the former consisting of two extreme factors and two means.¹ Nor again do I believe that the doctrine of the *Timaeus* can be quite so easily reconciled with that of the *Phaedrus*, *Politicus*, and *Laws* as he supposes. Nevertheless his essay is the thoughtful work of a highly intelligent scholar, and no student of our dialogue can afford to ignore it.

I. Aristotle (*de caelo* 279^b12) declares that everybody holds that the universe had a beginning (*γενόμενον ἀπαντες εἰναι φασι* (sc. τὸν οὐρανόν)). He should, no doubt, have made an exception of Heraclitus; but with that exception his statement seems true: all the pre-Socratics had in their various ways conceived of the world-order as evolving from or supervening upon a different state of things. That being so, one would have expected Plato to make it abundantly clear that he disagreed, if he did disagree.

But can anyone assert that he has done so? Surely even the stoutest Xenocratean could not claim more than that the language of the crucial passage, 27 d 5–28 c 2, in which Timaeus opens his cosmological account, is ambiguous; and I feel sure that no one coming fresh to the text, and knowing nothing about ancient or modern interpretations, would detect any ambiguity. Even Cornford, after rightly pointing out that *γίγνεσθαι* has two senses, that of coming into being and that of becoming so-and-so or, in Cornford's words, being in a process of change, admits that 'on the surface, he speaks of becoming in the first sense, as if the ordered world came into existence at some time out of a previous state of disorder'.² He could hardly fail to admit this, in view of such expressions as *γένεσις σχεῖν*, *γενέσεως ἀρχήν*, *γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητά* and above all, of course, the downright, uncompromising one-word affirmation of *γέγονεν* at 28 b 7. If Plato meant what the prevailing interpretation maintains, he surely did his best to mislead his readers. However, Cornford detects another meaning beneath the surface: that is to say, he believes that the actual language of this passage can, and does, bear a sense very different from its apparent sense. In attempting to show this he is, I may remark, deviating from the line taken by Xenocrates himself: he is arguing, not that Plato spoke of the coming into being of the universe *διδασκαλίας χάριν*, but that he never really spoke of it at all: he only spoke of the universe as always 'being in process of change'.

But on what is this view based? Where is the clue pointing indubitably to the second meaning of *γίγνεσθαι*? It is in the single word *ἀεί* at 28 a 1, where Timaeus asks *τι τὸ ὅν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τι τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὅν δὲ οὐδέποτε*; 'The statement', writes Cornford, 'that the world "has become" in this (sc. the first) sense is formally contradicted by the language of the first premiss, which contrasts with the eternally real "that which is *always* becoming, but never has real being". The phrase can only mean what "becomes" in the second sense, what is everlastingly in process of change. The application of the premiss to the visible world must mean that the world belongs to the lower order of existence so described. This is clear from the reason Plato gives for saying that the world "has become"; "for it is visible and tangible and has a body and all such things are sensible", and what is sensible belongs to the lower order, in contrast with the realm of eternal being.'

¹ 1014 b, 1025 a-b.

² *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 25.

Now what needs pointing out here is that these last words, viz. 'and what is sensible . . . eternal being' are Cornford's, not Timaeus'. I am not of course disputing their truth: my point is that they are Cornford's addition, replacing certain important words of his original. After 'all such things are sensible (*πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσθητά*) the text continues *τὰ δ' αἰσθητά, δόξη περιληπτά μετ' αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἐφάνη*. By omitting to translate (in his commentary) these words Cornford has omitted a vital point of Timaeus' argument, viz. that not only does the world belong to the lower order of existence, the sensible order, but that this was shown above (*ἐφάνη*, which must refer to 28 a 2-4) to be the order of things that become and are brought into being.

The upshot is surely inescapable: Timaeus is saying that the universe is both a *γιγνόμενον* (which might perhaps be ambiguous) and a *γεννητόν* (which is certainly not).

Having made, or attempted to make, this vitally important point against Cornford, I hasten to concede, as is only fair, that the words *τὸ γιγνόμενον* *δεῖ* do mean, must mean, as he says 'what is everlastingly in process of change', provided that by 'everlastingly' he means not 'from all eternity', but 'at every moment of its existence'. It is natural enough to find Timaeus' exposition starting from the familiar Platonic contrast of the changeless and the mutable; but it should not close our eyes to the equally familiar Platonic doctrine which at once emerges, that the mutable is the sensible, and the sensible is that which has come to be. And finally it may be pointed out that it is a little unsafe to build much upon this *δεῖ* of 28 a 1; for though neither Cornford nor Taylor has noticed it, the word is (as Burnet notes) omitted in two manuscripts and in the quotations by Proclus and Simplicius; it was also apparently unknown to Cicero and Chalcidius, though they are such incompetent translators that I would not set much store by this. In any case, with or without *δεῖ*, I find Cornford's argument invalid.

II. At 29 d 2 Timaeus tells us that the cosmology or cosmogony which is to follow must be regarded as an *εἰκὼς μῦθος*. The word *μῦθος* in Plato is not always properly to be rendered 'myth': sometimes, and probably, as Vlastos maintains,¹ here it means *story* or *account*, and is in fact indistinguishable from *λόγος*; nevertheless parts of the story that follows are certainly 'mythical' in the ordinary sense of the word: they are not intended as literal statements of scientific fact. The story can, however, we are told, be no more than probable (*εἰκώς*), because its subject—the physical universe—is only an *εἰκών*, the image of that original which Plato calls the *νοητὸν ζῶον*. It is probable that the caution which Plato thus enjoins on us has reinforced in some people's minds their doubts about a literal acceptance of the previous assertion that the world has come into being. I do not indeed feel sure that either Taylor or Cornford has been consciously influenced in this way; but however that may be, two facts should be remembered in this connexion: first, that the declaration that the world is an *εἰκών* and the consequent caution as to the *εἰκώς μῦθος* come *later* than the declaration that it is a *γεγονός*; and secondly, that there is no element whatever of mythical language, nor yet of doubt or reservation, in the passage we have been considering, viz. 27 d 5-28 c 2. It is all strict unadorned logical argument—what Frutiger somewhere calls 'dialectic without dialogue'.

¹ Op. cit., p. 72.

It might perhaps be argued that the caution enjoined at 29 b-c should be regarded, despite its position, as having retrospective force, i.e. as covering what was said at 28 a-c. To this I would reply as follows: it is no doubt conceivable that there should be an *eikón* that is not a *γεγενημένον*: but the *eikón* which is the universe is undoubtedly conceived as a *γεγενημένον*, and indeed it is because it is a particular sort of *γεγενημένον*, namely a *δεδημουργημένον πρός τι*, that it is declared to be an *eikón*. That being so, the uncertainty which must attach to any account of it, by reason of its mutability, cannot include any doubt as to its being a *γεγενημένον*.

III. It should not be supposed that acceptance of the unorthodox view (if I may so call it for convenience) entails accepting all the detail of the construction by the Demiurge of the world's body and soul as literal fact. Indeed this would, particularly in the case of the soul, be ridiculous: the mixture of Being, Sameness, and Difference described at 35 a is clearly to be taken as an analysis of the cosmic soul's faculties of cognition and motion. Nevertheless, it is surely plain that Plato conceives this soul as something which comes upon the scene, so to say, only when the *κόσμος* comes into being, and only through the action of the Demiurge, who plays in the *Timaeus* the part of Anaxagoras' *νοῦς*. There is no trace of any irrational or disorderly soul preceding the *διακόσμησις*, nor yet of any irrational element in the cosmic soul.¹ This is, in my submission, one of the main points where Plutarch goes wrong. The neat scheme of parallelism which he draws up between the construction of the world's body and that of its soul involves maintaining something for which there is no warrant in Plato, namely that the cosmic soul is the result of an ordering, a bringing *eis τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας* of a pre-cosmic soul; and this latter Plutarch claims to find in the soul-element called Divisible Being (*μεριστή οὐσία*) at 35 a. In point of fact, the Divisible Being, by virtue of which the cosmic soul (and by inference human souls also) cognizes the divisible objects of sense, is just as rational as the Indivisible Being (*ἀμέριστος οὐσία*) by virtue of which it apprehends indivisible intelligible Forms. (The recognition, or at all events *my* recognition, of this distortion by Plutarch is due to the careful and illuminating examination of the *de animae procreations* by a Swiss scholar, P. Thévenaz, whose work appeared in 1938, after Taylor's commentary on the *Timaeus*, but before Cornford's.)

Soul, then, makes its appearance in the universe, and of course also in the creatures with which the universe comes to be populated, including the stars and planets and human kind, as a feature of the *διακόσμησις* but not, like body, as the result of an ordering or re-fashioning of a pre-existent material or substrate.

IV. At this point we may recur to the words of 30 a, which announce in general terms the nature of the Demiurge's action: *πάντα δύοντα ἦν ὄρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸν ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας*. And we ask, to what, if soul is ruled out, is the motion here spoken of due? There can be only one answer: it is due to those mechanical, blind forces, the *αἰτίαι μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως*, which later (46 c) are said to produce their various random unordered effects (*τὸν τυχὸν ἀτακτὸν*

¹ Cf. Vlastos, p. 78, who reminds us that the cosmic soul is free from the six 'wandering motions' (34 a).

ἐκάστοτε ἔξεργάζονται). Plato is there speaking of these *aίτια* as operative not in the pre-cosmic state but in the existing universe, in which they are, he tells us, secondary causes, subordinate to the intelligent, purposive primary causes. Collectively they are entitled (48 a) ἀνάγκη or ή πλανωμένη *aίτια*, and thus half identified with, or mythically veiled under, the awful figure of that Necessity to which even the gods must bow. In the *κόσμος* these blind forces are for the most part harnessed in the service of *νοῦς*, but in part they act independently; and before the Demiurgic *νοῦς* has begun its work these 'secondary' causes or forces are the only ones that exist.¹

V. Two obvious difficulties in accepting what I have said are (*a*) that both in the *Phaedrus* (245 c) and in *Laws* 10 (896 b) soul is declared to be the sole ultimate cause of motion (*ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*), and (*b*) that in the *Phaedrus* (*ibid.*) it is ungenerated (*ἀγένητον*). As to (*a*), although the *Laws* is a more or less 'popular' dialogue, we should, I think, take its theological doctrine as seriously meant, and not attempt to force it into conformity with the *Timaeus*. At the stage of the *Timaeus* Plato's conception of *ψυχή* still clings in some degree to its Orphic and Pythagorean associations: it is still divine or semi-divine and wholly rational, as in the *Phaedo*; it is called at 46 d ή ἐμφρων φύσις: and yet it is partly discriminated from Mind or Reason in so far as it is distinct from the Demiurge, who implants it in the *κόσμος*. In *Laws* 10 it has got fully clear of *νοῦς*, so much so that two sorts of soul can be discriminated, the *νοῦν προσλαβούσα* and the *ἀνοίᾳ συγγενομένη*, the *φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες* and the *μηδέτερα κεκτημένον* (897 b), the *εὐέργετις* and the *τὰνατία δυναμένη* (896 e). Yet it is still soul, of whichever sort, that is, as in the *Phaedrus*, the originator of every sort of motion; the intermediate position taken in the intermediate *Timaeus* where, save for the semi-mythical expedient of introducing ἀνάγκη, the material substrate *πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀράκτως κινεῖται by itself*, is abandoned.

(*b*) As to the ungenerated soul of the *Phaedrus*, I do not believe that this should be taken as inconsistent with a pre-cosmic absence of soul. 'Chaos' is outside Plato's purview in considering the nature of *ψυχή* here; and we may fairly take him to mean that soul, being the necessary presupposition of all movements that occur in the universe, is coeval with the universe.

VI. I pass now to Taylor's main argument in favour of the orthodox interpretation of the cosmogony. It is based on the statement at 38 b (summing up the preceding paragraph 37 c 6 ff.) that 'time has come into being together with the universe' (*χρόνος μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν*). 'No sane man', we are assured,² 'could be [*sic: ?have*] meant to be understood literally in maintaining at once that time and the world began together, and also that there was a state of things, which he proceeds to describe, *before* there was any world.' I may be brief on this point, since it has already been disposed of by Prof. J. B. Skemp:³

¹ In the interpretation of 46 d-e I must dissent from Prof. J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (1942), p. 77, who holds that the second sort of *aίτια* are 'clearly psychical though irrational'. His opinion is partly based on what I think a wrong understanding of the genitives τῆς ἐμφρονος φύσεως (d 8) and κινουμένων and κινούντων (e 1-2). I follow Cornford in taking these as possessive, not

(as Skemp implies) objective, and in understanding τῆς ἐμφρονος φύσεως as a periphrasis for *ψυχῆς* (P.C., p. 157). As I have already said, I can find no mention or implication of irrational cosmic soul in the *Timaeus*. With ἐμφρων here cf. 36 e 4 θελαρχὴν ἡβάτο (sc. ή *ψυχή*) ἀπαντον καὶ ἐμφρονος βίον πρὸς τὸν αἴματα χρόνον.

² *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 69.

³ *The Theory of Motion*, etc., p. 111.

'One cannot dismiss the doctrine of a literal creation of the formed universe in time by quoting the saying that time came into being with the universe. This does not imply that there was no duration before the creation of the formed universe. *χρόνος* is the image of eternity moving according to number: it is the *πέρας* imposed upon an *άπειρον* of duration.' To put this in other words, it is periodic time that is meant by *χρόνος*, the 'days and months and years which were not before the universe came into being' (37 e), not time in the sense of mere prior-posterior succession.

Nevertheless it might be thought that what is said at 37 e 4, to the effect that past and future are *χρόνου εἰδη*, compels us to infer that for Plato there was no past or future apart from periodic time. But this I would deny. What he has in mind from 37 e 4 to 38 b 5—a paragraph which he virtually admits to be a digression (38 b 3-5)—is not a contrast between *χρόνος* with its *εἰδη* and a pre-cosmic state of things from which these *εἰδη* are absent, but a contrast between *χρόνος* which necessarily involves the relation of before and after, of past and future, and the timelessness of the eternal intelligible world. What he wants to emphasize is that the terms expressing the *χρόνου εἰδη* are inapplicable to *άδιος οὐσία*: and for that purpose any consideration of conditions before there was an *οὐρανός* with its periodic *χρόνος* is needless and indeed irrelevant. It would therefore be improper to infer from 37 e 4-5 that *ἥν* and *ἔσται* are wrongly used of *τὸ κινούμενον ἀτάκτως*.

VII. Aristotle's words at *de caelo* 279 b 32 ff., especially the word *βοήθειαν*, seem to imply that the reason for Xenocrates putting forward his interpretation was not that he felt any difficulty about the universe having had a beginning in time, or about a pre-cosmic state of things, but that Plato had maintained that a world which had a beginning would not have an end. Presumably Xenocrates, either on his own account, and remembering perhaps the words of the *Republic* (546 a) *γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἔστω*, or on the persuasion of Aristotle, found this incredible. Now Plato does give a defence of this at 41 a-b, in a passage which has indeed special reference to the imperishability of the created gods, but whose opening sentences are perfectly general, i.e. apply to the whole created universe. The world, like any other *γενόμενον*, is not everlasting in its own right (still less is it eternal *qua* timeless, like its *παράδειγμα*); but it will never in fact perish, since its creator will not suffer his own good handiwork to be undone.¹

This solution, I suggest, would seem to Xenocrates and Aristotle merely mythical; but Xenocrates, rather than give up the imperishability, preferred to explain away the becoming. As Vlastos suggests,² he need not have put forward his view as being Plato's own meaning; indeed it seems to me probable that he did not: for to him, as to any unprejudiced reader, the words of the crucial passage must have borne their 'surface' or plain meaning; rather, his position was that of the allegorist who assumes a licence of reinterpretation which he knows to be other than that of his author. If the *Timaeus* was to be accepted (and to reject any work of the Founder was unthinkable), it needed reinterpretation: it needed in fact a *βοήθεια*.

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¹ Cf. 32 c τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σῶμα . . . ἀλυτὸν ὑπό του ἀλλού πλὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ συνδῆσαντος.

² Op. cit., p. 73.

KATAALHPSIS—A NEGLECTED TECHNICAL TERM IN GREEK MUSIC

Σω. ἥκιστ' ἀλλ' οὐράναι Νεφέλαι μεγάλαι θεαὶ ἄνδρασιν ἀργοῖς·
αἵπερ γνώμην καὶ διάλεξιν καὶ νοῦν ἡμῖν παρέχουσιν
καὶ τερατείαν καὶ περίλεξιν καὶ κρούσιν καὶ κατάληψιν.

Aristophanes, *Nub.* 316–18.

THE Scholia on these lines provide divergent interpretations of the abstract nouns, one of the notes on κατάληψις reading as follows: κατάληψιν δὲ εἰώθασιν οἱ μουσικοὶ λέγειν ἐπειδὰν πλήξαντες τοὺς δακτύλους ἡ τῷ πλήκτρῳ τὰς χορδὰς καταλάβωσι καὶ ἀποτείνωσι τὸν φθόγγον.

A slightly different version of this scholium appears in Suidas, s.v. κατάληψις: μουσικῶς δὲ ταῦτα εἶπε. λέγουσι γάρ κατάληψιν ἐπειδὰν καταλάβωσι τῷ πλήκτρῳ ἡ τοὺς δακτύλους τὰς χορδὰς πλήξαντες, ὡς καὶ ἀποτείνεσθαι τὸν φθόγγον.

Although this technical meaning of κατάληψις is duly recorded in the lexica,¹ I am unaware that it has ever been noticed in works specifically devoted to Greek music or the technique of lyre and kithara. Clearly if the statement in the scholia has any authority² it is of great interest for so controversial a subject.

Before considering the nature of the technique here mentioned we should be quite clear what is meant by φθόγγον ἀποτείνειν, as it is implied in schol. *Nub.* and stated unequivocally in Suidas that this is the result of κατάληψις. Now ἀποτείνειν in a musical or acoustical context means ‘to prolong a sound, to cause a sound to resonate’, as is clear from the following passages:

Plato, *Prot.* 329 a ἀλλ' ἔαν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν φθείντων,
ωσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει ἔαν μὴ ἐπλάβηται τις,
καὶ οἱ ρήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου.³

¹ Cf. L.S.J., s.v. κατάληψις ii. 3—‘in Music, stopping of the strings of an instrument’. Older editions oddly rendered ‘a touching of the strings to see that they are in tune’. The term for this acc. to Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 9. 59 was ὑποκρέων. (ὑποκρέων γάρ κυρίως ἔστι τὸ ἡμεῖς ὑπῆχει ἐν τῷ ἀρμόζειν τὴν κιθάραν . . . πρότερον γάρ τῆς κιθάρας ἐφαπτόμενοι ὑποκρέουσαν.) But much of this scholium is far from clear.

² The schol. is not found in R or V, and I have no evidence for its appearance in any specific manuscript before it gained currency from the Aldine edition. Clearly, however, Suidas’ entry is based on a *Clouds* schol. and there is no case for dismissing it as a mere invention of a later age to explain a word of uncertain meaning, particularly if other evidence from antiquity can be adduced for a musical application of κατάληψις or καταλαμβάνων.

³ For ἐπλαυμβάνειν = καταλαμβάνειν v.

infra. Μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνειν (and the like) is of course a commonplace. Cf. also Plut. *Sulla* 7 φωνὴ σᾶλπιγγος ὅ ún ἀποτείνουσαν καὶ θρηνώδη φθόγγον. In Ar. *de An.* 420^b αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ δοα ἀλλα τῶν ἀφίκων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον, the meaning is ‘instruments capable of sustaining a uniform sound of definite pitch’. (Trendelenburg, ad loc., says it includes both ἐπίτρασις and ἀνεσίς; Hicks translates ‘pitch’ or ‘register’ but it is not so much the pitch as the quality of sound which is referred to. Appeal to Aristox. *Harm.* 1. 10 on the ground that ἀπότασις is used like ἐπίτρασις there is not really relevant—Aristoxenus is distinguishing ἐπίτρασις and ἀνεσίς in the usual way with reference to pitch, whereas ἀπότασις is a neutral word. Cf. Ar. *H.A.* 545^a17 (ζώων) δῶν ἔστιν ἀπότασις τῆς φωνῆς—‘where the voice admits of a continuous and prolonged sound’, D’Arcy Thompson correctly.) The *Life of Sophocles* includes among its fabulous

Plut. *Mor.* 721 b δρᾶς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἀγγείων τὰ κενὰ πληττόμενα μᾶλλον ὑπακούει ταῖς πληγαῖς καὶ τὸν ἥχον ἀποτείνει μακράν.¹

If therefore the schol. and Suidas state the facts correctly, *κατάληψις* must mean the seizing or 'stopping' of the string in such a way that the sound is prolonged. We must also bear in mind the important fact that the *κατάληψις* occurs *after* striking the string (*πλήξαντες* aorist).

Now the stopping of a string in modern parlance means the alteration of the vibrating length of a string by pressure of the finger in order to raise the pitch of the note,² and followers of Sachs and Gombosi might well be excited if this literary evidence could be adduced in support of their assumption that a similar technique of finger-stopping (or, as Gombosi preferred, of increasing tension by pressure on the non-sounding part of the string below the bridge) was fundamental to performance on the Greek kithara.³ But in such a procedure the player surely must prepare his string length before, or at most in the act of striking or plucking, which interpretation is precluded by the aorist participle *πλήξαντες*.⁴ Nor is *ἀποτείνειν* in view of the parallels cited likely to be used like *ἐπιτείνειν* of increasing the tension of the string and pitch of the note, and a stopped note is in fact less resonant than that of an open string.

A second possibility is suggested by the description of the playing of the traditional Chinese *ch'in* given by Sachs.⁵ 'The right hand plucks while the left hand taps the strings at a certain spot and glides to the following position without leaving the string and without lessening the pressure. If both hands

anecdotes of the poet's death the story that he choked himself in reading a passage from the *Antigone* without pausing for breath—δύαν ἀποτείναντα τὴν φωνήν (codd.), and I see no cause to alter to *ἐπιτείναντα* with Nauck and Pearson: duration, not pitch, was involved in this ill-fated recitation. Cf. *πνευματικῶς ἀποτείνεσθαι* of declaiming a passage in a single breath in Hermog. *Inv.* 4. 1. [Ar.] *Physiogn.* 806^b26 is puzzling—ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς ἡ μὲν βαρεῖα καὶ ἐπιτείνουμένη ἀνδρεῖον. As *ἐπιτείνειν* in music is consistently associated with raising tension of strings and pitch of notes it is surprising to find it combined with *βαρεῖα* of the male voice. The translators render it 'deep and full voice', etc. *ἀποτείνουμένη* would appear more apposite to the meaning 'resonant', but perhaps the familiar contrast with *ἀνεμένος* (ἢ δὲ ὄξεια καὶ ἀνεμένη δειλὸν) confirms the reading, in which case the words are dissociated from high and low pitch as such. This is a familiar problem to those who have studied the controversial matter of the *σύντονος* and *ἀνεμέναις ἀρμονίαις*, where the use of the terms frequently suggests an 'ethical' rather than musical connotation. Cf. Mountford in *J.H.S.* xl (1920), 23–24.

¹ The similarity of expression here suggests that *ἀποτείνειν* in the *Protagoras* passage is not, strictly speaking, used absolutely, as Adam thought.

² Note that *διάληψις* is so used in Ar. *Pr.* 19. 12 of producing an octave note by halving the vibrating length of the string. This

probably refers to monochord experiments (cf. Theon Smyrnaeus, p. 59; 22 Hiller).

³ For an account of the views of these scholars and a description of the alternative techniques proposed, see the article by R. P. Winnington-Ingram in *C.Q.* vi (n.s. 1956), especially pp. 169 and 183–6, where he demonstrates certain difficulties inherent in their assumptions. Finger-stopping on the kithara had been assumed on the basis of the difficult passage in Plato, *Phlb.* 56 a by J. Curtis in *J.H.S.* xxxiii (1913), 37. I am indebted to Professor Winnington-Ingram for his advice in preparing this article.

⁴ This objection applies also to an interpretation suggested to me by D. Mervyn Jones, that *καταλαμβάνειν* (literally = 'seize or grip', not merely 'stop') might refer to the violent pulling or plucking of the string to produce increased amplitude of vibration and resonance. Cf. [Ar.] *De Aud.* 803^b30 καν̄ τις ἀπηγται τῶν χορδῶν ταῖς χεροῖς βαίνως καὶ μὴ μαλακῶς, ἀναγκῇ καὶ τῷ ἀπαπόδουσιν αὐτὰς οὐτώ πάλιν ποιεῖσθαι βασιοτέραν. (There follow observations on the different tone achieved by plucking at different points of the string.) Forsyth (*Orchestration*, p. 466), writing of the harp, says: 'The string needs to be plucked a fair distance from the vertical if it is to produce a good tone.'

⁵ *The History of Musical Instruments*, p. 188. This instrument corresponds to the Japanese *koto*, the technique of which Gombosi also postulated for the kithara.

play on the same string, the left hand action stops the plucked string but is separately audible as a series of vibratos, glissandi and dull beats.¹ But again *καταλαμβάνειν* does not seem an appropriate word for describing the light touch required for this sophisticated procedure. Thirdly, one might think of the production of harmonics (for which there is some slight evidence in the literature²) through the partial stopping of the open string with the left hand, but neither verb is specially appropriate to describe such an operation.

In fact I have been able to discover only one instrumental technique which seems to follow the series of activities mentioned in the three verbs of the scholium *πλήξαντες*—*καταλάβωσι*—*ἀποτείνωσι*. This is a species of melodic ornamentation used by players of the Indian *vīṇā* and described as follows by Arnold Bake.³ ‘One way of creating these ornaments is to pull the string sideways with the fingers of the left hand after it has been vigorously struck and thus to vary the tension, producing various *śruti*s (i.e. microtones) as long as the vibration lasts.’ Even here a rise of pitch after the first striking of the note would be more appropriately described by *ἐπιτείνειν*, supposing this technique were ever used on the kithara.⁴

I am more inclined to think that *καταλαμβάνειν* in the scholium means not ‘stopping’ in the modern sense but ‘damping’. The kitharist after striking the string with the fingers of his right hand, or with the plectrum, stops the vibration with his left hand in order to articulate the notes more clearly or to produce a staccato effect, the *sons étouffés* of modern harp-playing. Such a left-hand technique has often been assumed from the artistic convention in vase-painting which shows the fingers of the left hand outspread on the strings after the right hand has apparently struck or plucked them, and also from the observation of such a technique in other civilizations.⁵ Thus schol. *Nub.* 318 might be said to provide the ‘positive evidence’ for this relationship of the hands which Winnington-Ingram queried in a recent article.⁶ That this is the most natural meaning for the verb in an acoustical context is confirmed by at least three passages. In Plut. *Mor.* 721 d (the sequel of the passage already quoted) it is used of deadening the sound of a ringing bronze vessel (… μέχρι ἀν ἀφάμενός τις ὠσπερ ἐν ὅδῷ καταλάβῃ καὶ τυφλώσῃ τὸ κένον). Dionysius (*Comp.* ch. 22. 166–7) uses it twice of stopping the voice in the articulation of words in which certain letters follow one another (δεῖ δὲ τοῦ σ οιωπῆ καταληφθέντος τότε ἀκουστὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ξ).

Most important is [Ar.] *Pr.* 19. 42, where the question is asked διὰ τί, ἔάν τις φύλας τὴν νήτην ἐπιλάβῃ, ἡ ὑπάτη μόνον δοκεῖ ὑπηχεῖν; ‘Why is it that if one plucks the string giving nete and then stops it, hypate (i.e. the note an octave below) appears to respond?’ That the acoustical phenomenon referred to here (and in *Pr.* 24) is the reverse of the readily recognizable perception of overtones

¹ See, for example, Düring in *Eranos*, xlvi (1945), 196, and the innovations ascribed to Lysander of Sikyon in Ath. 14. 638 a.

² *The New Oxford History of Music*, i. 223–4. Similarly Sachs (*Rise of Music in the Ancient World*, p. 182) writes of ‘a wail by deflecting the string right after plucking’. Cf. also A. H. Fox Strangways, *The Music of Hindostan*, pp. 182–3.

³ Unless *ἀποτείνειν* could mean ‘stretch

out of tune’, as *ἀπάδειν* = sing out of tune (as Mr. J. G. Landels has suggested to me). This is ingenious, but I doubt if the verb would be used in a musical context outwith its normal signification.

⁴ Cf. Sachs, op. cit., pp. 132–3.

⁵ Loc. cit., p. 183. The author prefers to see in this artistic convention the plucking of the strings with the left hand. I do not mean to deny that it was also used for plucking, for which there is ample evidence.

does not concern us. There is much that is obscure in the rambling answer given, the general purport of which relates to what we call the sympathetic vibration of consonant strings, and which was naturally familiar to Greek musicians. But the explanation of the apparent sounding of the hypate string includes the word ἀκατάληπτος,¹ viz. τὴν μὲν γὰρ νεάτην ἵσμεν ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται ἐπιληφθεῖσα, τὴν δὲ ὑπάτην ἀυτὴν ὄρῶντες ἀκατάληπτον οὖσαν καὶ φθόγγον αὐτῆς ἀκούντες, ταῦτην οἱούμεθα ἡχεῖν. Hypate, unlike nete, is not damped by finger pressure. It is not clear whether any distinction (e.g. of pressure) is implied between ἐπιλαμβάνειν and καταλαμβάνειν.²

But if this is the meaning of *καταλάβηις* and *καταλάβωσι* in schol. *Nub.*, the damped string could in no sense be said to resonate, and we are left with the problem of *kai* ἀποτείνωσι. The alternatives are (1) that the scholiast has not properly understood some text relating to the damping of strings and that the error is repeated in the rephrased entry in Suidas, or (2) that the words have suffered some corruption in transmission which was present already in a common ancestor of both schol. *Nub.* and Suidas. Winnington-Ingram suggests the remedy of reading *kai* ⟨μη⟩ ἀποτείνωσι, or alternatively ἀποτέμνωσι³ or ἀποτέμωσι = cut off the sound.

There remains one other important piece of evidence relating to this function of the left hand in string playing. Quintilian (*Inst. Or.* 1. 12. 3) discussing the ability to engage in a number of simultaneous activities, draws an analogy from singing to the kithara: ‘An vero citharoedi non simul et memoriae et sono vocis et plurimis flexibus serviunt, cum interim alios nervos dextra percurrunt, alios laeva trahunt, continent, praebent.’ In this distribution of the functions of the hands in playing the kithara it cannot be said that the sense of the last three verbs is certain. ‘Pluck, damp, release’ is the usually accepted meaning, and the first two are doubtless correct although *trahere* is hard to parallel in preference to the usual *carpare*.⁴ *Continere* is unlikely to refer to alteration of length and tension of the string in the course of playing. Thus far the Quintilian citation closely parallels the *Clouds* scholium—the striking with the

¹ L.S.J.’s ‘that cannot be reached or touched’ in citing this passage is surely wrong.

² Perhaps ἐπι- means to press on top of the string, *κατ-* to pinch it between two fingers. For ἐπι- cf. Plato, *Prot.* 329 a quoted above, and Plut. *Mor.* 995 f: τῶν χαλκαμάτων τὰ λεπτὰ τὸν φόφους ἐν κίνηλο διαδίδουσι ἀχρι οὐ ἐμφράξῃ καὶ τυφλώσῃ τις τῇ χειρὶ τῆς πληγῆς περιφερομένης ἐπιλαμβανόμενος (cf. *καταλαμβάνειν* in the similar context of *Mor.* 721 d). The verb is used in Theo Smyrnaeus, p. 71. 7 Hiller of the movable bridge of the monochord cutting off part of the string; in [Ar.] *De Aud.* 804^a 15 of closing the speaker hole (?) of the *aulos*. Cf. the common use of stopping the flow of water in the *clepsydra*. Some medical uses of *καταλαμβάνειν* (stopping *πνεῦμα*, etc.) may be consulted in L.S.J. Cf. especially Ar. *de Somn.* 455^{b7} ἐπι δὲ οἱ τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐχένι φλέβας καταλαμβανόμενοι ἀναίσθητοι γίνονται.

³ Suggested also independently to me by

Mervyn Jones. Aor. subj. ἀποτέμνωσι (parallel to *καταλάβωσι*) might have engendered the corruption more readily. The closest parallel I can find of ἀποτέμνειν used metaphorically of cutting short sound is in Aristid. Quint., p. 30. 11 Jahn where it is used of shortening a long vowel in hiatus: τῆς τοῦ καθηγουμένου τόνον μακρότητος ἀποτέμνεται. φθόγγον ἀποτέμνειν in Ptol. *Harm.*, p. 88. 10 Düring is used in the familiar sense of dividing string lengths on the monochord (cf. ἀποτομή of the difference between the *λείμα* and *τόνος* in Gaudentius, pp. 343, 344 Jan.). φθόγγον ἀποτέλειν is a commonplace in the musical writers, but always in the general sense of producing sound rather than the literal sense of bringing the sound to an end.

⁴ *Trahēre* happens to be used of *nervi* (sinews) in Lucr. 6. 1190, where the sense is ‘to contract’. *Tractare* in Ovid (*Am.* 1. 8. 60; *tractat inauratae consona fila lyrae*) is of more general reference than *trahunt* in this context.

plectrum (in right hand),¹ plucking with fingers (of left hand, according to Quintilian), the stopping of the vibration. *Præbent*, however, is most obscure, and the explanation mentioned by Colson² in his edition of Book 1 that 'by removing the finger the string in its natural condition is offered to the right hand' (i.e. for striking again) seems something of a subterfuge in order to extract the meaning 'release' from a verb which is unclear in itself and does not impress as a probable technical term. *Præbent* is in fact probably corrupt.³ *Prohibent* suggests itself readily after *continent*, and while one hesitates to use one emendation to confirm another, it is at least remarkable that this would produce the same series of activities as schol. *Nub.* describes if ἀποτέμωσι be restored there—the string is plucked, damped, and the sound cut off.

So far I have examined the scholium in isolation from the text which it presumes to illuminate, but the question may be asked, has it any relevance to the interpretation of the line, and was *κατάληψις* a technical term of lyre playing in the fifth century? Now it may be said first that if the musical meaning were totally irrelevant to line 318 of the *Clouds*, it is curious that this rather recherché technical meaning was ever attached to a note which otherwise interpreted the word conventionally enough by εῦρεσιν, or τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ αἰσθησιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην (the last word referring to the familiar definition of τέχνη as σύστημα ἐν καταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων)—not that the scholiasts did not sometimes collect different lexical meanings of a single word with or without relevance to the context or reference to their authorities, but the present case is of so singular a nature that it merits further examination.

Κατάληψις, to which the note properly belongs, is coupled in the text with *κροῦσις*, which is one of the most familiar words in the terminology of the playing of stringed instruments. There is every probability that the words were, in combination, suggestive of the musician's vocabulary, and I suspect that the scholium originated not merely in the recording of a specialized (but irrelevant) meaning of *κατάληψις* gleaned from another source, but as an interpretation of the metaphorical application of the whole phrase καὶ κροῦσιν καὶ κατάληψιν. That this is so is suggested by the introductory words in Suidas' version, μουσικῶς δὲ ταῦτα εἰπε, and by the form of the note itself πλήξαντες . . . καταλάβωσι.

The same combination of words recurs in *Eg.* 1379–80—κρουστικὸς | καταληπτικὸς τ' ἄριστα τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ—referring in caricature of current 'high-brow' vocabulary to the politician Phaeax. This is clearly not mere coincidence, and suggests that the terms have a peculiarly close connexion with each other, It will also be observed that a musical metaphor here is most appropriate—the

¹ There is a v.l. *percutiunt*, but with less good manuscript authority.

² Colson also records a different interpretation by Canon Galpin (q.v.), but *præbent* is no more satisfactory a word for the action described.

³ The second hand of codex Bg gives *prement*, an attempted correction with no probable authority, although *premere* would give a possible meaning. A number of older texts of Quintilian and lexica quote the passage with *probant* which is also presumably an early emendation as no manuscript is cited. This would mean 'check the

tuning of the string', a plausible enough phrase: cf. h. *Merc.* 53, etc. (*χορδάς*) πλήκτρῳ ἐπειρήσῃς κατά μέρος; Hom. *Od.* 21. 410 πειρήσαρτο νεύρης (where the bow is likened to *kithara*); Ovid, *Met.* 5. 339 (cf. ib. 10. 145) *praetent police chordas* (which verb indeed might also have given rise to *præbent* through *praetent* with haplography); Statius, *Ach.* 1. 187 *leviterque expertas police chordas*. But why should the citharoedus be testing the string at the same time as he sings? To give the correct pitch to the voice? But *trahunt*, *continent*, X suggests a more uniform series of operations.

skilled orator plays upon his audience, alternately rousing and quelling them by the power of his rhetoric: *καταληπτικός τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ* = capable of putting a damper on the noisy rabble (or of ‘disconcerting’ them, to use an allied English metaphor). I have no doubt that the scholiast’s explanation of the phrase (*προκαταλαμβανόμενος τὸς ἀκούοντας ὥστε θόρυβον μὴ κυῆσαι*) is basically correct, and that van Leeuwen’s ‘seizing on what will cause θόρυβος’ (*qui corrīpit quod plausum capet*) is improbable. The ribald riposte in the following line, *οὐκον καταδακτυλικός σὺ τοῦ λαλητικοῦ, sensu obscoeno*, obviously mimics Demus’ last words, and so would presumably have to mean *καταδακτυλικός* of what will cause loquacity.¹

Even if we omit the suggestion of a musical metaphor it may be observed that *καταλαμβάνειν*, in extension of its meanings ‘overtake, seize, grasp, etc.’, shares with the similar verb *κατέχειν* the meanings ‘suppress, quell, blot out’. When one stops the ears (Plut. *Mor.* 1095 e) or the eyes (Plat. *Theaet.* 165 b) with the hand, one does not grasp the organ but obstruct by application of pressure.² *Κατέχειν* is used by Aristophanes very much like *καταληπτικός* here in a rhetorical context in *Eccl.* 434 ὁ δὲ κατέχει τῇ βοῇ (sc. αὐτούς)—‘he reduced them to silence by his outcry’, and this I take to be the sense of *κατέχειν* also in the controversial phrase of the Hippocleides story in Hdt. 6. 129 *κατέχων πολλὸν τὸς ἄλλους*—in the display of after-dinner speaking he quite ‘eclipsed’ the rest of the competitors. Finally, as we observed that *ἐπι-* and *κατα-**λαμβάνω* were interchangeable of stopping the sound of a vibrating string or metal, it is interesting that Plutarch (*Mor.* 713 f) uses *ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι* of suppressing a noisy debate.³

While I have suggested that the musical word-play was both intended by Aristophanes and sensible to an audience composed of men who themselves in their youth had gone *εὐτάκτως εἰς κιθαριστῶν* and were familiar with the jargon of such sophist-musicians as Konnos (who was the subject of the play of Ameipsias which beat the *Clouds* for second place in 423 B.C.), I do not deny that the words in the context of the *Clouds* refer to the verbal dexterity of the modern sophists.⁴ *Κροῦσσων* doubtless means the striking power of their words or arguments (as Lucian referred to Demosthenes’ *κρονοτικόν*); *κατάληψις* may mean their quickness of comprehension, their ‘grasp’ of a subject,⁵ but should we not insist on consistency of usage here and in *Eq.* 1380 in view of the identity of phraseology? And ‘quick to comprehend the noisy’ has no meaning. Moreover, the other three nouns of line 318 refer not subjectively to the sophists’ mental abilities but externally to their coercive effect on their opponents, their power of confounding, out-talking,⁶ striking home—qualities so well exemplified

¹ If the preceding words were immediately comprehensible (as I believe) as punning on musical terminology, *καταδακτυλικός* may even extend, indecorately, this train of thought in characteristic Aristophanic fashion. Cf. Pollux 4. 66 τὸ μέντοι τῶν ψιλῶν κιθαριστῶν ὅργανον ὃ καὶ Πυθικὸν ὄνομάζεται δακτυλικὸν τυες κεκλήκασιν; Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 651 κατὰ δάκτυλον ἔστι δὲ ῥύθμοις καὶ κρούμασις εἶδος τὸ κατὰ δάκτυλον φράνται οἱ ἀνδραι πρὸ τοῦ νόμου. The *Knights* also contains the elaborate pun on *Δωριστί-Δωροδοκιστί* (985 ff.). Cf. also 532–3.

² Cf. also Plut. *Mor.* 932 a, e (of the

shadow of the moon obstructing vision).

³ For *κατέχω* of stopping noise cf. Plut. *Mor.* 414 c; id. *Pompey* 22. Cf. *καταλαμβάνω* of suppressing quarrels in Hdt. 3. 128; 7. 9.

⁴ Professor Dover (whose opinion I sought before writing this article) writes: ‘The context is verbal and dialectical rather than musical.’

⁵ *Dem. Enc.* 32.

⁶ But in fact neither *καταλαμβάνω* nor its cognates are so used elsewhere in fifth-century literature, and rarely even in Plato.

⁷ *περι-* here is intensive. Cf. Radermacher on Ar. *Ran.* 839.

later in the comedy in the rhetorical battle of the *λόγοι*. The notion of suppressing or quelling, derived from the musical meaning of *κατάληψις*, is much more appropriate to the context and agrees with the use of *καταληπτικός* in the *Knights*. Starkie's translation 'spell-binding' is perhaps not far off the mark.

If this interpretation of the scholium and the line itself is justified, we have a valuable piece of evidence about the playing of the lyre and kithara in the classical period, and a technical term of the practising musician which has been unduly neglected. If it is thought surprising that there is so little additional evidence for the word in the musical writers, it should be remembered that most of the extant works on music are handbooks confined almost exclusively to history and theory, in which remarkably little about actual performance of music is recorded. But when Konnos taught Socrates and his less distinguished pupils to damp the lyre strings as they played, he must have had a word for it, and that word I believe was *κατάληψις*.

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THE ESCAPE FROM PLATAEA: THUCYDIDES 3. 23

IN the summer of 429 B.C. the joint Peloponnesian and Boeotian army left behind at Plataea excavated two ditches round the city, and in the space between them built from the clay thus obtained two circuit-walls 16 feet apart. These they roofed over to give in effect a single broad wall, on the top of which they built (in addition to battlements along each side) at regular intervals, and of the same width as the wall itself, a series of towers to serve as cover in bad weather for the duty-picket. (The considerateness was misguided, as events proved, since progress round the top of the wall was now possible only by passing through these towers; and the capture of two adjacent towers by a small party would mean that the wall was effectively breached.) When building operations were over, and the majority had, in the normal way, withdrawn, those left behind were quartered at ground level inside the wall, pickets no doubt passing to and from duty by way of internal ladders leading into the towers. Apart from the various groups who supplied these pickets (and who, when not actually on duty themselves, were naturally liable to be called up to their own particular section of the wall in an emergency), there was also a special body of 300 men whose sole task, in the event of a threatened break-out, was to dash outside the wall and either cut off those attempting to escape before they could cross the outer ditch, or, if too late for that, pursue them beyond it.¹

In the winter of 428 B.C. some 220 Plataeans began their escape on a rainy night. Throughout, they confined their attentions to a single section of the wall, hoping initially that it might even be possible to make a secret escape over the now vacant *μεραπίρυνον*. But the alarm was soon raised, and the Plataeans who had been charged with the task at once seized the two adjacent towers and

¹ In this preliminary summary I have followed Professor Gomme, apart from his qualifications regarding the quarters and the role of the 300. (See his note on 22. 7.) That they must have been inside the wall along with the rest seems to me to be beyond any reasonable doubt: (i) The Plataean plan of action (which was obviously based on a thorough knowledge of the enemy disposition) involved an about-turn when they were over the outer ditch, and a rendezvous there before they took to the road; which indicates that once across they knew they had no fresh enemy concentration to fear. (Cf. below, and note *ἐχώποντας άθρόν*, 24. 1.) (ii) Thucydides distinguishes the 300 from the rest only with regard to their function (22. 7); but if they were, in addition, quartered in a separate camp outside, that was surely an important factor in the situation, deserving mention if not emphasis. (iii) It is difficult to imagine that one and the same planner provided one section of the Peloponnesian force with shelter not only off duty, but on it as well,

and left the other outside in all weathers. As for their role: there were only two eventualities to be feared: a surprise Athenian attack, and a Plataean break-out. But the outer wall was built to deal with the first threat (21. 1). (Note, by the way, the difficult nature of its ditch, 23. 4 f., as against the evidently simple crossing (even with ladders to carry) of the inner, 22. 1.) And a mere 300 men (necessarily unaided) were surely not expected to fight an Athenian army outside it. They were there, then, to deal with a Plataean break-out: which surely settles their location as well. For if they really were stationed outside the siege-works to start with, it could only have been because there they would be well placed to block the progress of any escaping Plataeans while these were still helpless in the outer ditch. What on earth, then, made them recross that ditch, and nullify that advantage, before making contact with the enemy? For it is inside it that they make their attack (23. 3).

helped others to climb on to their roofs. The wall was thus breached, and the main party could now abandon caution and swarm over:

(3. 23. 1 ff.) οἱ δὲ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους πολλὰς προσθέτες κλίμακας ἄμα καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες διὰ τοῦ μεταπυργίου ὑπερβάνον. ὁ δὲ διακομιζόμενος αἰεὶ ἵστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἡκόντιζον, εἴ τις παραβοηθῶν παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος κωλυτής γύγνοιτο τῆς διαβάσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες διεπεπεραίνοντο, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων χαλεπῶς οἱ τελευταῖοι καταβαίνοντες ἔχωροι ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτοῖς ἐπεφέροντο λαμπάδας ἔχοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πλαταιῆς ἔκεινοις ἔώρων μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἐστῶτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου, καὶ ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἐσ-ηκόντιζον ἐς τὰ γυμνά, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ὅντες ἥσσον διὰ τὰς λαμπάδας καθεωράντο, ὥστε φύλαντο τῶν Πλαταιῶν καὶ οἱ ὕστατοι διαβάτες τὴν τάφρον.

Professor Gomme emends ὁ δὲ διακομιζόμενος ff. by deleting τῆς τάφρου and reading τοῦ τεῖχους for τοῦ χείλους. Down to διεπεπεραίνοντο then refers to the scaling of the wall, and ὁ δὲ διακομιζόμενος ff. means that each man as he was getting over the wall paused for a few moments at the tops of the ladders in order to cover comrades already on the way down. When all the main group had thus got over the wall, they were joined at the ditch by those who had been in and on top of the towers, and began, along with them, to cross it. The 300, meanwhile, came up to stop them, but a covering party (probably on the near side of the ditch, and perhaps changing in personnel) dealt with these, and all got safely across.

Now it seems to me that this reconstruction in itself is improbable. When the alarm was given (as the first sentence in the quotation vividly illustrates), the most vital necessity from the Platæan standpoint was speed: for a rapid enemy counterattack along the inside of the outer ditch must have seemed to them an obvious possibility, whether they knew about the 300 or not. It is therefore unlikely that each man in the main group paused before descending his ladder, even 'for a few moments' (the text, by the way, says only ἵστατο), since a series of such pauses would soon add up to dangerous delay. Moreover, there was no need for members of the main group to provide their own cover in this way: the men up on the tower-roofs could surely shoot at anyone threatening the ladders from below, with less likelihood of hitting their own men in the process. This, indeed, may well have been their main purpose, since those inside the towers (now in effect small forts) could hold back the enemy on the wall itself, and according to Thucydides were already doing so.¹ (No doubt they were on top of the towers partly also to watch out for enemy scaling-attempts, and to leave the wall itself clear for the main group to swarm over unimpeded.) The same two arguments apply also to the notion of a covering

¹ ἐφύλασσον μηδένα δι' αὐτῶν ἐπιβοηθεῖν,
23. 1. Later in the same sentence, having already clearly stated where these two groups were, he says (referring to both groups together) οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων τοὺς ἐπιβοηθοῦντας καὶ κάτωθεν καὶ ἀνωθεν εἵργον βάλλοντες. Without exception, as far as I am aware, the adverbs are associated by translators and commentators with εἵργον βάλλοντες: yet it is surely possible, especially in view of the disjointed style of this passage, that they are something of an afterthought

qualifying τοὺς ἐπιβοηθοῦντας. And if we translate 'from the towers these warded off with missiles those counterattacking both down below and on the wall itself', the phrase, instead of being a superfluous clarification of ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων, makes explicit a significant point about the Platæan stratagem which has otherwise (in any case) to be inferred. (κάτωθεν and ἀνωθεν also mean what we expect them to mean when a siege-wall is involved.)

party in front of the outer ditch, about which Professor Gomme is more vague. Progress inside the danger area would again be slowed up if men delayed there by turns to cover others already crossing; and they would have no need to do so. For the ditch was surely not too far distant for its near side to be initially the responsibility of the men on the tower-roofs; and very soon those safely across could turn and take over from them.

Nor do I believe that the emendation on which this reconstruction is based is in fact necessary. Professor Gomme resorts to it for three reasons (I leave the main one to the last): (i) He finds the first *ἐπὶ τοῦ χεῖλους τῆς τάφρου* hard to believe because of the clumsy repetition a few lines later 'not only of the locality, but of the action'. But clumsiness is common hereabouts: the opening sentence of 3. 23 must be one of the clumsiest in Thucydides. And if the repetition still seems awkward enough to arouse suspicion, one would surely most naturally suspect the second occurrence of the phrase rather than the first, *ἔστωτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χεῖλους τῆς τάφρου* looking very much like a gloss on *ἐκ τοῦ σκότους*. (ii) Professor Gomme suggests that if *τῆς τάφρου* were really correct, we should expect *ἔξω* with it to distinguish it from the inner ditch. But that was most emphatically left behind at the start (22. 1), and no confusion is possible. Rather would one expect clarification of which *χεῖλος* is involved, but that too the reader is left to infer for himself from the context. (Contrast this with the later mention, in retrospect, of the capture of an archer *ἐπὶ τῇ ἔξω τάφρῳ*, where the reader has of course no such context to help him, 24. 2.) (iii) But the crux of the matter I take to be Professor Gomme's interpretation of *ὁ δὲ διακομίζομενος* ff. (a) He associates *διακομίζομενος* closely with the immediately preceding *ὑπερέβανον*, and concludes that 'over the wall' must be (again) implicit. But 'over the wall' is not necessarily understood even with *ὑπερέβανον*, since the verb is used absolutely in this passage to describe the whole operation, including the crossing of the ditches (cf. 23. 1 and especially 24. 3). Here it may well mean little more than 'they continued the operation'. There is thus no harshness involved in immediately understanding 'over the ditch' with *ὁ δὲ διακομίζομενος*. Indeed the use of *διακομίζομενος* prepares us for that: Essen cites thirteen other occurrences of this verb in Thucydides, and in every case the crossing of water is involved. To insert *τοῦ τείχους* here, then, can scarcely be right; and the use of *διεπεπεράντο* to indicate the completion of the *διακομίδη* confirms that, since, again, this verb is normally concerned with the crossing of water (cf. Thuc. 8. 32. 2, Hdt. 2. 124, 5. 23, 8. 25). (b) Nor does Professor Gomme seem to me to assess the tenses correctly. *ὁ δὲ διακομίζομενος* he construes as 'each man as he was getting over the wall'. But *διακομίζομενος*, standing as it does with an imperfect indicative, can if necessary represent action completed before the verb itself comes into operation, its present form merely indicating repetition. 3. 23. 3 *καταβαίνοντες ἔχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρουν* illustrates the relationship: 'after descending the wall, they would proceed to the ditch' (as opposed, for example, to *τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες* (not repeated) *ὑπερέβανον*, 23. 1, or indeed *ἔθορυβοῦντο κατὰ χώραν μένοντες* (ordinary present participle), 22. 6). The other factors involved, viz. the singular participial phrase to denote a series, and the idiomatic *αιεὶ* to denote the invariable combination of both actions throughout that series¹ (it is irrelevant where *αιεὶ* is placed in such phrases, of course—it belongs equally to main verb and participle) do not affect the issue. Cf. 4. 68. 1 *οἱ αἰεὶ ἐντὸς γιγνόμενος*

¹ A favourite with Thucydides: cf. 1. 11. 1, 1. 11. 2, 1. 22. 1, etc.

ἐχώρει¹ ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος, 'each man after getting inside invariably went to the wall'.

In conclusion, then, it seems to me that the text must be preserved and δὲ διακομένος f. construed to mean: 'and each man after crossing the ditch invariably stood on its outer edge and from there discharged arrows and javelins'. This phase of the operation then fits into the others with that smoothness and precision which characterizes the whole enterprise, making it seem almost too good to be true. And yet it must have been so: for only thus could 212 men have escaped from a beleaguered city and suffered but a single casualty.³

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¹ There is a v.l. *χωρεῖ*, the result no doubt of an understandable, but unnecessary, reaction to *γενόμενος*.

² I take this to be the traditional interpretation of the passage, though English translations are generally too obscure for one to be certain what they mean. (Cf., for

example, the Loeb translation by C. F. Smith: 'Meanwhile the main body . . . were climbing over through the space between the towers. And as each one got over (?) he halted on the (?) edge of the ditch.'

³ Of the original 220 or so (20. 2) a few had meanwhile turned back (24. 2).

KIDS AND WOLVES

(An interpretation of Callimachus, fr. 202. 69–70 Pf.)

65 ‘... τὴν Αθηναίης δὲ καὶ ἔέρων δόσιν,
καίπερ εὖ σμιλῆσιν ἡκριβωμένην,

οὐ πρόσω φοιτέων ἀμαρώσει χρόνος·

ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ τῇ παιδὶ καλλίστῃ δόσις,

ἔστ’ ἐμὸν γένειον ἀγνενή τριχός

70 καὶ ἐρίφοις χαίρωσιν ἄπταγες λύκοι . . .’.

THIS text has a curious history. R. Pfeiffer's first reconstruction¹ of this particular fragment from Callimachus' twelfth *Iambus* was based on P. Oxy. 1011. Soon afterwards, C. Bonner discovered fourteen lines, including these, on a Michigan Papyrus.² The new parallel text was obviously in better condition than the P. Oxy. Bonner communicated his discovery to the editor of Callimachus who published it in the Addenda of the second and final volume.³ It not only confirms the conjectures of E. A. Barber (v. 65), P. Maas (v. 63), and M. T. Smiley (v. 66), but offers an unexpected word at the beginning of the last line, *καὶ ἐρίφοις, et haedis*, where Lobel had originally thought of *κυλ]άφοις et cervis*.

What is the meaning of this line, as it stands now? Did Callimachus actually write *dum haedis delectentur lupi*? Pfeiffer, in 1953, still had his doubts. Following a suggestion of E. Fraenkel, he considered tentatively

καὶ ἐρίφοις χράσιν . . .

dum haedis ingruant lupi, after *Iliad* 16. 352. I believe that the text can be maintained—if one agrees on a rather special interpretation of the 'kids' and the 'wolves'.

Recently, E. Grassi⁴ has shown the way, but has not followed it to the end. In order to defend *χαίρωσιν* he quotes two passages, one from Plato, and one from Vergil. The former seems to me very much to the point: Plato, *Phaedrus* 241 d ὡς λύκοι ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς παιδὰ φύλοντας ἐρασταί.⁵ The second passage quoted by Grassi refers to the situation⁶ which Callimachus has in mind: Vergil, *ecl. 2. 63 ff. torva leaena lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam, | florentem cytism sequitur lasciva capella, | te Corydon, ò Alexi: trahit sua quemque voluptas.*

Grassi concludes: 'In rapporto di predazione, come è quello tra lupi e capretti, il predatore gode del predato, anche se non vale l'inverso.' This conclusion puts a little too much emphasis on Virgil's *voluptas* which has slightly different meanings in the same context, just as *sequitur* is not employed in

¹ Callimachus, ed. R. Pfeiffer, i (1949), 204.

² P. Mich. Inv. 4947, published by C. Bonner in *Aegyptus*, xxxi (1951), 133 ff.

³ Callimachus, ii (1953), 119.

⁴ In *La Parola del Passato*, xi (1956), 207–8.

⁵ Two slight textual changes, first proposed by Bekker and accepted by Haupt and others, but not by Burnet, turn this sentence

into a hexameter: ἀπν’ . . . ἀγαπῶς’.

⁶ Is it conceivable that Vergil uses the terms *lupus* and *capella* in the same sense as Callimachus? Nothing in Theocr. 10. 29–30 suggests *lasciva* and *voluptas*. But the parallelism between Corydon, the 'wolf' (?), and Alexis, the 'kid' (?), is apparently disturbed by the two other illustrations, modifying, as they do, the sense of *voluptas*.

exactly the same sense throughout these three lines. In the passage from Callimachus, only one connotation of *voluptas* is present, that of sexual enjoyment. Grassi has not been aware that Callimachus plays with two terms of the *sermo amatorius*. The 'wolf' is a nickname for the *φιλόπαις*, the 'kid' stands for the boy whose beard has just begun to grow, and the 'lamb' (in Plato) is the young, smooth-faced boy. To be even more specific—Callimachus alludes to himself; he is one of the 'wolves', and for a very practical reason which we shall see below he substitutes the 'kids' for the much more desirable 'lambs'.

In an epigram of Lucilius, *Anth. Pal.* 11. 216:

Τὸν φιλόπαιδα Κράτιππον ἀκούσατε· θαῦμα γὰρ ὑμῖν
κανὸν ἀπαγγέλλω πλὴν μεγάλαι Νεμέεις.
τὸν φιλόπαιδα Κράτιππον ἀνεύρομεν ἄλλο γένος τι
τῶν ἐτεροήλων. ἥλπια τοῦτ' ἂν ἔγω;
ἥλπια τοῦτο, Κράτιππε· μανῆσομαι εἰ, λύκος εἶναι
πᾶς λέγων, ἐφάνης ἔξαπίνης ἔριφος;

the 'wolf' is clearly the *φιλόπαις*, and the 'kid' must be the grown-up *pathicus* or¹ *cinaedus pilosus*.

The love of a 'lamb' is the 'wolf's' delight. Plato seems to quote a proverb which appears in several variations in the Homeric Scholia:

(a) On *Iliad* 22. 263 οὐδὲ λύκοι καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν the Scholion (B) mentions a proverb οὐτως φιλοῦσι λύκοι τοὺς ἄρνας ὡς φιλέουσι νέον ἔρασται [φιλέουσι ἀντεραστάι cod.: em. Haupt]. As a companion-piece, we find (in V), to the same line, a different version: ἄρνα φιλοῦσι λύκοι νέον ὡς φιλέουσιν ἔρασται [τὴν ἔρωμένην add. cod.: del. Haupt tamqu. add. a scriba intell. ἄρνα . . . νέον].² The *Schol. Townl.* give it in a shorter form 〈ὡς λύκοι〉 ἄρνα, φιλοῦσιν ἔρασται.³

(b) On *Iliad* 1. 209 ἄμφω ὅμως θυμῷ φιλέοντα τε κηδομένη τε the Scholia (A, B) note οὐ πᾶς δὲ ὁ φιλῶν κτήσεται, ὡς λύκοι ἄρνα.⁴

In all these testimonies the 'lamb' stands for a young beardless boy, and the 'wolf' for the grown-up *φιλόπαις*. This terminology was still alive in Lucilius' time. Strato, who seems to be roughly his contemporary,⁵ tells us in an epigram of his *Musa puerilis*:

Νυκτεριήν ἐπίκωμος ἀνὴν μεταδόρπιον ὥρην
ἄρνα λύκος θυρέτρος εὐρόν ἐφεστάστα,
νίδν Άριστοδίκου τοῦ γείτονος· ὃν περιπλεχθεὶς
ἔξεφίλουν ὄρκοι πολλὰ χαριζόμενος.
νῦν δ' αὐτῷ τί φέρων δωρήσομαι; οὐτ' ἀπάτης γὰρ
ἀξιος, 'Εσπερίης οὐτ' ἐπιορκοσύνης. (Anth. Pal. 12. 250)

The use of these terms in Lucilius and Strato is probably more than a literary reminiscence. There is evidence, however, that both epigrammatists⁶ were thoroughly familiar with Callimachus whom they imitate here and there.

¹ As L.S.J. translate, adopting in the *Addenda et Corrigenda* Dübner's note on this epigram.

² iv. 294 ed. Dindorf; ii. 596 ed. Bekker.

³ Ed. Maass, ii. 390.

⁴ i. 34; iii. 41 ed. Dindorf; cf. Diogenian. 8. 76, *Paroemiographi Graeci*, p. 320 ed. v. Leutsch-Schneidewin. These scholia have been admirably discussed by M. Haupt, *Opusc.* ii. 204–5.

⁵ Strato lived under Nero, according to

R. Keydell: *Hermes*, lxxx (1952), 499–500. Lucilius is dated by *Anth. Pal.* 9. 572. 8 Καίσαρ . . . Νέρων (see W. Theiler, *Stud. Ital. Fil. Cl.* [1955], p. 572).

⁶ For Lucilius see Pfeiffer on *Call. fr.* 267; cf. fr. 2. 5 and *Anth. Pal.* 11. 183. 5; fr. 194. 80 and *Anth. Pal.* 11. 316. For Strato cf. *Call. fr.* 1. 20 and *Anth. Pal.* 12. 4. 6; fr. 43. 83 and *Anth. Pal.* 12. 205. 1, fr. 687 and *Anth. Pal.* 12. 229.

The situation which Strato outlines is typical. It is always the 'lamb' that attracts the 'wolves'; they despise and ridicule the 'kid'. We learn about this discrimination from other epigrams of the *Greek Anthology*, in which rejected lovers threaten conceited youths with the curse of Nemesis. Strato, *Anth. Pal.* 12. 229,¹ observes that the beauty of Alexis has yielded to the *τριχάλεππος δάιμων*.² Elsewhere, *Anth. Pal.* 12. 191, he declares that a boy has turned from Troilus into Priamus³ overnight, because his beard has begun to grow.

When a former *puer delicatus* has reached this stage, he should consider himself punished for his greediness and fickleness—this is the implication behind almost all these epigrams. Tibullus, in one of his Marathus-poems,⁴ 1. 8. 31–32, is told by the god Priapus himself that *carior est auro iuvenis cui levia fulgent | ora nec amplexus aspera barba terit*. After that, his appeal declines rapidly, and there are no more precious gifts; hence the request in *Priap.* 3. 3–4 *da mihi quod cupies frustra dare forsitan olim, | cum tenet obsessas invida barba genas*. Furthermore, this change very often means that the boy is no longer interested in a homosexual relationship: Catullus, *c.* 61. 129 ff.⁵ *sordebant tibi vilcae, | concubine, hodie atque heri: | nunc tuum cinerarius | tondet os. . . .*⁶

The growing beard alone does not always discourage a determined 'wolf'; but when he sees the hair on the boy's legs⁷ his desire vanishes altogether. Automedon notes with heavy sarcasm, *Anth. Pal.* 11. 326 *ἡλθες ἔσω μάνδρης, ὑπερίφανε,* meaning *in caulam venisti, id est: iam hirco similior es quam puer*.⁸ Catullus, who distinguishes between *pueri* and *pilosoi*, *c.* 16. 8 ff., predicts in one of his savage invectives, *c.* 33. 7–8 *natis pilosas, fili, non potes asse venditare.* In the eyes of the φύλόποι, such a boy is no 'lamb', no 'kid', but 'a shaggy he-goat' (anon. *Anth. Pal.* 11. 51).⁹

After having established the existence of such a terminology, we can return to Callimachus. In the twelfth *Iambus* the poet offers a gift of song at the ἐβδομά, the 'seventh-day feast' of Leon's little daughter. As a divine prototype to his gift, he introduces the song recited by Apollo at the ἐβδομά of Hera's daughter Hebe. Apollo is the speaker in vv. 54–70. He admires politely the gifts of Athene and other gods but predicts that they will be 'rendered obscure' by time. His gift, on the other hand, is the most beautiful gift for the girl, as long as his chin is smooth and as long as 'wolves' enjoy 'kids'.

¹ Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 12. 195. 7–8.

² There is a pun on *τρίχα-* and *λεπτός*. Strato seems to be fond of such euphemisms; cf. *Anth. Pal.* 12. 21. 6 and 176. 4.

³ Cf. *Call. fr.* 491.

⁴ The reminiscences from Callimachus in this group of elegies (Tib. 1. 4, 8, 9) have been collected and discussed by Christopher M. Dawson, *Am. J. Ph.* lxvii (1946), 1 ff. (In 1. 8 Tibullus loves Marathus, but Marathus loves Pholoe; one is tempted to compare this situation with the bucolic imagery in Virgil's second *Eclogue*; cf. Gow on Theocr. 6. 17).

⁵ Cf. Phanias, *Anth. Pal.* 12. 31. 3–4 *ἥδη γάρ καὶ μηρὸς ὑπὸ τρίχα, καὶ γένος ἥβᾳ, | καὶ Πόθος εἰς ἔτερην λοιπὸν ἀγε μανῆν.*

⁶ Here, the verb *tondet*, as Ellis notes in his commentary, 'perhaps includes not only the shaving of the first hair on the cheeks and

chin . . . ; but the removal of the long locks habitually worn by *delicati* . . .'; cf. Hor. *c.* 4. 12. 2–3.

⁷ Phanias, *Anth. Pal.* 12. 31—or elsewhere, Alcaeus Mess. *Anth. Pal.* 12. 30; Meleager 33.

⁸ Correctly interpreted by Dübner in his note ad loc.

⁹ Several epigrams of this kind were already collected by Meleager, in his *Garland* (above, n. 7); a few more appear in Philippus' *Garland*: Tullius Laureas, *Anth. Pal.* 12. 24; Statilius Flaccus 25–27; Automedon 11. 326; Diocles 12. 35; Philippus 11. 36; perhaps also Asclepiades of Adramytium, 12. 36, because of the similarity to Philippus' epigram. Lucilius and Strato, as we have said above (p. 35, n. 5), seem to have been contemporaries; Fronto, 12. 174 and 233, is probably younger than both.

With these two examples the speaker claims to celebrate the permanence of his song, in the manner of the 'Homeric' epigram:

Χαλκῆ παρθένος εἴμι, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σύμπατη κείματι.
ἔστ' ἀν νῦντος τε νάγη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλη,
αὐτοῦ τῆδε μένουσα . . .

The first example is very appropriate. Apollo is indeed forever youthful, as Tibullus, in another poem of his Marathus-cycle says, 1. 4. 36 *solis aeterna est Baccho Phoeboque iuventas*. In a sense Apollo is the prototype of the eternal *puer delicatus*. When Ovid describes the beauty of Narcissus, he compares him to Apollo and Dionysus, *met.* 3. 321–2 *et dignos Baccho, dignos et Apolline crines, | impubesque genas et eburnea colla*. Apollo's chin will always be smooth, his hair always long, and he will always represent the 'wolf's' ideal of beauty which is unattainable.

Is the second example appropriate, too? Generally speaking, no, for 'wolves', whenever it is possible, prefer 'lambs'. But in one particular case the example fits. Whenever the 'wolf' is too poor to attract a *puer delicatus*, he has to content himself with the second best. Callimachus is a 'wolf' himself—we know this from his epigrams and from other fragments of his *Iambi*; he is also poor and complains more than once about the greediness and arrogance of the handsome boys with whom he claims to have fallen in love.¹ In the case of Callimachus, the penniless poet who has given up the hope of being rich some day, the example is meaningful. Here is one 'wolf' who will always be forced to enjoy 'kids'. From the point of view of the god who casts an amused side-glance at the poet, both illustrations—his own youth, and Callimachus' empty pocket—achieve exactly what they are meant to achieve. They confirm the permanent value of his song, because they are permanent themselves.

The passage, viewed in this light, offers a curious example of Callimachus' sense of humour. Into the speech of a god, he inserts an erotic joke, aimed at his own, Callimachus', ambitions and frustrations, mirroring his personal, somewhat shabby existence—and all this in a birthday poem for the little daughter of one of his fellow citizens! If we had to attach a label to this kind of humour, we should probably call it 'romantic irony'. It is based on the *ἀπροσδόκητον*, the strong intentional contrast between the solemn ring of v. 67

ὅ πρόσω φοιτέων ἀμαυρώσει χρόνος,

and the slightly disreputable allusion in v. 70. We recognize the Alexandrian technique which aims at the surprising, the puzzling, the shocking. Callimachus' Apollo had a choice of a dozen or more conventional hyperbolae and *ἀδύνατα*, cosmic and otherwise,² but he selects his illustrations from the poet's own intimate range of interests, and scorns the traditional elements of the *encomium*. Once more Callimachus' art reveals its intensely personal character; the poet himself breaks through the literary form where we least expect him.

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¹ Call. epp. 28–32; 41–42. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung*, i. 171 ff.; Pfeiffer on fr. 193. 17.

² e.g. in the 'Homeric' epigram quoted

above; also Leonidas Tar. *Anth. Pal.* 9. 24; Philippus Thess. 9. 575; anon. (probably Byzantine period) 9. 821; Virg. *Aen.* 1. 607 ff.; Seneca, *Herc. Oet.* 1582 ff.

THUCYDIDES 2. 40. 1

φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας.

THIS sentence has been much quoted but not understood. The first part contains an acknowledged difficulty—as Gomme¹ says, ‘It is difficult to be happy about this clause’—and the meaning of *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* has been uncritically accepted as ‘culture’ or ‘philosophy’, although, in fact, it is more closely specified than those terms allow. I shall offer below an explanation which, I hope, accounts for the facts more satisfactorily than the current glosses and translations.

Before coming to matters of detail I wish to make the following observations. First, the two assertions in this famous sentence both have the air of paradoxes. It is asserted that something is true of Athens which is not generally true of states, as of Sparta,² or is not thought by other states to be the case. They are paradoxes designed to challenge ‘commonplace’ ideas or generally held opinions (*ἔνδοξα*).³ If this is agreed, it ought also to be possible to detect what ‘commonplaces’ precisely are here challenged. In the case of the second paradox (*φιλοσοφοῦμεν . . .*), where the general sense is plain, this is not a difficult matter. The sense is—‘we Athenians can reflect and also be brave’, and the ‘commonplace’ in view is therefore ‘thinking is an impediment to action, or incompatible with courage in action’. This is shown by parts of 2. 40, where Pericles asserts that for other people *λογισμός* brings *όκνος*, whereas *ἀμάθια* brings them confidence. If, therefore, we can detect the ‘commonplace’ which belongs to the first paradox, we shall be able to assess the meaning of the first paradox itself.

Secondly, Pericles is describing how Athens achieves two things; she can live a full and varied life in peace and can also carry on war more successfully than other states. It is plain from the second paradox that *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* refers to behaviour in peace or behaviour preceding actions in war: for it is resumptive of vague expressions like *ἀνεψιένως δαιτώμενοι* and *ῥαθυμίᾳ* (39. 1 and 39. 4) and anticipates the statements in 40. 2–4. Again, *μαλακία* refers to behaviour exhibited (or, in this case, not) in war. It is likely therefore, in view of the obvious parallelisms of the two paradoxes, that *φιλοκαλοῦμεν* refers to peace-time behaviour and *εὐτελείας* to war-time behaviour.

(i) I now turn to consider the expression *φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας*. Gomme’s superb note makes it plain how difficult it is to interpret the phrase satisfactorily, as long as we persist in thinking that *μετ' εὐτελείας* qualifies in some way the activity described by *φιλοκαλοῦμεν*. The words cannot refer to the kind of taste⁴ shown; and to suppose that they refer to expenditure (or economy in expenditure) is absurd, because the sums spent on the buildings alone (apart from other *καλά*) were notoriously large.⁵ The meaning of the

¹ *Commentary*, ii. 119 f.

² Referred to mainly in 2. 39 and 40.

³ In the sense, for instance, that Aristotle reviews *ἔνδοξα* in the *Eth. Nic.* before going on to his own theory.

⁴ I take it that the meaning ‘cheap and

nasty’ (Gomme, ii. 120) does not need any discussion. For remarks on the idea that good taste is meant see Gomme, loc. cit.

⁵ Cf. esp. Plutarch, *Pericles*, 12. 2 . . . ναοὺς χιλιοτάλαντους.

phrase *μετ' εὐτελείας* can be obtained in the light of the second observation above. It refers to what Athens is doing in time of war; Pericles is asserting, quite bluntly, that Athens is able to practise economy¹ in her tastes when it comes to war. The reason is, as he says in *πλούτῳ τε f.*, that expenditure is conditioned by the situation—in peace we spend on *καλά*, in war we economize on them and spend on victory. *φιλοκαλοῦμεν* can be understood if we honour the value of the two parts² and translate—‘we like fine things’. The *καλά* thus denoted should not be restricted to magnificent temples,³ though they are no doubt included. The *καλά* have been described in 2. 38 and include (1) ‘contests’ and sacrifices, (2) splendid private property, (3) wide variety of imports. Clearly the activity of liking fine things brings pleasure which is wider than aesthetic enjoyment alone.

The point about these *καλά* is that they are expensive and imply the presence of great riches. This is shown also by the use of the word *φιλοκαλέω⁴* elsewhere. Acragas was magnificent because of the citizens’ *φιλοκαλία*—τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ φιλοκαλησάντων εἰς παντοῖνα κατασκευασμάτων πολυτέλειαν.⁵ Antigonos gave a royal funeral—καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἑκφόραν βασιλικῶς ἐφιλοκάλησεν.⁶ The twelve kings who desired a common tomb wished to make it bigger and better than their predecessors’ buildings in Egypt—εἰς ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολήν φιλοκαλοῦντες ἔσπενσαν ὑπερβαλέσθαι τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἔργων ἀπαντασ⁷. . . .⁷ The most explicit association of wealth and *φιλοκαλέων* is in Diodorus Siculus 20. 8. 4 τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων *Καρχηδονίων* διειληφότων τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τοῖς πλούτοις πεφιλοκαληκότων πρὸς ἀπόλανους.

There is therefore an important notion unexpressed but essential to the understanding of this phrase; it is that Athens has great wealth. Thucydides has in mind the point often stressed that successful prosecution of the war requires money;⁸ and the *ἔνδοξον*, of which this is the refutation, is that wealth makes cowards⁹ of us all or that riches corrupt. To suppose that riches corrupt¹⁰ (as, no doubt, other states thought of Athens’ peacetime expenditure) is incompatible with requiring riches for fighting wars successfully. The fate of corruption by wealth, and hence of being incapacitated for war, is avoided at Athens because she spends as occasion requires. It is the description of how Athens uses her money that amplifies the words *μετ' εὐτελείας*.

At this point I add a translation of the first paradox: ‘Our passion for good¹¹ things is compatible with economy¹² The good things are, primarily, acquired in peace, economy being practised in time of war.

¹ The proposals about finance in Thuc. 2. 13. 3 f. might serve as an example. For comments see Gomme, ii. 22 f.

² I take it that this is also the indication of Gomme’s remark about *φιλοκαλέων* and *φιλοσοφέων* (ii. 121)—‘each word may have its original significance’.

³ Pericles would not have agreed with Zeno Stoicus, who argued that temples were not *πολλοῦ ἄξια* because they were built by labourers. Plutarch, *de Stoicorum rep.* 1034 b.

⁴ The word seems to be common in political discussions. Cf. the examples in Plutarch, *de Stoicorum rep.* 1044 d (Chrysippus). When Iosephus, c. *Ap.* 12, uses the word in connexion with *παιδοτροφία*, he is deliberately avoiding the normal usage.

⁵ Diodorus Siculus, 1. 90. 3.

⁶ Ibid. 20. 37. 6.

⁷ Ibid. 1. 66. 3.

⁸ Cf., e.g., Thuc. 1. 141. 5 and 1. 142. 5.

⁹ Perhaps the *locus classicus* is Aristophanes, *Plutus* 202 δειλότατόν ἔσθ' οἱ Πλούτοις. The same play contains the *ἔνδοξον* that money brings victory—lines 184, 185.

¹⁰ Plutarch, *Philopoemen*, 9 is especially apt —ἢ μὲν γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις θέαμασι πολυτέλεια τρυψήν ἐπάγεται καὶ μαλακίαν ἔνδιδωσι. . . . Cf. too Plutarch, *Cato Maior*, 3, for the incompatibility of *πολυτέλεια* and *εὐτέλεια*.

¹¹ Taking the *καλόν* part as equivalent to *τὰ ἄγαδα* in the ordinary Greek and English sense.

¹² Thuc. 2. 53 is the best commentary on *τέρρης* at Athens (during the plague). But there *καλόν* means honourable.

(ii) *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* ἄνευ μαλακίας has not attracted much analytic attention, presumably because the meaning was held to be plain. The favourite renderings are culture,¹ philosophy,² sapienza,³ Wissenschaft,⁴ cultivate the mind,⁵ and so on. Here again I propose to treat the word *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* by honouring the component parts.

The word occurs once in Herodotus,⁶ where it is applied to Solon. But the impulse, which Solon gratified by travel, is hardly identical with a taste which Athenians could indulge at home. In the fourth century the word soon came to mean 'philosophize' in the works of Plato and Aristotle.⁷ A passage from comedy⁸—*φιλοσοφεῖ δὲ τοῦθ' ὅπως καταπράξεται τὸν γάμον*—has the sense of 'devising a trick'. A less glorious sense than 'philosophy' also occurs in Lysias,⁹ where a speaker says of his opponents—καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὥμην φιλοσοφοῦντας αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγεν τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. The speaker means that the line taken by his adversaries was so remote and unlikely that it could only have been undertaken from a wish to show their verbal skill in pleading the counter-statement. The activity denoted here by *φιλοσοφοῦντας* looked innocent until the speaker realized that his opponents' dexterity was coupled with an evil intention.

I suggest then that in Thucydides too the word means 'we like skilful discussion', by which is chiefly meant the habit of arguing on both sides about *matters of policy*. The limitation is important and is suggested by the amplification of 40. 2-4, where we meet the following phrases—οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἴγοντες, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον η̄ ἐπὶ ἀ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Similar is ἐκλογίζεσθαι of 40. 3. This view entails the following translation¹⁰ of 40. 3 κράτιστοι δ' ἄν . . . 'They should rightly be judged the bravest who have the clearest knowledge of what is dangerous and what pleasant, and because of that do not shrink from facing danger.' He means, for instance, that Athenians know how pleasant their life is in peace-time, and the risks they run in going to war. The former they know from experience, the latter by reflection. Nevertheless, it is this knowledge which gives them courage to face the war, for, if they did not, they would lose their pleasures altogether. By running risks now and admitting a diminution of their pleasures, they are hoping to save their advantages.¹¹ The state which has more to lose is more ready to fight, because it knows what would be lost by not fighting.

In favour of this rendering of *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* the following considerations should also be mentioned.

(i) The funeral speech is closely knit and the parts inter-related.¹² It would therefore be surprising if *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* meant 'do philosophy', whereas the

¹ Marchant.

² Haas.

³ Malusa.

⁴ Weinstock.

⁵ Jowett. Poppo has *litteris studemus*.

⁶ i. 30.

⁷ Isocrates' talk of 'philosophy' when he means mainly 'rhetoric' will make the following interpretation of *φιλοσοφοῦμεν* more likely. See, e.g., *Panegyricus* 10. The language used of Theopompus is interesting. See F.G.H. 115 T 5 b (compare T 1) and 115 T 20a l. 21 = Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ep. ad Pompeium*, 6. 2, 5 and 6. Quintilian I.O. 10. 1. 74 calls him 'orator'.

⁸ Menander (Koerte) 204, (Kock) 242.

Xen. *Cyr.* 6. 1. 41 is similar.

⁹ Lysias 8. 11 and 12.

¹⁰ This view was suggested to me by Mr. J. L. Creed. It was apparently advocated by Professor Bodin, but not accepted by Mme de Romilly, *Thucydide, Histoire et Raison*, p. 175, n. 2.

¹¹ Cf. Thuc. 2. 43. 5 οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφειδότεν ἀν τοῦ βίου κτλ.

¹² Thus the first paradox resumes ch. 38 and is amplified by πλούτῳ τε . . . of ch. 40. The second resumes hints in ch. 39 and is amplified by 40. 2-4.

context is full of ideas relating to discussion about policy. (ii) This view is supported by the remarks of Cleon and Diodotus in the Mytilenean debate.¹ Cleon attacks the Athenians for being *σοφώτεροι τῶν νόμων*, which is primarily directed against their wish to reconsider a settled matter. Diodotus, in reply, speaks at greater length even than Pericles here on the merits of elaborate discussions before arriving at a decision. (iii) In Euripides *σοφός*² is constantly used of people who are skilful arguers or persuaders. Euripides' plays are a fascinating commentary³ on the Peloponnesian War, partly because this verbal skill, which was frequently practised in Athens, is so often shown up as something hollow.

A further remark should be made against translating 'we are philosophers'.⁴ In that case Pericles would mean either that all Athenians are philosophers or he would be referring to the interests of his own group of friends. The former is clearly impossible; for well-known evidence⁵ suggests that in the late fifth century philosophy was an affair of groups and *cénacles*, as it largely continued to be later. The latter is again unlikely; for throughout the speech Pericles is speaking of Athenians in general, and it would be surprising if we were required to take the plural here as referring to a small group, which was, anyway, under constant political fire.⁶

The misunderstanding of this famous passage has arisen, I think, from two causes. First, because the words seem to suggest this, modern historians,⁷ with one eye on the Parthenon and another on the (later) philosophical fame of Athens, have been anxious to read into this passage a reference to complete all-round activity. The image of aesthetes and metaphysicians buckling on hoplite armour, to return after battle to the contemplation of temples and the good, is satisfying but untrue. It may be arguable that Athens was that kind of place, but not on the evidence of the present passage. Secondly, Plutarch's Life of Pericles makes a great deal of Pericles' association with Anaxagoras, and it is easy to translate *φιλοσοφῶμεν* with that relationship and Plutarch's Life in mind. But since this sort of theme is dominant with Plutarch⁸ anyway, as one would expect from a Platonist writing a kind of history, it is probably good sense to play down the significance of this relationship between a statesman and a philosopher.

Both paradoxes therefore are designed to refute *ἐνδοξα* about wealth and rhetoric; the first is that wealth makes men cowards, the second that talking makes men cowards. The two paradoxes are not quite identical, however, in spite of the similarity of sound. For we are meant to understand that valour is a direct consequence of the Athenians' love of discussion. But it is not true that

¹ See esp. Thuc. 3. 37. 3-4 and 3. 42. In 3. 37. 3 *ἀμάθια* is contrasted with *δεξιότης*.

² There are two frequent meanings: 'verbally clever but morally bad' (cf. *Iph. Aul.* 333; *Troades* 1224) and 'knowing the right thing to do' (e.g. *Bacchae* 179).

³ I mean that the (repeated) attacks on sheer verbal skill are an elucidation of what Thuc. says of the abuse of language in 3. 82 f.

⁴ There is no more need to suppose that 'philosophy' is meant than to suppose that Laches (Plato, *Laches* 188 c 6) is claiming to be a 'philologist' (*φιλόλογος*).

⁵ e.g. the *Clouds* and the *Symposium*.

⁶ Hence the prosecution of Anaxagoras, Plutarch, *Pericles* 32.

⁷ This kind of idealization is too well known to require comment. Cf., e.g., Cloché, *La Démocratie Athénienne*, p. 114: 'l'idéal de beauté . . . etc.'

⁸ He was especially interested in the idea of 'philosophy in action'. Cf. *de Alex. virtute aut fortuna*. However, he does at least make Themistocles 'teacher' a master of *δευτέρης πολιτική*. See *Them.* 2 and cf. Thuc. 1. 138. 3.

economy is a direct consequence of their love of good things; it is instead a direct consequence of spending as occasion requires, which is a principle stated in the amplification *πλούτῳ τε . . .*¹ The point is that wealth is required for war, but success in war only comes if people economize; whereas love of discussion amuses the Athenians in peace and enables them to be brave in warfare.

I would translate therefore: 'Our love of good things is compatible with economy² and our love of discussion does not involve cowardice.' If we take the passage in this way our understanding will be less sublime but more historical.

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¹ It should be noted that Pericles here also asserts that there is no disharmony between rich and poor, for the latter have opportunities to escape from their poverty. For the effects of poverty see Thuc. 3. 45. 4.

² This translation seems to distort the use of *μετά*. For instance, in Thuc. 1. 120. 5 . . . μετ' ἀσφαλεῖας μὲν δοξάζομεν . . ., the *μετά* phrase and the verb both refer to the same time, whereas the translation here is

based on a distinction between peace-time behaviour and war-time behaviour. However, since the main notion is of Athenian life as a whole, even though the description can be completed only by reference to behaviour in two sets of conditions, this makes it possible for the words *μετ'* *εὐτελείας* to act as substitute for some such expression as *φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ καὶ εὐτελῶς διαιτώμεθα*.

PLATO'S SOPHIST AND THE FORMS¹

I

THE *Sophist* is on the face of it concerned to charge the sophist with being a mere maker of images, and to defend this charge by showing that images, though they 'are not' what they are images of, yet in some sense 'are'. This leads to the analysis of Not-being as being other than, but Plato makes it quite clear that the general problem concerns Being as much as Not-being (250 e); the difficulty is that Being is neither Rest nor Motion, and so can neither rest nor move of its own nature, but surely it must do one of these (250 c, d). In other words Being is in danger of not being able to have attributes except by being identical with them. The ensuing discussion seems to point out that this is not so, and that Forms, like other things, do have some attributes and not others, without being identical with them.

But such an interpretation will only hold if the Megista Gene are in fact all Forms. This is denied by Dr. A. L. Peck, who argues (*C.Q.* 1952; cf. 1953, 1954)² that the whole point of the discussion is to show that Being, Not-being, Same, and Other are not Forms, but merely empty names, and so *φαντάσματα* rather than the *εἰκόνες* which are the names of real things; the sophist raises paradoxes by relying on linguistic habits (Dr. Peck (S p. 52) points to the frequency of verbs of saying in the *Sophist*) to pervert the theory of Forms into positing absurd Forms.

An obvious way of testing this view is to see what sort of Forms Plato posits in writings later than the *Sophist*. Unfortunately the evidence in this respect is not very great. The most important passage is the famous catholic list of Forms given in the *Seventh Epistle*. After discussing the five aspects of each of τὰ ὄντα, and taking the circle as an example, Plato goes on (342 d 3-8): *ταῦτὸν δὴ περὶ τε εὐθέος ἄμα καὶ περιφεροῦσ σχήματος καὶ χρόας, περὶ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου, καὶ περὶ σώματος ἀπαντος σκεναστοῦ τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότος, πυρὸς ὑδατός τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ζωοῦ σύμπαντος πέρι καὶ ἐν φυχαῖς ηθοῦς, καὶ περὶ ποιήματα καὶ παθήματα σύμπαντα.*

In this list there is no mention of logical Forms like Being, Same, and Other, but it is hard to know whether Plato deliberately excluded them without knowing just what is implied by the final phrase *ποιήματα καὶ παθήματα σύμπαντα*. Translations of this phrase include: 'all states active and passive' (Post), 'all qualities and relations' (Glenn Morrow), 'all things done and suffered' (Harward), 'all actions and passivities' (Ross), 'all moral actions or passions in souls' (R. G. Bury). Bury follows Wilamowitz in deleting *καὶ* after *ηθοῦς*, and one could take the *καὶ* as epexegetic, so that the final words sum up what has gone before. Apart from these alternatives the choice lies between taking the phrase in a narrow and literal sense with Harward, or in a wider sense as a general expression covering all attributes, in which case it could cover the logical Forms too. In any case it would seem that Plato is not emphasizing the logical Forms here.

¹ I am grateful for comments and suggestions to Mr. D. W. Hamlyn, and to Mr. G. E. L. Owen, who suggested, *inter alia*, the approach in terms of criteria.

² I shall refer to these three articles on the *Sophist* and *Parmenides* as S, P1, and P2 respectively.

The *Timaeus* (35 a) seems to treat Same and Other as Forms, though they do not play the paradigmatic part of the other Forms (or at any rate are not explicitly said to do so). But the dispute about the date of the *Timaeus* prevents its being of much use here. The *Statesman* I shall mention later. Plato never gives Same, Other, or Being a place in a diaeretic schema, but this of course applies to many other undoubted Forms, including the ethical ones. The *Seventh Epistle* may bear against there being logical Forms, but the other evidence seems inconclusive. But I think there are reasons for doubting Dr. Peck's view that what the *Sophist* is doing is showing that there are no logical Forms, or Forms corresponding to incomplete phrases.

Let us start by asking what a Form is. Throughout Plato's life there is always one thing that he attributes to the Forms pre-eminently, reality, existence, being. Forms are essentially the things which are—this is made clear by *avtò ὁ ἐστιν*, however one interprets it, and the constant use of phrases like *τὰ ὄντα* or *ὄντως ὅν* or *τὸ ὅν* (*Rep.* 479 d, *Sta.* 285 d 10; cf. *Phl.* 58 a). One could almost say the function of a Form was to constitute part of the solid furniture of the universe. They also have a semantic function (to be mentioned below), and various other properties, such as being unchanging and the objects of knowledge, and somehow being the source of the reality of particulars (*Rep.* 509 b), which participate in them. Dr. Peck would appear to agree with nearly all of this; he talks of the Form as something 'self-subsisting' (P2 p. 43), which 'must be and must be *one*' (P2 p. 35, italics his), and refers to them as *τὰ ὄντα* (S p. 53), which 'are "things" in the truest and fullest sense' (P1 p. 149 top), and are apprehended *λογισμῷ* (P1 p. 141). (Dr. Peck also holds that 'souls are an essential factor in the relationship between Forms and particulars' (P1 p. 136), and seems to think Plato did not believe 'there was any direct relationship between Forms and particulars, i.e. a relationship from which the soul or souls could be excluded' (p. 134; cf. (3) on p. 139). The doctrine is only needed because souls can apprehend 'some *one* entity, unifying the many physical objects in each case. . . . To that extent, the Form and the soul mutually involve each other, though neither is dependent on the other for its existence' (p. 134). I do not fully understand this, which seems to depend on taking *Parm.* 132 b, c (the *vόηηα* passage) seriously, and seems hard to reconcile with *Rep.* 509 b; but so far as I can see it does not affect the theme of this paper.)

The question then arises what candidates are to be admitted to the status of Forms, and why. Discussion of this usually starts from *Rep.* 596 a, saying that we posit a Form to cover every group of objects to which we apply a single name. Beds and tables, i.e. nouns, are given as examples, but one would imagine, and there is nothing to contradict this, that whatever reasoning leads to the need for Forms here would also lead to it in the case of adjectives. Dr. Peck accepts 'true common attribution' as the (or at any rate a) basis of the Forms (P2 p. 35 mid.; cf. p. 39–40, 41 (end of II)), but thinks that where the sophists go wrong is in assuming that such an attribution occurs wherever a verbal attribution occurs: 'the fallacy . . . lies in assuming that modes of speech are necessarily a true index to "things"' (S p. 49). The criterion of Formhood is that the phrase to account for which the Form was posited must be complete in itself; we can call something just and have done with it, but when we call something other we want to know other than what? and the completion of the phrase 'would show at once that there is no common attribution' (P1 p.

146; cf. S pp. 52–53). If, on the other hand, as in the case of statements like 'Socrates is just', no part of the statement is dropped, we may legitimately posit a Form (S p. 47). Dr. Peck goes on to argue that the predicates 'is not', 'is other', 'is the same', 'is', 'is one' are all incomplete, and so do not correspond to Forms (see the table at P2 p. 40).

At first sight two claims seem to be implied here, that these phrases are incomplete, and that completeness is the criterion for a phrase being an *eikón* or true image corresponding to a Form rather than a *phantasma* or deceptive image (this seems to be Dr. Peck's main view, though S p. 53 implies there can be 'true and correct *eikóves*' which are not the names of Platonic Forms). 'Same' and 'other' no doubt are linguistically incomplete, but in ordinary language, both English and Greek, 'is' and 'is one' are not necessarily so, and so if they are to be excluded on grounds of incompleteness, this incompleteness must not be merely linguistic.

Dr. Peck thinks (S p. 51) that *κίνησις ἔστι* must be expanded to *κίνησις ἔστι κύριος*, but this would surely imply that Plato deprived himself of the means of asserting the king-pin of his theory, that Forms exist. It can presumably be said of anything at all that it is itself, for even if particulars are constantly changing and never completely exemplify any Form, they surely are what they are at any given moment. Similarly he thinks that 'is one' is incomplete because one man is not the same as one leg (P2 pp. 36–37). But neither is a beautiful man the same as a beautiful leg (there will be different criteria for beauty in each case). Dr. Peck seems to find some difficulty in there being 'a Form which is a bare One unqualified' (P2 p. 36); but is it really any harder than a 'bare Beautiful unqualified'?

This suggests that 'is' and 'is one' are not incomplete, and so can correspond to Forms, which still leaves us with 'same' and 'other'. But is completeness the criterion we are looking for? There is reason for thinking that one function of the Forms is to give meaning to language (cf. K. W. Mills in *Phronesis*, 1957, no. 2). It is all very well for Dr. Peck to say that '“Being” is part of the very nature of the Form' (S p. 49) and '“The One” is not a Form; but each Form is one' (P2 p. 39)—but what is part of its nature? and each form is what? This suggests that 'same' and 'other' may still correspond to Forms, even though they are linguistically incomplete, and also incomplete in the sense that anything participating in the Form does so *with respect to* something.

Are we then reduced to saying, with Dr. Peck's sophist, that there is a Form for every verbal attribution? I see no reason to suppose that Plato ever elaborated a complete semantic theory to cover all classes of words (despite Protagoras and Prodicus Plato's Athens need not have been as grammar-conscious as Austin's Oxford). But *Sta.* 262 d, e explicitly tells us that there is at least one perfectly good adjective, *βάρβαρος*, which does not correspond to a Form, and the reason why it does not is that it applies to *ἀπέριοις οὖσι καὶ ἀμείκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφάνοις πρὸς ἄλληλα*. This reminds us of the 'chopped-upness' from which *θάτερον* suffers (*Sph.* 257 c), and which Dr. Peck uses (S p. 52; cf. P2 pp. 34–35) to show that *θάτερον* is not a Form. But there is a difference. A thing which is other than beauty participates in Other with respect to Beauty (cf. 256 b 1). In other words *μὴ καλόν* can be reduced to two Forms, Other and Beauty, and so does not need a special Form of its own. Similarly *βάρβαρος*, though positive in form, can be reduced to Other and Greek. But 'other' itself cannot be reduced in this way, nor can 'is' or 'is one', and so

the semantic role of a Form is called for. The reason why *βάρβαρος* covers a heterogeneous field (and *cannot* be a Form) is that there is no single *φύσις* common to barbarians *which is not also common to Greeks*. This distinguishes the chopped-upness of *βάρβαρος* from that of *θάτερον*. (It might be asked why Man is a Form, since it could be reduced to Rational Animal. But there is a single *φύσις* (Rationality) which applies to man and does not apply to other animals.)

II

Let us now consider the evidence of the *Sophist* itself. For one thing Plato nowhere gives any hint that he has divided the Gene into real Forms and spurious ones. It is true that he does not always say very clearly what he is doing, and Dr. Peck thinks he is carrying on the whole demonstration within the sophist's own terminology. This might explain the language used in the *Parmenides* and the early part of the *Sophist*, but it hardly explains why he should come out into the open and talk 'straight' at 256 a, b and again at 259 c, d, and then promptly retire into the sophist's terminology at 258 a, d, e, where 'Other' is talked about for all the world as if it were a Form, while the whole discussion ends with the famous remark about *λόγος* depending on the *συμπλοκή εἰδῶν* at 259 e. Such a procedure could hardly fail to mislead his readers. Furthermore, in the ensuing discussion of falsity (260 a ff.) Plato deliberately emphasizes that it is only now that he is coming on to the discussion of *λόγοι* (*καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα* (261 d); *καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλους ἔμμοττεν, τὰ δὲ οὐ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὖ σημεῖα . . .* (262 d))).

Secondly, would anyone who did maintain Forms of Being, Same, and Other be refuted or reduced to contradiction by anything that Plato says in the *Sophist*? During the main discussion five groups of people come under attack, dualists (243 d-4 b), monists (244 b-5 e), materialists (245 e-8 a), 'friends of the Forms' (248 a-9 d), and 'late-learners' (251 b), these being all the people who have in any way discussed *οὐοία* (251 c, d). The argument against the dualists is that they cannot say that hot and cold are the only two ultimate things, and also that these things exist, because this existence is a third thing. This on the face of it is rather an assertion than a denial that Being is a Form. But perhaps it is an ironical assertion, and the dualist is meant to defend his dualism by seeing that Being is not a Form at all. But why should Plato, who certainly in any case believed in some entities other than hot and cold, want to defend the dualist in this way? The dualist does not appear later in this or any other dialogue as having been vindicated; and suppose that the dualist announced that he was converted, and now accepted Being as a third entity (and was ready to accept other such entities too, if necessary), what could Plato say in reply? The arguments against the monist are similar, but it is significant that at one point (244 d 3) even the existence of a name in addition to the one entity is regarded as a sufficient refutation of the monist. The monist could hardly answer this point by making any distinction between Forms and pseudo-Forms. Surely therefore these passages are what they appear to be, straight refutations of dualism (for ignoring metaphysics) and of monism (for doing inadequate metaphysics). It is even less plausible to regard the refutation of the materialists as ironical, since it consists simply in asserting the existence of various virtues and vices and of the soul, and Plato certainly kept Forms of the virtues if he kept any

at all, and may well have kept Forms of the vices (the soul raises questions beyond our present scope). Again the refutation of the friends of the Forms does not seem to have anything to do with the logical Forms. It is at this point (249 d) that Plato returns to his criticism of the dualist and points out for the second time (cf. 243 c) that we are in as much of a mess about Being as about Not-being. But the difficulty is that Being cannot be identical with Motion or Rest, while it surely must be either in motion or at rest. The obvious way out here is to distinguish between the identifying and copulative senses of 'being', and if this is done there is no need to abolish Being as a Form. And in fact Plato goes on immediately to bring in his fifth class of opponents, the late-learners, who are accused of making just this confusion, and refusing to allow any but identical predication. Plato then goes on to say (251 c, d) that the coming discussion is meant for all the above groups of people. Dr. Peck calls it 'absurd' (S p. 49) that a thing should be or be other not in virtue of its own nature but in virtue of participating in something else. But whether or not this seems absurd to us,¹ it is no proof that Plato did not think it. What it implies is not, as Dr. Peck thinks, that *κίνησις* is a *vox nihili*, but that if *κίνησις* must necessarily be the name of something that exists (as for Plato it must be if it is to have any meaning at all), then the thing of which *κίνησις* is the name must necessarily participate in the Form of Being.

What does emerge from this central part of the *Sophist* is that there is no Form of Not-being in the absolute or existential sense—or at any rate that if there is such a Form we cannot know or say anything about it (258 e–9 a). Not-being is reduced to Other (i.e. non-identity). Plato can say 'x does not exist' without using 'other', by saying 'x does not participate in Being'), and the Form which that which is not participates in is the Form of Other. Thus the phrase 'is not' is incomplete and misleading in that it suggests the existence of a Form where there is no Form, or rather not the Form that is suggested. But it is significant that whereas Not-being is equated with Other, Being is not equated with Same, but is explicitly differentiated from it. This suggests that 'is' is not incomplete in the way that 'is not' is, and we can say that something is, without meaning that it is the same as something.

A further, though lesser, difficulty is that if Plato is concerned to distinguish Forms from pseudo-Forms he gives us little idea of how to go about it. *μέγα* was a standard Form in the *Phaedo* (e.g. 100 b), and appears happily sandwiched between *καλόν* and *δίκαιον* at 257 e–8 a, but these imply an ideal standard in a way in which *μέγα* does not. Again, if *κίνησις* is a Form, and *εἶναι* is not, what about *γένεσις*, which appears between them in the list of Forms which Plato says we must examine at *Parm.* 136 a, b? Then there are relational Forms like Father of and Fatherhood (one cannot tell a man is a father by examining him; Dr. Peck refers to the 'the dog is your father' argument in the *Euthydemus* at S pp. 46–47), and also Knowledge, which at 257 c ff. is 'split up' like Other (knowledge must be knowledge of something).

Mention of the passage about Knowledge, however, brings us to another question, for it is in this passage that not only *καλόν* and *μέγα* but also *μὴ καλόν* and *μὴ μέγα* appear to be treated as Forms; yet surely *Sta.* 262 b ff. and *Phr.* 265 e make it clear that negatives of this nature are not Forms? And if they

¹ Mr. Hamlyn points out to me that on Dr. Peck's view Plato would be committed

to an ontological argument for the Forms.

can be talked about as if they were Forms while in fact they are not so, may not the same apply to Other?

It is true that we cannot uncritically assume a Form wherever the words *εἶδος* or *φύσις* happen to be used, but I have given what I hope are stronger reasons than this for supposing that Plato is not concerned to deny the status of Form to Other. We must take account of the context. Plato is not concerned here with the rules for diaeresis that are discussed in the other two dialogues, and so he may be forgiven a looseness of speech that would be far less venial if he were explicitly concerned with the population of the world of Forms, as Dr. Peck thinks. But can it be dismissed as a mere looseness of speech? Is it not vital to Plato's case that *τὸ μὴ καλόν* should be just as real as *τὸ καλόν*? What is necessary for Plato is that anything which is not identical with Beauty, and anything which does not participate in Beauty, should not for those reasons be denied existence. These things (or at any rate the former of them) will in fact participate in Other with respect to (*πρός*, 256 b 1) Beauty. In what sense then are the *μὴ καλόν*, etc., 'parts' (257 d 4) of Other? Presumably in that things which are not Beauty form a sub-class of things which are other. This need not imply a separate Form for the sub-class, since the distinction between these sub-classes is covered by the use of *πρός* noted above. If this is correct the 'division' of Other is not a diaeretical division, and indeed Plato does not say that it is.

Dr. Peck ends his article with three final points, the last of which is that for Plato the philosopher's real work is dialectic, which consists in diaeresis, and the *Sophist* is a mere clearing of the ground; for this reason the Visitor proclaims at 254 b that we are now hunting for the sophist, and have left the philosopher for treatment later. There is a passage in the *Statesman* (286 b) that might support this, if accented in a certain way. Plato is defending certain discussions which were undertaken not for their own sakes, but to make us more dialectical. These include the discussions of weaving and the statesman in the *Statesman* itself, and then Plato adds *καὶ τὴν [μακρολογίαν] τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐσίας*. Accenting *περὶ* this would suggest that the discussion of *μὴ ὄν* was a long discussion not carried out for its own sake, in fact a mere preliminary, but if we accent *πέρι* (with the Oxford text) the long discussion would be that concerning the sophist (at the beginning and end of the dialogue), which belonged to our discussion of that which is not.¹ This would bring this *μακρολογία* into line with the other two as an example of diaeresis, and Being, Same, and Other could take their place among the *ἀσώματα* with which dialectic is chiefly concerned. Even with the former accentuation it might be argued that the discussion of Not-being was indeed a preliminary, concerned with dismissing the supposititious Form of absolute Not-being, but the passage about dialectic in the *Sophist* (253-4) seems to show that the coming discussion of the Megista Gene is a part of dialectic; the relations between Motion and Rest have just been discussed (251-2) by a process compared to that of the grammarian, and it is *this* process which is said (253 b, c) to require the greatest

¹ Lewis Campbell and the Budé (Diés) accent *πέρι*, but take *τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐσίας* as a resumptive explanation of *τοῦ σοφιστοῦ*. The Loeb (Fowler) and Teubner accent *περὶ*. Campbell thinks *περὶ* would involve making Plato refer to his dialogues

by name, but Fowler translates 'the sophist's long talk' (with a small 's'). Jowett temporizes: 'And in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being'.

knowledge and to be the work of the philosopher. The dismissal of the philosopher at 254 b need mean only that we are now concerned with arriving at the concept of the sophist by diaeresis, the philosopher being left till a later dialogue (cf. 217 a, 218 b), though there may also be a reference to the fact that here the dialectical method is being used rather than discussed, which it is in the *Phaedrus*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*. Similarly the limitative phrase *καθ' οὐσίαν ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως* (254 c) need refer only to the fact that the present discussion has just been limited to a small selection of the Forms rather than the thorough discussion recommended at *Parm.* 136 a-c.

The purpose of the *Sophist* then is what it is usually supposed to be, to point out that there is no Form of absolute Not-being, but that this does not imply that there is no such thing as not-being at all, and to point out that Forms must be allowed to blend with each other in certain circumstances. (This blending is not necessarily symmetrical, as Cornford thought, or else Motion could not exist without Existence moving (cf. J. L. Ackrill in *J.H.S.*, 1957, No. 1). But there is no intrinsic reason why it should not be symmetrical in certain cases. If A participates in B, then of course B cannot participate in A if A is a particular, but it may if B, as a Form, can participate, and A, as a Form, can be participated in. Therefore, although *μετέχω* is sometimes used non-technically (228 c 1, 235 a 6, 238 e 2), we have not got to assume that there are no Forms of *καθ' αὐτό* and *πρὸς ἄλλα* (255 c, d) merely because blending appears to be symmetrical in this case. Blending is non-symmetrical.) The paradox which arises during the establishing of the separate existence of the Megista Gene depends only on ignoring the difference between identity and participation. The establishing of Being as separate from Motion and Rest leads to the paradox that it can neither move nor be at rest, but no actual paradoxes occur in the rest of the passage. 254 e-5 b shows Motion and Rest to be different from Same and Other, by saying that otherwise we shall find Motion and Rest participating in each other, which is taken to be absurd. The reasoning is that, whereas Motion and Rest both participate in Same and Other, if (say) Motion were identical with Same, then Rest, in participating in Same, would be participating in Motion; and furthermore if Motion were identical with Same, then the contrary of Motion (Rest) must be identical with contrary of Same (Other), and so Motion, in participating in Other, would be participating in Rest. The proof that Being and Same are not identical is that it is true that Rest and Motion both are, but not that they are both the same. There is of course an ambiguity here, since Rest and Motion are the same as themselves, but not as each other, but the point is that when we say 'Rest and Motion are the same', we may mean that they are the same as each other, but when we say 'Rest and Motion are', we do not mean they are each other, which we should have to express by saying 'Rest is Motion and Motion is Rest'. The argument is elliptical but not invalid. Finally Being is different from Other because a thing can be without reference to anything else, an argument that seems quite straightforward.¹ (Plato does not bother to prove that Same and Other are not identical.)

Let us review the course of the argument so far. After the bout with the friends of the Forms we are left in a puzzle because we want to say that Being either moves or is at rest, but can't do so without equating Being with either

¹ Dr. Peck uses this argument to prove that 'other' is incomplete (S pp. 48-49). It seems to prove equally that 'is' is (sometimes) complete.

Motion or Rest. Plato then introduces (251 a) a discussion of predication in general terms, and brings in the late-learners, etc., who deny it altogether. These people are obviously not the main enemy; they were considered as refuted way back at the beginning of the *Parmenides*. But the argument is going to be directed against them nevertheless. This suggests that they are going to be refuted *a fortiori*,¹ and in fact the next section (251 d-2 e), which returns to the language of the Forms, points out that if nothing blends with anything, then everyone, Formists and non-Formists alike, will be in the soup, and that in fact some things must blend and some not. After the description of dialectic (253-4) we have the exposition of the remaining Megista Gene as described above, leading up to the overt distinction between being identical with and participating in the (Form of) Same at 256 a, b.

Why did Plato see this difficulty in the interparticipation of Forms? There may be more than one reason. For one thing there is the peculiar grammatical behaviour of 'same', in that the article appears in both the identifying and the predicative uses of *ταῦτόν*. When *τὸ καλόν* is predicated of something that something is referred to as *καλόν* rather than *τὸ καλόν*, but when *ταῦτόν* is predicated of it it is referred to as *ταῦτόν*. However, this cannot be the main trouble, as we have puzzles arising before Same and Other are even mentioned, and the puzzles are not limited to how other things can 'be' one of the logical Forms, but are also of the converse sort, as that of how Being can rest or move (250 c, d); and it is at first taken as absurd that Rest should move or Motion rest (252 d), though it is later pointed out (256 b) that though as a matter of fact neither of these things happens (and so the argument at 252 d, that there are limits to interparticipation, remains valid), yet if they had happened we could have said so without the implication that Rest and Motion were identical.

We are obviously led at this point to the statement of a similar problem at *Parm.* 128 e-30 a, where it is stated not once but six times in succession. At first the problem is that Forms, or perfect instances, should participate in the opposite Form. Both the language of Forms and that of perfect instances (*αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοια*, etc.) are used, but that phrases like *αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοια* are meant to refer to the Forms is obvious because Plato immediately goes on to speak of *τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα*. But there are hints of a wider problem in the six formulations. The third (*εἴ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἰδή ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνου τάνατί ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα* (129 c 2-3)) suggests rather that the problem is that Forms, like particulars, should have contrary attributes, while the fifth and longest reads as follows (129 d 6-e 3): *ἔαν δέ τις ἀν νυνὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ εἰδή, οἷον ὄμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δινάμενα συγκεράννυθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ . . .* This could refer to the interparticipation of each of the contrary pairs mentioned, but it could equally be stating the more general problem of how Forms can have attributes at all, and this is perhaps slightly favoured by the general phrase *συγκεράννυθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι*, unless these refer to the interparticipation but non-identity of the pairs of Forms, which seems a more abstruse interpretation. (Incidentally these words surely do not imply that a given pair of Forms sometimes blend and sometimes do not, as Dr. Peck thinks in the first of his three final notes.)

¹ *A fortiori*, because Plato will show that Forms can have attributes not only things (*Parm.* 128 e-30 a) but

III

I want to end with a perhaps rather speculative suggestion as to the cause of the trouble. The use of contraries in the *Parmenides* and elsewhere suggests that the difficulty is connected with self-predication; it is easier to admit that ὄμοιότης should be ἀνόμοιος than that αὐτὰ ῥὰ ὄμοια should be so. It is quite obvious that Plato uses self-predicational language in the earlier dialogues, but W. Sellars (*Philosophical Review*, 1955, p. 423) has raised the question whether this may not be merely a matter of language and not a vital part of the theory. K. W. Mills (*Phronesis*, 1957, no. 2) has argued against this that for Plato a term has a meaning by naming something, and that αὐτὸν τὸ καλόν is what καλόν names; καλόν, Mills adds, cannot name a sensible, because any sensible can as well be called αἰσχρόν as καλόν. I think that as well as this semantical aspect of the theory there is a metaphysical aspect. Plato often refers to a Form by the formula αὐτὸν ὁ ἔστιν F, a phrase which *prima facie* can have three meanings: (i) That F which is. (ii) That thing which F is. (iii) That thing which is F. The Forms are of course often spoken of as the things which really exist (e.g. αὐτὰ ῥὰ πράγματα at *Pho* 66 e 1, τοῦ ὄντος at 65 c 9), but the evidence for the meaning of the formula is not unambiguous. Sometimes, as at *Rep.* 490 b (αὐτοῦ ὁ ἔστιν ἔκαστον), the grammar suggests (i), but in other cases (i) seems to be impossible because the word preceding ὁ ἔστιν is in a different case from the word following them, as at *Tim.* 39 e (τῷ ὁ ἔστι ζῶν); cf. *Pho.* 75 b 1, *Crat.* 389 b 5. The trouble with (ii) (which Mills himself uses on p. 146) is that on the theory that a word can only have meaning by referring to something it is hard to see what 'F' refers to. (One might also expect αὐτὸν ὁ ἔστι τὸ F on (i) or (ii), though this is not conclusive.) This suggests (iii) as the correct meaning for at least some occurrences of the formula,¹ which in turn suggests what is surely one of the chief *raisons d'être* of the Forms: Beauty is that which is really beautiful, as opposed to sensible beautiful things, which are not fully so. The point is that an object cannot have a quality unless the quality exists, and the quality is that which by its presence (*παρονοίᾳ*) justifies us in describing the object as we do (in so far, at any rate, as we are so justified at all). But how can a quality exist in an object except just by being itself? An object's beauty, conceived rather as the 'quality-things' of the Presocratics were conceived, is beautiful because it is *the* beautiful in the object. If this is so, self-predication is not a sort of excrescence which Plato wrongly attributed to the Form; it is the whole nature of the Form, and that out of which the Form developed. But the term 'self-predication' is rather misleading here. The quality is not a thing which has itself, because this would imply two things, that which has and that which is had. The quality is itself—or perhaps we might try to express it without being too paradoxical by saying that the quality exists just by having itself. Though the view I have just described is primarily a pre-*Phaedo* view, there is a passage in the *Sophist* which, while throwing little direct light on Plato's views at the time of the *Sophist*, seems by its terminology to illustrate this earlier view (as I indicate below, the mechanism of self-predication in the later view seems obscure). When Plato is arguing that Being is not identical with either Rest or Motion and therefore neither rests

¹ R. Loriaux (*L'Être et la forme selon Platon*, pp. 23–34, 58–61, 75–78, 117–26) defends (i) at the explicit expense of respect

for the grammar. (I owe these references to the review by K. W. Mills in *Gnomon*, xxix. 5 [1957].)

nor moves, what he says is that *κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν* it neither rests nor moves (250 c 6). Why does he add these words? What sort of things *would* rest or move *κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν*? Presumably if anything, Rest and Motion. Is this a hint at two ways of having a quality, a particular (or other Form) having it by participation in the Form, and the Form having it 'naturally'?

At this stage the quality both is itself and is had by the particular, but Plato soon came to treat the quality as a thing outside the particular altogether, thus creating what are usually known as the Forms, and we have a situation like that described by Cherniss (*A.J.P.*, July 1957, p. 261; cf. especially pp. 258 ff.): 'As the passage in the *Republic* shows [597], it [the phrase "the idea is that which its particular participants *have* as a character"] means that of any character or property, *x*, that a particular *has*, the *reality* is *ὁ ἔστων x*, which it could not be if it were *had* by anything and which therefore must be independent or "separate" from all manifestations of itself as a property.' The Form has now become something standing on its own feet, and Plato comes to think of the Forms as essentially the things which exist. Instead of being merely qualities in things they have themselves become *things*, and as such must themselves have qualities.

One of the difficulties about the *Sophist* is that at this late stage in things Plato should still be having to point out that there is a difference between identity and participation; surely, one thinks, that had been realized before now. On the present interpretation so it had, in the case of particulars (except for a few hangers-on, treated with obvious contempt and refuted *a fortiori* as the late-learners), but not in the case of Forms, the reason being that Forms have gradually changed their nature in the course of their development.

An obvious question that arises at this point is whether the Forms ever ceased being self-predicational. There are of course insuperable difficulties to their being so, which have often been pointed out, but on the other hand Plato never explicitly repudiates self-predication, and some Forms, such as One and Being, have got to be self-predicational (and Plato would probably say the same of *τὸ καλόν*). One of the most significant Forms from this point of view is *κίνησις*, and it may be significant that Plato nowhere, I think (except for *Sph.* 249 b, which does not seem really to be an example of this at all), uses *τὸ κινοῦν* or *τὸ κινούμενον* for *κίνησις*. But the question is not the simple one, did the Forms, which were once self-predicational, ever cease being so? What came about was a new view of what a Form is, and what did happen is that Forms ceased to be self-predicational (if indeed that is the right word) in the same sense in which they had been—self-predication ceased to be the whole nature of a Form, and a Form no longer *had* to be self-predicational in order to be a Form at all. Just which Forms went on being self-predicational, or perhaps we should say became self-predicational in a new sense (the proper sense of the word), and how they managed this, seem to be questions that Plato neither asked nor resolved. At any rate at *Met. N* 1091^a33 Aristotle can still refer to such an undoubted Form as the Good as *οἷον βούλομεθα λέγειν αὐτὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ὄριστον*.

A SECOND NOTE ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE *AENEID*

An article in *C.Q.* iv (1954), 214–15 discussed the recurrence in Books 8 and 9 of the *Aeneid* of a number of well-defined motifs which occur also in Books 5 and 6—an attack on the ships of the Trojans and the saving of them by a miracle; the active prominence of Ascanius, and of Nisus and Euryalus and Mnestheus; Iuno sending Iris to make trouble for the Trojans, and Venus appealing to another god to help them; a dream motivating an expedition; a prophetic vision of the future. These correspondences give to the area of the poem over which they extend a distinctive character and mark it as having a special status of its own.

Now the fact that this part of the poem has a distinctive character appears with equal clarity but in a different way when we study the relationship to Homer that Virgil here assumes. We find that in Books 5–9 he has produced five successive counterparts to five famous Homeric show-pieces: the Games of *Il. 23*, the Nekyia of *Od. 11*, the Catalogue of *Il. 2*, the Shield of *Il. 18*, and the Doloneia of *Il. 10*. Virgil in this part of the *Aeneid* is not merely using Homeric motifs to assist the evolution of his story. He is creating counterparts to Homeric episodes chosen because of their celebrity.

Further, in his treatment of his counterparts he has observably followed a certain principle throughout. In whatever other ways he has modified each Homeric original, he has consistently in each case given his own version a specifically Roman application.¹ Thus in the Games of Book 5 he has incorporated as a concluding item the Roman institution of the *Lusus Troiae*; in the Underworld of Book 6 he evokes a vision of the future heroes of the Roman state; the Catalogue of Book 7 is a catalogue of Latin and neighbouring peoples; the Shield of Book 8 is decorated with scenes from Roman history; the counterpart in Book 9 of the Homeric Doloneia is cast in the form, familiar to us from Livy, of an example of Roman military *virtus* and concludes with the poet's promise that the fame of the participants will endure as long as the imperial power of Rome.²

The peculiar emphasis given to the Roman theme in this part of the *Aeneid* can be illustrated in other ways. In it (as nowhere else in the poem except at 1. 33 *tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem* and 12. 166 *Aeneas, Romanae stirpis origo*) the poet speaking in his own person repeatedly mentions the name of Rome: 5. 601 *hinc maxima porro accepit Roma . . .*; 7. 603 *nunc maxima rerum Roma colit . . .*; 8. 338 *Carmentalem Romani nomine portam quam memorant . . .*; 8. 626 *illic res Italas Romanorumque triumphos fecerat ignipotens . . .*; 9. 448 *dum . . . imperiumque pater Romanus habebit*. Again, he refers in these books with unmistakable emphasis to a number of characteristically Roman religious institutions: the *Lusus Troiae* in Book 5, the Sibylline Books in Book 6, the *Ianus*

¹ With this and the preceding paragraph compare G. E. Duckworth, 'The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy', in *Transactions of the American Philological Association* lxxxviii.

² Cf. the particulars at *Aen.* 9. 222 (*statione relicta . . .*) and 240 (*si fortuna permittitis uti . . .*) and 253 ff. (Aletes' commendation) and

308 ff. (*omnis euntis primorum manus ad portas . . . prosequitur . . .*) with the corresponding particulars in Livy's account of Manlius' combat with the Gaul (Livy 7. 10); also the poet's concluding laudation at *Aen.* 9. 446 ff. with that of the commanders in Livy 7. 10, and 7. 36 (especially), and 7. 37.

temple in Book 7, the Ara Maxima in Book 8.¹ Again, the series of three long pageants concluding Books 6, 7, and 8, each with a wholly Roman or Italian content, is obviously meant to be emphatic in its effect, and so is the appearance of Ascanius as ancestor of Augustus both in 5 (where he is in company with Atys, founder of the Atii) and in 9 (where he is apostrophized by Apollo as 'sire of gods to be').

It appears therefore that Virgil has chosen in the central portion of the *Aeneid* to emphasize the Roman theme of the poem in a strongly distinctive way.² In this connexion it is interesting to consider the account he gives of the building in which Latinus receives the Trojan envoys at 7. 170 ff. This building stands on an eminence in the Latin town, a majestic edifice with numerous columns, its doors adorned with trophies of war. At its entrance are statues of former kings and military heroes. The building itself is both a temple and a council chamber. Two ceremonies are specially associated with it: the first formal appearance of the king with lictors in attendance after his accession, and a religious banquet of which the city elders partake on stated occasions. Now, at Rome meetings of the senate for matters of high importance used sometimes to be held in the Capitoline temple of Jupiter; and Virgil's description in the passage under consideration will obviously fit the Capitoline temple with its imposing size and dominant situation and triple row of frontal columns and the statues of the kings in the area Capitolina opposite the doors. Moreover, it was there that Jupiter and his two consorts dined with the senate on the Ides of September and November each year at the *epulum Iovis*. It was also there that the new consuls made their first formal appearance with lictors in attendance when they took up office. These details are too many and too precise for their appropriateness to be accidental.³ Here in the very middle of the *Aeneid* Virgil has placed a symbolic counterpart of the great Capitoline temple of Rome, which he has called to mind also at 8. 347 ff. and 9. 448.

But how is this special treatment of the five central books related to the general structure of the poem?

As has been observed elsewhere, there are two evident plot-units in the *Aeneid*, the Carthaginian adventure of Books 1-4 and the War in Italy of Books 7-12; each begins similarly with an intervention of Iuno and ends with the death of the secondary hero, Dido in the last line of Book 4 and Turnus in

¹ To this list can be added the morning worship of the Lar, Vesta, etc. at 5. 744 and 8. 542. The only comparable instances that I can find elsewhere in the poem are in the references to the *caput velatum* at 3. 403 and 545, and to *spolia opima* at 11. 5 ff. The latter of these is not attested as an allusion by Virgil, but that it is one is suggested by the parallel descriptions of the procedure in Plutarch, *Marcellus* 8 and *Romulus* 16; the subject was topical because of the fear of Licinius Crassus who in 29 B.C. killed the king of the Bastarnae in combat with his own hand (Dio Cassius 51. 24). Perhaps one should also include the funeral procedures at 6. 212 ff. and 11. 59 ff. and 139 ff. The frequent allusions to the national *penates* are given in the story and cannot be brought to bear on the present argument.

² To the instances given already should be added the Roman family names of 5. 117 ff., the Roman topography (of course!) of 8. 307 ff., and a number of specially emphatic reminiscences of Ennius in Book 9 (e.g. 503, 528, 532, and the situations at 672 ff. and 805 ff. where the prototypes are Homeric but Virgil is said by Macrobius to be following Ennian versions).

³ For the statues of the kings see Appian, *B.C.* 1. 16; for statues of other notables see Suetonius, *Caligula* 34; for the *epulum Iovis* see Valerius Maximus 2. 1 and Aulus Gellius 12. 8; for the first appearance of the consuls with lictors see Ovid, *Fasti* 1. 79. Most of these references are supplied, with others, by Jordan, *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 19 ff. and 59 ff.

the last line of Book 12. The longer of these two units, the story of the war, is punctuated strongly in its middle, at the beginning of Book 10, where the threads of a hitherto divided action are drawn together and the point marked by a council of the gods. Standing between the Carthaginian adventure and the War, Books 5 and 6 are largely occupied by the two great episodes of the Games in Sicily and the visit to the Underworld at Cumae; and these too form a unit, though of a rather different kind, because the poet has made both expressive of Aeneas' piety towards his father. We thus arrive at a series of three units, 1-4 and 5-6 and 7-12, the last being punctuated so as to consist of 7-9 and 10-12.

It is a commonplace that the layout of the story in Books 1-4 is based largely on that of *Od.* 5-13: a traveller is thrown up by a storm on a strange shore, is kindly received by the local ruler, tells the story of his past adventures, and so (though his hosts would be glad to have him remain always with them) departs on the last stage of his journey. It is less commonly stated, though no doubt commonly enough observed, that the layout of the story in Books 7-12 is based in important particulars on that of the *Iliad as a whole*: circumstances remove the principal hero from the scene of combat; in his absence a teichomachy ensues and the enemy, led by a champion of their own, come near to achieving a decisive success; at the crucial moment the hero reappears on the scene¹ and after a series of frustrations brings the rival champion to bay and kills him, thus taking vengeance for a friend who has fallen by the rival's hand. In this scheme the mission of Aeneas to Pallanteum corresponds to the retirement of Achilles to his tents, and the anger of Aeneas against Turnus for the death of Pallas corresponds to the anger of Achilles against Hector for the death of Patroclus. The fundamental similarity of overall design is unmistakable, though it is disguised by obvious particular differences—of motive in that there is no originating Quarrel, and of proportion in that the single Book 9 of the *Aeneid* corresponds to the dozen or so books of the *Iliad* in which the fighting proceeds in Achilles' absence. But the relationship of Virgil to Homer in this respect is quite different in kind from the relationship that we found exemplified in the treatment of the central area of the *Aeneid*. There it was a matter of producing counterparts to well-known Homeric episodes; here Virgil is borrowing from Homer principles of overall design for his poem as a whole.

Virgil thus appears to have followed two principles in constructing the *Aeneid*. On the one hand, he imposed on the traditional data of the Aeneas legend two schemes of structure borrowed from the *Odyssey* and *Iliad* respectively, thus making the units 1-4 and 7-12.² On the other hand, he also chose to

¹ With the secondary Catalogue in *Aen.* 10. 166 ff. and Aeneas' signal at *Aen.* 10. 261 ff. compare the secondary Catalogue in *Il.* 16. 168 ff. and Achilles' appearance at the wall in *Il.* 18. 202 ff.

² It is worth observing that the adoption of the Homeric layout is associated in Books 1-4 with the visit of Aeneas to Carthage and in Books 7-12 with his visit to Evander's capital. It is precisely the introduction of these visits that constitutes the most important difference, though not, of course, the only one, between the story of the

Aeneid and the Aeneas legend as given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1. 49-60 and 64-65). Moreover, the modification is in both cases of the same distinctive type—it is brought about by the conflation with the Aeneas legend of a legend properly quite separate from it. We have no evidence to suggest that any author before Virgil had brought Aeneas and Evander together. It is sometimes said that Naevius had brought Aeneas and Dido together. But in fact all we know is that Naevius mentioned Dido somewhere in his poem about the Punic war; that

bridge the centre of the poem with a complex of episodes, in the arrangement and choice and treatment of which certain distinctive principles are apparent. In this central area, comprising Books 5–9, we find sometimes a broadly symmetrical grouping of recurrent motifs around a central point. We find also a series of counterparts to celebrated Homeric episodes. We find also, both in association with these episodes and apart from them, numerous allusions to Rome and things Roman, and thus a heavy emphasis on the Roman theme of the *Aeneid*. The wish to achieve this emphasis may partly explain the symmetrical grouping of certain motifs in this part of the poem, for instance, the three pageants which conclude Books 6, 7, and 8 respectively, and the parallel appearances of Ascanius as ancestor of Augustus in Books 5 and 9; but in other instances the symmetry seems to have been preferred for its own sake. The resulting central mosaic stands in the space between the end of the Carthaginian adventure (Books 1–4) and the council of the gods at the beginning of Book 10 which marks the beginning of the second phase of the war story.

The combination of the two principles described was possible because the requirements of plot in Books 5–9 are not exacting, and the texture of the whole of this part of the poem is highly episodic. Hence Books 7–9 belong both to the plot-unit 7–12 and to the central mosaic 5–9. In a somewhat similar way Books 7–8 of *Paradise Lost* belong both to the conversation between Adam and Raphael that occupies Books 5–8 of the poem and bridges its centre, and to the continuous story of our world that begins with the preface of Book 7 (see especially lines 21 ff.: 'half yet remains unsung', etc.) and occupies Books 7–12.

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he told in that poem the story of Aeneas' departure from Troy and coming to Italy; that according to the Servian commentary (on *Aen.* 4. 682 and 5. 4) Varro somewhere said that someone named Anna (not Dido)

killed herself for love of Aeneas, or (merely) was in love with him; and that Ateius Philologus at an unknown date in the first century B.C. wrote an essay entitled *An Didum amaverit Aeneas*.

A NOTE ON PERIKEIROMENE 87-88¹

(Mo.) ἀρα τὸ μυλωθρεῖν κράτιστον; (Da.) εἰς μυλῶν'; [(Mo.) ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὐτοὶ φερόμενος η[ξε]ν. (Da.) μηδ[α]μ[ῶς] τέχνη[ν λ]έγ[ε].²

MOSCHION, discussing the reward he is to give Daos for having, as he thinks, procured his mistress for him, facetiously proposes a spell of work at the mill. The text of the following 1½ lines is defective, but the latter part of line 88 shows that Daos reacts with a predictable disgust. This suggests that the tone of Moschion's original remark is continued in the line which follows, but the precise import is uncertain, even if Körte's restoration and assignment of speakers are adopted. C. Robert³ was apparently the first to notice a resemblance to the ambiguous dialogue of Dionysos and Pentheus, E. Ba. 968 (Δι.) φερόμενος ηξεις . . . (Πε.) ἀβρότητη' ἐμῆν λέγεις. | (Δι.) ἐν χεροὶ μητρός. (Πε.) καὶ τρυφᾶν μ' ἀναγκάσεις. More recently, R. Goossens⁴ has argued that Menander is indulging in a direct reminiscence of the Euripidean passage and that the irony of Dionysos' language is present also in Moschion's. Adopting Sudhaus's text,⁵ (Da.) εἰς μυλῶνα; [(Mo.) προσδοκᾷ κτλ., he would have Moschion mean 'This fellow expects to come back (from the mill) carried'—but 'carried' not because he, any more than Pentheus, will return in a triumphal chariot, but because he will have been beaten there until he cannot walk. Goossens compares the sinister *double entendre* which occurs in the conversation between Mercury and Sosias, Plaut. *Amph.* 356 (Mer.) *at scin quo modo?* | *faciam ego hodie te superbum, nisi hinc abis.* (Sos.) *quonam modo?* | (Mer.) *auferere, non abibis, si ego fustem sumpero;* he quotes also the dream phantom's prophecy to Rufinus in Claudian, *In Rufin.* 2. 332 'omni iam plebe redibus | altior, et laeti manibus portabere vulgi.' | *has canit ambages: occulto fallitur ille | omne, nec capit sentit praesagia fixi* (cf. 2. 434 *caput . . . iam de cuspide summa | nutabat, digna rediens ad moenia pompa*).

This interpretation involves several difficulties. In the first place, if there is a conscious derivation from the Bacchae, ηξειν must have the same sense that ηξεις has there, 'return': yet both the general context and Daos' εἰς μυλῶνα⁶ make it natural to expect the emphasis to be on *going* to the mill, not on coming back from it. In general, too, slaves who are sent to the mill are flogged, if at all, before being sent, not when they arrive: cf. Lys. 1. 18 μαστιγώθεσσαν εἰς

¹ I am grateful to the University of Birmingham for permission to include here material from an M.A. thesis submitted to the University in 1957; also to Professor George Thomson and Mr. R. F. Willetts, of the Department of Greek of the University, who have read through and criticized this Note.

² The text of Menander quoted here and subsequently is that of A. Körte, *Menandri quae supersunt*, Pars i ed. 3, 1955, Pars ii, 1953. The fragments are cited according to Körte's numbering and the abbreviations of the plays are those used in his Index.

³ *Hermes*, xlix (1914), 633-4.

⁴ *Chronique d'Égypte*, xxi (1946), 111-15.

⁵ S. Sudhaus, *Menandri reliquiae nuper repertae* (1914), ad loc.

⁶ As an alternative to supposing the ellipse of some verb of motion (as is done, e.g., by H. Teykowski, *Präpositionsgebrauch bei Menander*, p. 25), it is legitimate to understand the phrase as locative; cf. in Menander G. 6 ἀπόδημον εἰς Κόρινθον, Fr. 614-5 ἰδροσάμενος τούτους γάρ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, 754. 4 κάς τὴν οὖδν | ἐκάθισαν αὐτούς. But in all these instances an idea of motion is implicit in an accompanying word to a degree in which it is not in μυλωθρεῖν here, and εἰς c. acc. as equivalent to ἐν c. dat. is a late use according to L.S.J., s.v.

μυλῶνα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ μηδέποτε πάνσασθαι κακοῖς τοιούτοις συνεχομένην, Plaut. *Bacch.* 777 *per omnis deos adiuro . . . ut tua iam virgis latera lacentur probe | ferratusque in pistriño aetatem conteras*, *Epid.* 121 *quem quidem ego hominem irrigatum plagiis pistori dabo*, Ter. *And.* 199 *verberibus caesum te in pistrinum, Dave, dedam usque ad necem*. The punishment of being sent to the mill consists primarily of a spell of hard labour in fetters (cf. Men. *H.* 1–3, Plaut. *Most.* 16–19, *Poen.* 827–8); if a flogging is mentioned, it is as an additional punishment, which takes place at once. Incidental flogging received while at labour in the mill (cf. Lys. *I.c.*, Ter. *Phorm.* 249–50) can hardly be meant by Moschion who, by speaking of Daos' return, implies that his stay there is to be brief. It is most unlikely that *μυλῶν* refers here to a public jail or treadmill, to which slaves might be consigned simply to be flogged or otherwise tortured by a *carnifex* (without productive labour being necessarily involved)¹. The idea of labour has been stressed in *μυλωθρεῖν* and this usage of *μυλῶν* appears to be comparatively late.²

Consideration must secondly be given to the word *φερόμενος*, which Goossens takes to have the sense 'carried'; and indeed its association with *ῆκει* here, as at *Ba.* 968, might be thought to suggest that it here bears the same sense as it has in Euripides. The similarity is misleading, for such a combination is not very unusual: cf. Pl. *Tim.* 23 *αἱ ὥστερ νόσημα ἦκει φερόμενον αὐτοῖς θέντα οὐράνιοι*, Aeschlin. 3. 89 πάλιν ἦκει φερόμενος εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, Lycurg. 59 *ἥξει δὲ ἵως ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν λόγον φερόμενος*, Diph. 14. 1 *ἦκει φερόμεν’ αὐτόματα πάντα τάγαθά*, Men. *E.* 345 *εὐθὺς ἥξει φερόμενος | ἐπὶ τὸν ἐλεγχον*, Plu. *Mor.* 52 d *ἐκπεσῶν φιλοσοφίας πάλιν εἰς πότους καὶ γύναια καὶ τὸ ληρεῖν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν ἥκει φερόμενος*. Moreover, *φερόμενος* may be used on its own as a virtual adjective ('impetuous'), cf. Plu. *Mor.* 1144 *αἱ προπετεῖς τε καὶ φερόμεναι τῶν αἰσθησέων*, or be combined with other verbs of motion than *ῆκει*, cf. Hdt. 7. 210. 2 *ἐσέπεσον φερόμενοι ἐς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας οἱ Μῆδοι*, 8. 28 *φερόμενοι ἐσέπεσον ἐς τοὺς ἄμφορέας*, 9. 102. 3 *φερόμενοι ἐσέπεσον ἀλλέας ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας*, Pl. *R.* 6. 492 c *παιδείαν . . . ἦν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου φύγον ἡ ἐπάνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερόμενην κατὰ ροῦν, ἢ ἀν ὅντος φέρη*, Phd. 98 b *ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος . . . ωχόμην φερόμενος*, D. 55. 16 *διὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς δημοσίας ἔμελλεν βαδιεῖσθαι φερόμενον*, Theophil. 11. 1 *τοῦ μῆποτ’ αὐτὸν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς Λαΐδα | φερόμενον*, Diph. 61. 4 *ἄτενές δὲ τηρῶ τοῦ μαγείρου τὸν καπνὸν. | κάν μὲν σφρόδρος φερόμενος εἰς ὄρθον τρέχῃ, | γένηθα*, Plu. *Mor.* 16 d *οὐ μὲν ᾧς ἀληθῆ προσδεξάμενος λόγον οἴχεται φερόμενος καὶ διέφθαρται τῇ δόξᾳ, 76 d ἡ φύσις . . . πρὸς τὸ χείρον οἴχεται φερόμενη, 558 f ἡ δίκη φερόμενη περιῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς παιδᾶς*. In all, or nearly all, these cases, *φερόμενος* is used absolutely; in none, with the possible exception of Diph. 14. 1,³ does it mean 'carried' but always something like 'at top speed'.⁴ It is therefore a mistake to suppose that on the basis merely of

¹ Cf. Herod. 5. 32 and W. Headlam's note ad loc. in his edition.

² e.g. Plu. *Mor.* 144 a, *Ph.* 1. 623 and lexicographers quoted by Headlam, *I.c.*

³ But cf. Pl. *R.* 8. 567 d (quoted in note 4).

⁴ Compare the colloquial use of *πετόμενος* and *τρέχων*, Ar. *Lys.* 54 *ἄρ’ οὐ παρεῖναι τὰς γυναικας δῆτα χρῆν; | — οὐ γάρ μά δι’ ἀλλὰ πετομένας ἦκει πάλαι*, Pl. *R.* 8. 567 d *αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἦσαν πετόμενοι, εὖν τὸν μισθὼν διδῷ* (cf. the joke at 5. 467 d

πτεροῦν χρή παιδία ὄντα εὐθύς, ἵν’ ἂν τι δέηπετόμενοι ἀποφεύγωσι), Ar. *Ach.* 828 *εἰ μὴ τέρπωσε συκοφαντήσεις τρέχων, Nu.* 780 *ἀπαγγαίμην τρέχων, Pax* 259 *οἶδεν ἀλετρίβανον τρέχων; | Av.* 991 *οὐδούν ἐτέρωσε χρηματοδογήσεις ἐκτρέχων; | Pl.* 1103 *ἀλλ’ ἐκκάλει τὸν δεσπότην τρέχων ταχύ*, Nicopho 12. 2 *περιτός εὐθέως | ἦκει τρέχων, Pl.* Com. 69. 2 *τί οὐ τρέχων σὸν τὰς τραπέζας ἐκφέρεις; | etc. So φέρων, intransitively: L.S.J. s.v. φέρω, A. X. 2. b.*

the verbal similarity the Euripidean line, and hence the Euripidean meaning, can be shown to be contained in Menander's text here—any more than in *E.* 345 or the other passages of this kind which have been quoted. If Goossens's thesis is correct, the present instance comes into a special category. Even if it is held that the Euripidean double sense of *φερόμενος* is satisfactory in the context, it has still to be assumed that Menander thought (rightly, it may be presumed) that his audience would recollect the Euripidean half-line and identify it here without confusion from the popular idiom of different application, for otherwise his point would be completely lost. It is certain that he would not have considered a Euripidean quotation in itself inappropriate to Moschion, brash young man though he is,¹ since the use of tragic phraseology for straightforward humorous effect is widespread among his characters, irrespective of their class and temperament,² but a conscious quotation of at once such point and such brevity cannot seemingly be paralleled.³

It is therefore probable that Menander is not quoting Euripides, in which case, even if a connexion is not wholly lacking,⁴ the restoration and interpretation of the passage cannot be based on *Ba.* 968 alone. The reading $\eta[\xi\epsilon]w$ remains the most plausible,⁵ but a certain reconstruction of the lines is no nearer. The most satisfactory stopgap (both for general sense and because it deals neatly with the difficult *eis μυλῶν*) is the reading suggested by Jensen⁶ in his apparatus, (*Mo.*) *ἀρά τὸ μωλωθρέν κράτιστον; eis μυλῶν[α προσδοκᾶ | οὐτοὶ φερόμενος η[\xi\epsilon]w*: 'Does then a turn at a mill suit you best? (Daos expresses horror). (Aside). This fellow's expecting to be off to a mill at top speed.' There is no literary borrowing here, direct or indirect,⁷ but an idiom derived from everyday speech, an aspect of Menander's language which has not always received the attention it deserves.⁸

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¹ A later line of Moschion's, 277, has a paratragic sound: E. Capps, *Four Plays of Menander*, ad loc., compares *E. Ph.* 1382 (see also E. W. Hope, *The Language of Parody*, s.v. *λόγχη*).

² In this, as in other things, Menander may well reflect real life, as he is particularly praised by Quintilian (*Inst.* 10. 1. 69) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 853 d-f) for the aptness of the language he puts into the mouths of his different types.

³ See the detailed discussion of A. Pertusi, 'Menandro ed Euripide', *Dioniso*, xvi (1953), 27-63, esp. 31-39 and notes, and references cited by him, 55 n. 9.

⁴ It is not absolutely necessary to rule out any connexion. In many of the post-Herodotean examples quoted in the text *φερόμενος* possesses a clear sense of ill-omen (compare also some of the passages quoted in note 4, p. 58), and the Euripidean use, despite its different meaning, resembles them at least in having a pejorative import. It is thus just conceivable that Euripides is making oblique allusion to a pejorative idiom of popular speech which does not

appear in surviving literature in its straightforward form until the fourth century B.C. In this case his own specific *double entendre* at *Ba.* 968 has a further dimension that has escaped notice.

⁵ It is accepted by Sudhaus into his text, but elsewhere (*Menanderstudien* 66-67) he expresses doubts: to fit in, the missing letters would have to be closely written, and hence he tends to favour $\eta[\mu]w$, which Guéraud prefers.

⁶ C. Jensen, *Menandri reliquiae in papyris et membranis servatae*, ad loc.

⁷ This passage is listed as an example of tragic *λέξις* in Menander by Pertusi, l.c., 56 n. 11, citing Goossens's article.

⁸ Thus Men. *Th. fr. 2* has been deemed a conflation of *E. Hel.* 757 and *Fr.* 973 (attributed also to Menander, *Fr.* 941: probably by confusion with *Th. fr. 2*; see Körte, ad loc.) by A. Sehrt, *De Menandro Euripidis imitatore*, pp. 48-49, but the verbal resemblance is slight and the concept a commonplace, cf. Hom. *Od.* 1. 200-2, 15-172-3, *Theoc.* 21. 32-33, Ov. *Tr.* 1. 9. 51, D. L. Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, No. 116. 6

(iv A.D.) (quoted by A. S. F. Gow on Theoc. 21, 31 ff.). Similarly in the Latin adaptations from Menander: Plaut. *Bacch.* 820 is derived by R. Reitzenstein, *Hermes*, lviii (1930), 77-79, from S. *Fr.* 945 Pearson (which does appear to be quoted, in a conflation with S. *El.* 1241, by Philo, *De Spec. Leg.* 3. 50), but the phraseology is not distinctively tragic, cf. Hom. *Il.* 18. 104, *Od.* 20. 379, Pl. *Thet.* 176 d, O. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, No. 233 (quoted by A. C. Pearson on loc. cit.); Ter. *And.* 427 is regarded by Schrt,

I.c. 65, as a borrowing of E. *Med.* 85-86, but the thought is not confined to Euripides, cf. S. *O.C.* 309, *Ai.* 1366, (Men.) *mon.* 407, Schol. on E. *Med.* 86-87 (and Ter. *And.* 426) (quoted by D. L. Page on E. *Med.* 86). The phraseology of Plaut. *Bacch.* 426 may be tragic in origin but resembles not only E. *Alc.* 557, with which it is associated by F. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen* (1895), p. 121, but also S. *Ph.* 1266, *O.C.* 595, *O.T.* 667, E. *Cyc.* 683, *Hipp.* 874, *Med.* 78.

IMITATIVE ECHOES AND TEXTUAL CRITICISM

IN establishing the text and interpretation of doubtful passages the dependence of the Roman poets—I refer more especially to the lesser—on their predecessors, whether Greek or Latin, may be a source of invaluable aid, and many examples may be adduced where critics have exploited this aid to the full. It is nevertheless the case that insufficient emphasis has sometimes been laid on its importance, and numerous passages may be found in which critics have failed to use, or at all events to make appropriate use of, material that is available. Where an imitation as transmitted in the manuscripts closely corresponds to its model in regard either to language or to general sense, the critic, it seems obvious, has to be particularly chary of any textual alteration by which such correspondence is destroyed: we do not always find the evidence of the model taken into full account. Again, where the text of an imitative passage is in some respect demonstrably unsound, the model may sometimes provide a basis for emendation. It has, however, always to be borne in mind that in imitating a predecessor a poet may not be conscious that he is doing so. The Latin poets were deeply versed in the great masters and their minds were saturated with echoes of all kinds. On these they drew extensively and reproduced the language or matter of their original without necessarily being aware, or more than half aware, of their indebtedness.¹ In any event they frequently felt no desire to adhere to their model but preferred to make such variations and innovations as appealed to them. The imitation may thus differ from the model in the most varying degrees and emendation based on the latter must proceed with caution.² The object of this article is to draw attention to a number of relevant passages, to establish the text and interpretation of these passages, so far as that may be possible, by recourse to any originals by which they may have been influenced, and to consider some difficulties which arise in the task. Several of the passages are taken from Valerius Flaccus, whose dependence on Apollonius of Rhodes, though the reverse of slavish, makes his work a source of particular interest. The texts quoted represent, except where otherwise stated, the standard edition of the relevant work.

We may first consider passages in which an unsatisfactory text may be rectified, by due examination of the source, in a comparatively simple manner.

Val. Flacc. 5. 435–7

textitur Argoa pinus Pagasaea securi,
iamque eadem remos, eadem dea flectit habenas;
ipsa subit nudaque uocat dux agmina dextra.

¹ Thus Virgil in reproducing the flippant line of Catullus 66. 39 'inuita, o regina, tuo de uertice cessi' in Aeneas' sorrowful protestation to Dido, *Aen.* 6. 460, 'inuitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi' may well have had Catullus' line in his head without recollecting its associations. It does not seem necessary to assume, as does Professor Brink (*Imagination and Imitation*, Inaugural Lecture, Liverpool, 1952, pp. 10 f.), that the imitation was conscious and deliberate. Again,

when Paulinus of Nola, *Carm.* 14. 79, wrote 'amor omnia Christi | uincit', he can have had but a dim remembrance of Virg. *Ecl.* 10. 69 'omnia uincit Amor: et nos cedamus Amori'.

² Consider, for example, Virg. *Ecl.* 8. 42 'ut uidi, ut peri' (Theocr. 2. 82 χώς ἵδον, ὡς ἐμάρην) and the Ovidian echo, *Her.* 12. 33 'et uidi et peri'. There can be no question of altering the text of the latter.

Sc. *Pallas*, the patron deity of the Argo.¹ In 437 V has *ipsa*, C *ipse*. As above Bury, Giarratano, and Kramer. Langen very properly objects that 'narrationis tenor interrumpitur: prius enim nauigatio describitur quam conuentus herorum', and, accordingly, transposes 436 after 437; in 437 he reads *ipse* with C (so Schenkl). The great critic, Thilo, followed by Baehrens, suggests *nectit* for *flectit*. Damsté² takes *flectit* to refer to the making of the oars and ropes. None has called attention to Virg. *Aen.* 12. 471 (of Iuturna's mounting the chariot): '*ipsa subit manibusque undantis flectit habenas*'.³ The obvious imitation removes any doubt both about the soundness and the meaning of *flectit* ('guides') and about the reading *ipse*.⁴ But it does more: the order *subit—flectit* in the model lends very strong support to Langen's transposition. Read, therefore,

textitur Argoa pinus Pagasaea securi;
ipsa subit nudaque uocat dux agmina dextra,
iamque eadem remos, eadem dea flectit habenas.

Id. 8. 413–16

(Medea) prior occupat unum
Aesoniden longeque trahit, mox talibus infit:
'me quoque, uir, tecum Minya, fortissima pubes,
nocte dieque mouent, liceat cognoscere tandem . . .

uir, tecum, T's reading for *uitiae cum* (V), adopted by Thilo, Schenkl, Bury, Giarra., and Kramer, is unsatisfactory: the expression *me mouent* seems odd, and why *quoque*? The original, as Langen indicates, supplies the clue: Apoll. 4. 355 *Αἰονίδη, τίνα τὴνδε συναρπύνασθε μενοντὴν | ἀμφ' ἔμοι*; we must look to *τίνα* rather than to *ἀμφ'* *ἔμοι* and read *quid tecum* (Heinsius); the error, no doubt, arose from haplography—*quoq; uidelicum < quoque uitiae cum*. The correct punctuation must be that suggested by Thilo (who, however, conjectures *nouent*)⁵ and followed by Langen:

'me quoque, quid tecum Minya, fortissima pubes,
nocte dieque mouent, liceat cognoscere tandem . . .'.
When we come to the Christian poets, we find a dependence on their classical predecessors very pronounced, but their indebtedness is sometimes overlooked:

Dracontius, *Laud. dei* 3. 175–8

(non) aditum lambebat flamma camini.
crinibus ignitis ieциuna alimenta recusant,
fastidita fames, reiecto fomite pingui
non fuit ignis edax.

The three youths escape incineration in the furnace (Dan. 3. 23 ff.). The

¹ Cf. 5. 628 ff. 'non queror, exstructa quod uexerit ipsa (sc. *Pallas*) carina | uellera sacra meis sperantem auertere lucis, | quodque palam tutata uiros'.

² *Mnemos.*, n.s. xl ix (1921), 266.

³ The verse-ending *flectit* (*flectat*) *habenas* occurs also in *Ov. Met.* 2. 169, *Stat. Silu.* 5. 1. 37, *Theb.* 11. 384 (see *Thes.* s.u. *flecto* 894. 22 ff., 896. 5 ff.).

⁴ Compare, too, with Burman, *Aen.* 8. 696 '*regina* in mediis patrio *uocat agmina sistro'.*

⁵ For the use of the indicative cf. 1. 281, 7. 120; but Thilo's conjecture *nouent* may be right: cf. 5. 303 *multa nouantem*, so M followed by Thilo, Langen, Bury, Giarra., *mouentem* Reuss, Kramer, *nauantem* V.

above text (so Vollmer with B), in which *crinibus* is made to depend as dative on *recusant* (sc. *ieiuna alimenta*), is out of the question,¹ and Arevalo's correction *recusat* (without comma) has obvious attractions. The connexion, however, of this passage with Ovid, *Met.* 8 has not been pointed out: that *ieiuna fames* forms one phrase is revealed by its occurrence not only in *Satisf.* 269 but also in Ov. *Met.* 8. 791 (so Iuv. 5. 10, *Il. Lat.* 397, Paul. Nol. *Carm.* 31. 437); but the main key is *Met.* 8. 837 'utque rapax *ignis* non umquam *alimenta recusat*', which puts the reading and interpretation beyond doubt. We must, therefore, read *recusat* and interpret: *ieiuna fames alimenta fastidita recusat*. The words *crinibus ignitis*,² however, join somewhat awkwardly with *recusat*: they must go rather with *lambebat*.³ Our text will then run:

(non) aditum lambebat flamma camini
crinibus ignitis. *ieiuna alimenta recusat*
fastidita fames, etc.

Ibid. 1. 579-82

quod generant terrae, quod flammae, pontus et aer:
usibus humanis data sunt haec cuncta uenire,
ut similis qui factus erat de puluere Christo
his dominaretur cunctis.

So Vollmer with Eugen., *generat terra quod flama* B. *flammea* is very strange: in the corresponding passage in Genesis (i. 26-28) are listed the fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, and the beasts of the earth (cf. Psalm 8. 6-8); what are the creations of *flammea*? Arevalo (with a late manuscript of Eugen.) very sensibly reads *flumina*. But neither he nor anyone else cites Claud. *Rapt.* 2. 294 ff. 'quidquid liquidus complectitur aer, | quidquid alit tellus, quidquid maris aequora uerrunt, | quod *fluumi* uoluunt, quod nutriuere paludes, | cuncta tuis pariter cedent animalia regnisi'; cf. too Lucan 10. 155 f. 'quod terra, quod aer, | quod pelagus *Nilusque dedit*', Alc. Auit. 3. 230 'quod pelagus, quod terra creat, quod *flumina* gignunt'; *flumina* is at once confirmed.⁴

In the following passage the corruption is deeper, but conjecture may be assisted by reference to the original:

Ibid. 1. 527-30

bucula rana sues⁵ formicae coruus hirundo
praedicunt pluuias nec clam praesagia fallunt.
quid res exanimis, testas? ardente lucerna
scintillare oleum fungis crescentibus igne?

Vv. 529-30 (as above Vollmer with the manuscripts) have no convincing construction or sense. Here the original, which Vollmer quotes, is, I think, of vital aid: Virg. *Georg.* 1. 391 f. 'testa cum ardente uiderent | scintillare oleum et putris concrecere fungos'. Peiper's conjecture *testa candente uideamus* seems well on the way to the truth. It is reasonable to suppose that *lucerna* represents a

¹ See my note in *C.Q.* xxxiii (1939), 158.

² Cf. Val. Flacc. 1. 205 'protulit ut crinem . . . ignis et escendit . . . viscera'.

³ A mixture of metaphors is involved according to either punctuation.

⁴ Cf. for the error *Laud. dei* 2. 655 *flumina* B for *flammea*.

⁵ B reads *bucula ranas ue*, Eugen. *ardea rana sues*. In the model, Virg. *Georg.* 1. 373 ff., the creatures are *grues-bucula-hirundo-ranae-formicae-coruorum exercitus*. Arevalo's conjecture *grues* for *sues* may thus have prima facie attraction, but *sues* is confirmed by Vollmer's appeal to v. 400 of the Virgil passage.

gloss on *testa*, here used in a rare sense (cf. Serv. Virg. l.c. ‘*testa c. a.* propter uilitatem *lucernam* noluit dicere, nec iterum *lychnum*, sicut in heroo carmine’, *Breu. Expos.* l.c. ‘*testa lucerna*’), and Peiper’s *uidemus* receives strong support from the Virgil (cf. too *Georg.* 1. 451 ‘nam saepe uidemus’); cf. *Romul.* 10. 100 f. ‘per cuncta *uideres* | *scintillare* diem’. But *testa candente* as violating the Virgil is out of the question. Here Vollmer’s citation of a parallel passage from Pliny may help, viz. *N.H.* 18. 357 ‘pallidi namque (*ignes*) murmurantesque tempestatum nuntii sentiuntur, pluiae *iam in lucernis fungi*’. I suggest *testa iam ardente*; *TESTIAM* may very well have resulted in the loss of *IA* and in the consequent alteration of *testam* to *testas*. The text may then be:

quid res examines? testa iam ardente uidemus
scintillare oleum fungis crescentibus igne.

While study of a model may often prove of the greatest help in restoring an unsound text, it may also frequently serve to vindicate a text that is under unjust suspicion. The poets of the Silver Age are notorious for their artificialities of expression and it is typical that Valerius Flaccus should sometimes like to represent in strained or obscure language what was simple and direct in his Greek original. A comparison of the following passages is illuminating:

Apoll. 1. 1058–60

αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
τρὶς περὶ χαλκείοις σὺν τεύχεσι δωηθέντες
τύμβῳ ἐνεκτερέιξαν.

Virg. *Aen.* 11. 188–9

ter circum accensos cincti fulgentibus armis
decurrere rogos.

Val. Fl. 3. 347–8

inde ter armatos Minyis referentibus orbes
concussi tremuere rogi.

Doubt about the text has arisen in the following:

Id. 4. 209–12

hic mihi lex caestus aduersaque tollere contra
bracchia. sic ingens Asiae plaga quique per arcton
dexter et in laeuum pontus iacet haec mea uisit
hospitia; hoc cuncti remeant certamine reges.

Amycus, the pugilist king, specifies his regulations for visitors. The word *cuncti* is regularly altered to *functi* (Burm.): so Thilo, Schenkl, Baehr., Langen, Bury, Giarra. By Kramer alone is *cuncti* retained, with the comment ‘*hoc—certamine* pro ablativo pretii est, *certamen* est pretium (*λύτρον*), quo se redimunt’. Or we may regard the ablative as instrumental and interpret ‘it is only by means of this contest that the princes, all without exception, are enabled to return’, i.e. *nullus rex remeat nisi hoc certamine peracto*. It is precisely this meaning which is found in the Greek: Apoll. 2. 12 ff. οὕτω θέρμον ἔστω ἀφορμήντα νέεσθαι | ἀνδρῶν θύειν, ὃς κεν Βέρρυξ πελάσσῃ, | πρὶν χείρεσσον ἐμῆσον ἔας ἀνὰ χεῖρας ἀείραι.¹ Cf. too 216 ‘mox omnibus idem ibit honos’. Strained the language

¹ Cf. also 5 ff. ὅς τ' ἐπὶ καὶ ξεινοισιν δεικέα πειρήσασθαι ἔστο | πυγμαχίης. θεσμὸν ἔθηκεν, | μῆτρ' ἀποστέίχεν, πρὶν

no doubt is, but to object to the text on such grounds is to object to Silver Latin poetic diction. Consider, again:

Id. 5. 99–101

mixtoque sonantem
percutit ore lyram nomenque relinquit harenis.¹
altius hinc uentos recipit ratis.

hinc cod. reg. T¹, in V. The original supports the above text read by Thilo, Schenkl, Giarra., Kramer: Apoll. 2. 928 ff. ἀν δέ καὶ Ὁρφεύς | θῆκε λύρην
ἐπ τοῦ δὲ Λύρη πέλει οὐνομα χώρω. | αὐτίκα δ' οἶγ' ἀνέμῳ κατασπέρχοντος
ἔβησαν | μη' ἔπι. The Greek poet is referring to a new action (*αὐτίκα*) and to a strong favouring wind.² Yet some queer conjectures have been suggested or read: *altius intentos* (Burm.), *acrius in remos redit* (Baehr.), *actus inceptos* (Reuss), *altius it uentosque rapit* (Bury), etc.; Langen reads *acrius hinc*. *altius* is difficult and has caused trouble even to its defenders.³ The poet must be referring to the bellying out of the canvas as they sail before a fresh wind,⁴ but has obscured his meaning by his use (by synecdoche) of *ratis* instead of a specific word for sails.

An interesting example of misunderstanding caused by an unusual linguistic turn occurs in Valerius:

I. 355–7

celer Asterion, quem matre cadentem
Piresius gemino fouit pater amne Cometes,
segnior Apidanii uires ubi sentit Enipeus.

cadentem (Barth., edd.) is a correction of *carentem* (V) based on Stat. *Theb.* 1. 60 ‘de matre cadentem | fouisti gremio’ (cf. *Silu.* 1. 2. 109, 5. 5. 69) and Claud. *Rufin.* 1. 92 ‘meo de matre cadentem | suscepit gremio’;⁵ it represents a noteworthy instance of a text seemingly innocuous shown to be otherwise by subsequent imitation; for it is hard to believe that the notion in these passages is not similar.⁶ But compare the Greek original (below).

The words *geminō fouit . . . amne* have been misunderstood, in spite of the Statius, by some, or, one suspects, by many critics (Langen does not explain). Kramer supposes that a newly delivered infant requires to be rinsed in water, comparing for the use of the verb cases like Cels. 1. 5. 1 ‘os . . . frigida aqua fouendum’. Thilo adopts Heinsius’s strange suggestion *lauit*; and, similarly, Baehrens. Yet the meaning was indicated by Pius: ‘*geminō amne*: ad confluentes fluuiorum geminorum’. Mr. Morel (I.c.), who points out that the ablative is

¹ This verse is dealt with later below.

² Note that Valerius, unlike Apollonius, has made no reference to a landing.

³ In support of *altius hinc* Damsté (I.c. p. 264) strangely compares 5. 126 ‘hinc magis alta | Haemonidae petere’.

⁴ Cf. Apoll. 1. 1278 κυρτάθη δ' ἀνέμῳ λίνα μεσσόθι, Luc. 9. 799 ‘nec tantos carbasa Coro | curuauerit sinus’, Ov. *Pont.* 4. 10. 16, Sen. *H.F.* 153. For *uentos recipit* cf. Ov. *Met.* 12. 37 ‘acciipiunt uentos a tergo mille carinae’, 11. 477, Germ. *Phaen.* 156.

⁵ The inspiration may be Hom. *Il.* 19. 110 ὅς κεν . . . πάσῃ μετὰ ποσὶ γυναικός.

Cf. too Luc. 9. 899 ‘in terras paruuus cum decidit infans’.

⁶ I cannot agree with Mr. W. Morel (*Rhein. Mus.* lxxxvii [1938], 61 f.), who preserves *carentem*; he objects to the use of *cadere* with an ablative of separation, indicating a person, without a preposition. The ablative *matre* represents a special case and is almost equivalent to *uentre matris*; it is significant that the *Thes.* gives the two above examples only of a corresponding use with preposition; and the analogous use of the ablative with *nascor*, etc., lends strong protection.

local, not instrumental, in character, compares for the use Prop. 1. 14. 1 'abiektus Tiberina molliter unda' and 1. 3. 6 (see too Blomgren, *Siliana*, p. 5);¹ trans. 'at the doubling of the stream'. The original has not been adequately studied, viz. Apoll. 1. 35-39:

ηλυθε δ' Ἀστερίων αὐτοσχεδόν, ὃν ρά Κομήτης
γείνατο διηγέντος ἐφ' ὑδασιν Ἀπιδανοῖ,
Πειρεστὰς ὄρεος Φυλλήιον ἀγχόθι ταίων,
ἔνθα μὲν Ἀπιδανός τε μέγας καὶ δῖος Ἐνυπεὺς
ἄμφω συμφορέονται, ἀπόπροθεν εἰς ἐν ιόντες.

No hint here of lunatic or brutal behaviour on the part of Cometes, nor, indeed, of Asterion's lack of a mother (*carentem*); merely the simple facts of paternity and residence at the junction of the rivers, and it is these which Valerius has re-echoed in a more colourful, if slightly obscure, form.

Another passage where a suspected reading is confirmed by reference to a model, though here the difficulty does not seem to be connected with the imitation, is the following:

Id. 4. 289-91

emicat hic dextramque parat dextramque minatur
Tyndarides; redit huc oculis et pondere Bebryx
sic ratus, ille autem celeri rapit ora sinistra.

Pollux feints with his right and then swiftly lands a blow with his left. The reader may reasonably object to *dextramque parat* on the grounds that it is not his right hand that P. is getting ready but his left, and Heinsius's conjecture *laeuamque p.* was adopted not only by Baehrens but also by Bury, who went so far as to comment 'haud dubie recte'; for the error Baehr. gives a satisfying parallel in 7. 169 (to which we may add 4. 161, 5. 467). We are then confronted with Virg. *Aen.* 10. 810 'Lausum increpitat Lausoque minatur'. It can scarcely be doubted (*pace* Baehr.) that Valerius had this before him and was attracted by the repetition; cf. (with Baehr.) 3. 153 'Glaucum sequitur Glaucumque ruuentem | occupat'. The meaning must be 'puts his right hand in the prepared position as though about to strike' ('eleuat uelut plagam incussurus' Pius); but we should have expected some such word as *leuat* as in Stat. *Theb.* 6. 779 '(manus) leuat ecce diuque minatur | in latus inque oculos'.

In the following passage from Statius a recent proposal to solve a difficulty by recourse to a new punctuation is disproved by consideration of the Virgilian original:

Theb. 1. 494-7

sensit manifesto numine ductos
adfore, quos nexas ambagibus augur Apollo
portendi generos, uultu fallente ferarum,
ediderat.

Adrastus realizes that the two arrivals are his predicted sons-in-law. The

¹ I feel very doubtful, however, about Val. Fl. 5. 207, where Morel sees a comparable example of the ablative: 'reuerenda fluentis | effigies te, Phasi, manet' ('an den Gewässern'); for *ad fluentia* would still be unsatisfactory.

fying. Pius's interpretation of *fluentis* as genitive (= *aluei tui*) does not convince. Conjectures are *futuris* (Schenkl), *reuerendaque natis* (Baehr.), *tuenti* (Sandström, Langen). Apoll. does not help.

usual¹ explanation of *adfore*, viz. that it is used for *adesse*, cannot be substantiated for the time of Statius.² Mr. A. Ker³ would solve the difficulty by placing the comma after *ductos* (sc. *esse*) instead of after *adfore*; he admits that 'the presence of three verbs, *adfore*, *portendi*, and *ediderat*, may seem a little clumsy'. Can the unclumsy Statius have so written? Mr. Ker has, I think, overlooked the Virgilian source (quoted by Heuvel): *Aen.* 7. 255 f. 'hunc illum fatis externa ab sede profectum | portendi generum'. The likelihood of the poet's having so maltreated his model is at least remote.

According to my interpretation, which I have not seen elsewhere stated, *adfore* represents the oblique form of the future indicative used in a potential sense to express an assumption:⁴ i.e. 'they must be present who'. Equally misunderstood (e.g. Langen, *Thes.*)⁵ in my view is Val. Fl. 3. 82 'usque, uiri, optatos huic adfore credite Colchos', i.e. 'it must be the long desired Colchians who have come, be sure'. In both passages the future indicates the sudden recognition of an existing fact.

Imitation of a model may often lead to results that are imperfect in varying degrees and ways. Löfstedt in an interesting article⁶ discusses a number of passages in which a word or phrase taken from its original setting reposes awkwardly in its new surroundings. He emphasizes that in general an imitation is inferior to the original and the results can at times be poor indeed; this has sometimes led to doubt about the validity of the text. Certainly, surprising things happen even in accomplished writers: for example, in Lucan's description of the Battle of Pharsalus, 7. 512 'inde sagittae, | inde faces et saxa uolant', the *faces* seem to owe their rather curious introduction, as Postgate (ad loc.) suggests, to no better reason than the fact that they appear in Virgil's description of the rising of a frenzied rabble in *Aen.* 1. 150 'iamque faces et saxa uolant' (see P.'s note);⁷ they do not appear in Caesar's sober account. In the following passages from the Christian poets the text has been wrongly suspected by some:

Orient. 1. 113-14

ecce tibi caelum pendet, tibi terra recedit,
aera librantur, fluctuat oceanus.

All nature exists for man's benefit. *recedit* has aroused some doubt and for it Delrio proposed *residit*. It is rightly translated by Bellanger 'pour toi la terre s'étend au loin' with the explanation (*Étude*, p. 198) 'O. exprime heureusement l'attrait qu'on éprouve pour les vastes horizons'; but 'heureusement' or not, he makes the reservation 'si le text est intact'. Attention has not been called to the usage illustrated by Ovid, *Met.* 8. 139 'mecumque simul mea terra recedit', where the verb *recedo* is applied to the apparent withdrawal of a place from a person who is himself withdrawing (by ship); so 11. 466 'terra

¹ e.g. *Thes.* (s.u. *assum* 925. 67), Heuvel.

² The use of *adfore* for *adessem* appealed to by Heuvel does not help. Cf. Schmalz-Hofm.,³ p. 610 'Abgeschwächtes *fore* = *esse* findet sich nicht'; see, however, *Thes.* l.c., where more convincing examples of *adfore* = *adesse* are cited from the fourth and fifth centuries, viz. Paul. Nol. and Cypr. Gall.

³ C.Q., n.s. iii (1953), 175.

⁴ See Kühner-Steg. i. 142, where are

listed cases like Plaut. *Pers.* 645 'haec erit bono genere nata: nihil scit nisi uerum loqui', Sen. *N.Q.* 6. 23. 1 'huius motus . . . haec erit causa'; add as an instance of the oblique form Liv. 3. 35. 6 'profecto haud gratuitam in tanta superbia comitatem fore'.

⁵ *adfore* is again regarded as = *adesse*.

⁶ *Eranos*, xlvi (1949), 148 ff.

⁷ Cf. *Thes.* s.u. *fax* 401. 48 ff.

recessit'.¹ In the Orientius passage the use of the phrase, apt and felicitous in the Ovid, is strained and unnatural.

Dracont. *Laud. dei* 3. 274-8

Codrus Apollinei tripodis responsa petuit:
accipit infelix, alieni causa triumphi,
uestibus induitus famuli post arma tyranni.
nam cui bella negant, fecerunt iurgia mortem;
in dubiis mors est inopem simulare tyranno.

King Codrus visited the enemy camp disguised as a poor man and was killed in a brawl. In 278 the manuscript reading *in dubiis* has been suspected or condemned (even by the conservative Vollmer) and occasioned the conjectures *indubia* or *indubie* (Arev.), *induuis* (Grosse, followed by Vollm.), *mors* for *mors* (Glaeser); yet it is sound enough. As I have already pointed out,² the passage is awkwardly modelled on Luc. 8. 239 ff. 'positisque insignibus aulae | egreditur famulo raptos induitus amictus. | *in dubiis* tutum est *inopem* simulare *tyrano*.' In time of peril Deiotarus found safety in his disguise, Codrus death. The poet has attempted to adapt his original by the clumsy substitution of *mors* for *tutum*.

Apart from the infelicitous use of the actual words of a model, imperfection in imitation may be of various kinds. It may, for example, consist in the awkward or abrupt insertion of some detail suggested, and dealt with at appropriate length, by the original. Consider

Val. Fl. 7. 493-6

quis mihi lucis amor? patriam cur amplius optem,
si non et genitor te primam amplectitur Aeson,
teque tuo longe fulgentem uellere gaudens
spectat et ad primos procumbit Graecia fluctus?

In place of *procumbit* Baehr., Langen, and Bury adopt Heinsius's conjecture *procurrit* ('non male' Thilo), Schenkl reads *procursat*; and it is some such word that we should expect.³ Giarra. and Kramer rightly retain the manuscript reading, the latter observing 'ipsam Graeciam προσκυνήσει Medeiam sicut deam Iason blande promittit'. But he does not refer to the model, Apoll. 3. 1122 ff. εἰ δέ κεν ἡθεα κείνα καὶ Ἑλλάδα γαῖαν ἵκηαι, | τιμήσσα γνωξὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν αἰδοτη τε | ἔσσεαι· οἱ δέ σε πάγχυ θεὸν ὡς πορσανέοντος. *procumbit* (a verb used in a similar sense in 3. 438) is a somewhat abrupt and concise reflection of the last sentence.

A striking lack of clarity caused by compression of the original occurs in 5. 98-100

carmina quin etiam uisos placantia manes
Odrysium dux rite mouet mixtoque sonantem
percutit ore lyram nomenque relinquit harenis.

The name bequeathed by Orpheus is not his own but that of his instrument, *Lyra*. As Langen points out, the meaning would not be intelligible, had we not

¹ Similarly Virg. *Aen.* 3. 72 'prouehimur portu terraeque urbesque recedunt', Sil. 3. 157, Stat. *Theb.* 1. 549; otherwise Luc. 1. 102 'si terra recedat (sc. *Isthmos*)'.

² *C.Q.* xli (1947), 105 f.

³ Heinsius compares 2. 637 'ipse ultro primas procurrit ad undas | miraturque uiros'.

before us Apoll. 2. 928 f. ἀν δὲ καὶ Ὁρφεὺς | θῆκε λύρην ἐκ τοῦ δὲ Λίρη πέλει οὐνομα χώρᾳ. Damsté¹ objects that so accomplished a writer as Valerius could not have expressed himself in so clownish a fashion, for any reader would take the meaning to be *suum nomen*; he holds that V's reading *perclytore* has been wrongly emended² (as above T) and makes the bad conjecture *protinus ore*. It seems rather that the poet has obscured his meaning by a careless abridgement of his original. Apoll. (2. 922 ff.) states that the Argonauts landed on the shore, paid honour to the tomb of Sthenelus, and built an altar to Apollo, that Orpheus dedicated his lyre, so giving the place its name, *Lyra*, and that they then embarked on board ship. In Valerius there is no mention of landing or of re-embarking.³ Mopsus sees the tomb some way off at the water's edge and pours libation to the shade of Sthenelus (96 f.), Orpheus sings to the accompaniment of his lyre and leaves a name to the sands; there is no reference to Orpheus' dedication of his lyre, which would have involved landing, though it was his doing so that gave the place its name. It is hard to see how the difficulty can be explained by any textual fault.

The results of imitation may be good, middling, or bad. How bad, however, is something open to question. Certainly, sober opinion cannot but at times wonder whether in fact they are not too bad to be true. Our judgement will naturally be influenced by the general ability of the writer, and what we may be ready to accept in an inferior we may feel unable to accept in a greater. About some passages disagreement among scholars is inevitable; many will prefer to remain sceptical or neutral. A notorious passage occurs in Catullus:

66. 75-78

non his tam laetor rebus, quam me afore semper,
aflore me a dominae uertice discrucior,
quicum ego, dum uirgo quondam fuit, omnibus expers
unguentis, una uilia multa bibi.

The Lock soliloquizes gloomily. The text of this passage, for which various conjectures had been put forward, has recently been put on a new basis by the discovery of the original, Callimachus, Fr. 110. 75-78 (Pf. p. 120):

οὐ τάδε μοι τοσοῦνδε φέρει χάριν ὅσσον ἔκεινης
ἀσχάλλω κορυφῆς οὐκέτι θιξόμενος,
ἥς ἄπο, παρθενίη μὲν ὅτ' ἦν ἔτι, πολλὰ πέπωκα
λιτά, γυναικέων δ' οὐκ ἀπέλαυσα μύρων.

λιτά has enabled Mr. Lobel to emend *milia* (codd.) to *uilia*. Yet the text (as above Pfeiffer) remains strange, and I cannot myself agree with Mr. Levens,⁴ who implies that now all is well and that the restoration of the text by the change of but one letter represents a substantial victory for the conservative critic. Mr. Levens, I note, omits the comma after *fuit*,⁵ thus making the phrase *omnibus expers unguentis* go with *uirgo*; and the text is now so printed in Professor Mynors's Oxford edition. Such an arrangement involves serious difficulty. The sense is not only without point but also incompatible with the Greek: for the words *γυναικέων δ' οὐκ ἀπέλαυσα μύρων* can only mean 'but of unguents

¹ I.c., p. 263.

² Cf. Ov. Am. 3. 12. 40 'duraque percussam saxa secuta lyram'.

³ Cf. above, note on 5. 101.

⁴ *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, p. 299.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 304, n. 57.

used by her when a woman¹ I have not had enjoyment', and the words *omnibus expers u.* are applicable, therefore, not to *virgo* but to *ego*.² Vv. 77–78, accordingly, should mean 'with which (head), while in former days she was a maiden, I, (now) starved of all unguents, in its company drank much of a cheap sort'.³ This certainly involves a contortion of language, as Professor Pfeiffer notes, and it cannot but arouse scepticism. Can Catullus, handicapped by the exigencies of translation, have been guilty of such language? Pfeiffer indicates that both *omnibus*, in place of which 'desideratur uox quae uoci γυναικείων correspondeat', and *una* are suspect; but emendation is a problem.⁴ The only other possibility seems to be that Catullus has misunderstood the Greek. Yet the sense is clear, and the mystery remains.

The following passage, being based not on previous poets but on historical sources, is not an imitation in the sense of the other passages, but it bears a close affinity with its sources and is not irrelevant to this study.

Luc. 7. 52¹–4

cum Caesar, metuens ne frons sibi prima labaret
incursu, tenet obliquas post signa cohortes,
inque latus belli, qua se uagus hostis agebat,
emittit subitum non motis cornibus agmen.

A study of the sources, which critics do not appear to have adequately considered,⁵ shows that the desired meaning is *cum Caesar, qui metuens ne . . . cohortes tenebat, . . . subitum agmen emittit*: Caes. B.C. 3. 89. 4 (before the battle) 'timens ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumueniretur, celeriter . . . cohortes detraxit . . . equitatuique opposuit', 3. 93. 5 f. (during the battle) 'quod ubi C. animaduertit, quartae aciei quam instituerat sex cohortium numero dedit signum. illae celeriter procucurrerunt';⁶ note Frontin. Strat. 2. 3. 22 'sex deinde cohortes in subsidio *retinuit* ad res subitas et dextro latere conuersas *in obliquum*, unde equitatum hostium exspectabat, conlocauit. . . . Pompei equitatum inopinato excursu auerterunt'.

Can the sense specified above or any other be squeezed⁷ from the Latin? It is hard to believe.⁸ My own feeling is that the words *metuens . . . cohortes*

¹ The Lock is clearly contrasting its former period of simple nourishment with its subsequent state of starvation. The contrast παρθενίη μὲν ὅτι ἦν—γυναικείων δὲ admits of no other interpretation.

² Cf. 82 and (as emended) 91 'unguinis expertem non siris esse tuam me'.

³ 'Coma multum olei simplicis, quo virgo utebatur, biberat, at cum breui post nuptias abiuncta esset, unguentis, quibus Ber. nupta utebatur, frui non potuit', Pfeiffer.

⁴ Anything like Prof. Heresu's recent proposal (*Eranos* lv [1957], 153 ff.), *hominis expers, unguentorum una millia*, other difficulties apart, destroys the correspondence between *expers unguentis* and οὐκ ἀπέλανσα μύρων.

⁵ Postgate alone finds difficulty with this passage. His proposal *ciet* for *tenet* is disproved by *retinuit* in the Frontinus passage

quoted below.

⁶ Cf. too Plutarch, *Caes.* 44. 2 ff. δεδοκώς τὴν λαμπρότητα καὶ τὸ πλήθος αὐτῶν . . . ἐξ απέρας . . . κατόπιν ἔστησε τοῦ δεξιοῦ, κτλ. (also *Pomp.* 69. 2 ff.).

⁷ e.g. Duff's rendering 'moved the cohorts which he kept at an angle to his front behind the standards, and suddenly sent them forward'. It will be noted that Duff makes the *metuens ne*-clause indicate the cause of the cohorts' dispatch, not of their posting as in Caesar and Plutarch.

⁸ In *C.Q.*, n.s. iv (1954), 190, where I discussed the passage, I expressed the view that it represented loose writing on the part of Lucan. The late Prof. A. Y. Campbell wrote to say he disagreed with this view; he suggested that Lucan could not write so badly. I now feel that he is right.

represent a parenthesis¹ and that a verse containing a finite verb (e.g. = 'gave the signal to charge'; cf. Caes. l.c.), carelessly omitted as not necessary to the sense or construction by a copyist as easily satisfied as the editors, has dropped out after 522.

In many cases there may rest some doubt about the soundness of the text, and judgement as to the degree of carelessness, incompetence, or absurdity, to which a writer can attain, must depend on the feeling and discrimination of the individual scholar. Where an apparent ineptitude concerns the reproduction of the actual words of a model, there is in some cases at least the possibility of one type of corruption for consideration: the words before us may represent not those of the poet but an interpolation or a marginal quotation which has ousted the original. Agreement of the manuscript words with those of the model constitutes, indeed, strong *prima facie* authority and the assumption of an interpolation must be an extreme resort; the possibility, often overlooked, nevertheless remains. A passage where this type of corruption may have occurred is

Consol. ad Liuiam 359–62

tendimus hoc omnes, metam properamus ad unam,
omnia sub leges Mors uocat atra suas.
ecce necem intentam caelo terraeque fredoque,
casurum triplex uaticinatur opus.²

Cf. Ov. *Trist.* 2. 425–6 'explicat ut causas rapidi Lucretius ignis | casurumque triplex uaticinatur opus'. The difficulty in 362 is the absence of any convincing subject for *uaticinatur*, for (with all respect to Helm³ and Bickel⁴) *Mors* would make a queer one. Löfstedt⁵ attributes the strange language to the poet's naïve reproduction of the Ovid. Was he really so witless? Some scholars adopt Heinsius's conjecture *casurum(que) . . . uaticina(n)tur* (so Witlox), but both sense and Latin seem to me unsatisfying.⁶ Now 361 is admirable; what we miss in 362 is a continuation of the accusative construction introduced by *ecce*. I suggest as a possibility that *uaticinatur* may have ousted some such word as *praecipitanter* and that in his exploitation of Ovid the poet wrote

ecce necem intentam caelo terraeque fredoque
casurum(que) triplex praecipitanter opus.

The original word may have been corrupted and *uaticinatur* interpolated from the Ovid; *-que* (which is not, however, essential; see Bickel, l.c.) would then be omitted as redundant.

An interesting passage which has not been diagnosed by editors is

Paul. Nol. *Carm.* 16. 221–3

et multi dubitant agnoscere et ante rogantes,
uerane, te, facies? aiunt, tune ille beatus
redderis heu tanto nobis post tempore, Felix?

¹ Campbell too suggested this independently, but proposed to read in 523 *in latus (has) bellis*.

² I print according to the manuscripts.

³ *Phil. Woch.* lv (1935), 921.

⁴ *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F. xciii (1950), 209 ff.

⁵ l.c. 157 f.

⁶ Löfstedt's objection, however, that 'the change (to *uaticinantur*) is inadmissible in view of the fact that the singular form is evidenced both by the manuscripts and by Ovid' does not take into account the possibility of the reading's having been brought into line with Ovid by interpolation.

The long-lost Felix reappears. What is the construction of *te* in 222? It has none, and the only reason for its existence, which editors have missed, is Virg. *Aen.* 3. 310 '*uerane te facies*, uerus mihi nuntius adfers', where *te* is the object of *adfers*. So accomplished and learned a writer as Paulinus could not, indeed, have failed to understand the grammar of the sentence as a whole. May he, however, have had in his mind an echo of the first three words only, and may he have vaguely thought of the ellipse of some verb, e.g. *rogo*?¹ Or is it more probable, as I have previously suggested,² that he wrote *uerane tu facies*, and that *te* is due to a copyist's assimilation to the Virgil? Cf. *Georg.* 4. 566 'Tityre, *te* patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi', where G reads *tu* for *te* owing to *Ed.* 1. 1 'Tityre, *tu* patulae recubans sub t. f.'³

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¹ Cf. adjurations with *per*: e.g. Luc. 10. 370 'per *te* quod fecimus una | perdidimusque nefas, perque iustum sanguine Magni | foedus, ades'.

² *C.R.* iii (1953), 82. I suggested the possibility of this type of corruption also in *Culex* 275 'nec faciles Ditis sine iudice sedes',

where the odd language is generally ascribed to the poet's inability to make a sane use of Virg. *Aen.* 6. 431 'nec uero haec sine sorte datae, sine iudice, sedes': I conjectured *nee facilis Ditis sub iudice sedes*, i.e. *et sedes Ditis sub non facilis iudice (positas)*.

³ See Havet, *Manuel*, §§ 1087 ff.

NOTES ON HORACE, EPISTLES 1¹

1. 5. 4-6.

HORACE addresses *Epist. 1. 5* and *Od. 4. 7* (*diffugere nives*) to his friend Torquatus. The superscription to the ode and Ps.-Acro on the epistle identify the recipient as Manlius Torquatus; the reference to Torquatus' lineage (l. 23 of the ode) suits a member of this old patrician family. Some editors have supposed that Horace's friend was C. Nonius Asprenas, who was given the name 'Torquatus' after he had been injured in the *lusus Troiae* (Suet. *Aug. 43. 2*). But Suetonius implies that this accident happened shortly before the games were abandoned, towards the end of the century;² and Asprenas must have been a boy at the time.

In the epistle Horace invites Torquatus to supper, and gives particulars of the wine that will be drunk:

vina bibes iterum Tauro diffusa palustris
inter Minturnas Sinucessanumque Petrinum:³
si melius quid habes arcesse, vel imperium fer (4 ff.).

Editors say that *imperium* is the authority of the *dominus convivii*, but Münzer, *R.E. xiv. 1. 1193*, sees an additional point: he suggests that there is a joking allusion to the proverbial *imperia Manliana*, which are often associated with the Manlii Torquati. The first person to bear the name Torquatus, T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, cos. 347, etc., was famous for his stern discipline; everybody knew how he had executed his son for disobedience on the battlefield. In Livy's account of this episode the word *imperium* is used five times, culminating in an explicit reference to *imperia Manliana* (8. 7. 8-22). In Livy 26. 22. 9 another T. Manlius Torquatus, in refusing the consulship, says to the people *neque ego vestros mores consul ferre potero neque vos imperium meum*. In fin. 2. 105 Cicero is talking to his Epicurean friend L. Manlius Torquatus, and criticizing the Epicurean view that the wise man forgets his misfortunes; he says *sed res se tamen sic habet ut nimis imperiosi philosophi sit vetare memirisce. vide ne ista sint Manliana vestra aut maiora etiam, si imperes quod facere non possim*. For other references to *imperia Manliana* see Liv. 4. 29. 6, Gell. 1. 13. 7; even Augustine, in telling the story of Imperiosus Torquatus, says *quia contra imperium suum, id est contra quod imperaverat pater imperator . . . pugnaverat* (*civ. Dei 5. 18*). So if Münzer is right, Horace is saying that Torquatus, though he came of a family which was used to giving orders, would have to receive them for once.⁴ The case for this interpretation is by no means proved, but cannot be dismissed out of hand on grounds of obscurity; this is exactly the sort of point which, though obscure to us, would be clear to Horace's readers.

It seems to have been forgotten that another historical allusion has

¹ I wish to thank Mr. Gordon Williams for his help.

² For the date cf. K. Schneider, *R.E. xiii. 2065*.

³ The three lines form a unity, and a colon should be printed after *Petrinum*.

⁴ Münzer also finds significance in l. 21 where Horace says *haec ego procurare et idoneus imperor et non invitus*; and indeed *imperor* is so strange that it needs some explanation.

previously been found in the same context.¹ The first of the Torquati, old Imperiosus himself, defeated the Latins in 340 between Sinuessa and Minturnae; see Livy 8. 11. 11 *huic agmini Torquatus consul ad Trifanum—inter Sinuessam Minturnasque is locus est—occurrit.*² It looks as if Horace is deliberately offering his friend wine from his ancestor's battlefield; for wine with sentimental value cf. *Epd. 13. 6, Od. 3. 21. 1* and especially *1. 20. 2*, though wine from a battlefield is unique. Torquatus, a Roman patrician, must have known where his greatest ancestor (Cic. *Sull. 32*) was supposed to have fought his most decisive battle. It then becomes difficult to believe that Horace wrote the words in ignorance or with indifference. Sinuessa and Minturnae were only nine Roman miles apart, so the coincidence would be unusual. The district (and hence, one might guess, its associations) would be known to everybody who had travelled down the Appian Way to Campania. Horace does not say 'Trifanum' because it was an obscure place, ignored by Diodorus; in any case wine from a single village or estate would have been hard to obtain.

This interpretation gains support from I. 6 *si melius quid habes arcesse*. Horace's wine is of medium quality, six years old at the very most;³ a man of Torquatus' position would be expected to keep a better cellar than Horace. In fact, on the conventional interpretation it is hard to understand the point of *si melius quid habes arcesse*. But if the wine had a sentimental value Horace can challenge Torquatus to produce something better, without fear that his challenge will be accepted.

If we admit that Horace's wine has associations with Imperiosus Torquatus then Münzer's explanation of *imperium fer* becomes much easier.

I. 10. 44 ff.

laetus sorte tua vives sapienter, Aristi,
nec me dimittes incastigatum, ubi plura
cogere quam satis est ac non cessare videbor.

The surface meaning of these lines is perfectly satisfactory, yet a special point may be seen if we consider the recipient of the epistle, Aristius Fuscus. Ps.-Acro says at the beginning of the epistle that he was a *grammaticus*; Porphyrio on *Sat. 1. 9. 60* calls him *praestantissimus grammaticus illo tempore*. A *grammaticus*, even when a professional grammarian and man of learning, was primarily a schoolmaster. *dimittere* is naturally used of dismissing pupils (e.g. Mart. 9. 68. 11); *castigatio*, both with *verba* and *verbata*, was an everyday activity of ancient schoolmasters. Horace seems to be gently mocking both his friend and himself.

Aristius Fuscus was the recipient of *Odes 1. 22 (integer vitae)*, and in *Satires 1. 9* he refuses to rescue Horace from the bore. There is another possible fact about him which is worth recalling, as it is omitted in the notices in *R.E.* and

¹ See I. G. F. Estré, *Horatiana Prosopographica* (1846), p. 497. I owe this reference to Mr. T. F. Higham; I originally thought that the point had been completely overlooked. As Estré does not argue his case, and his book is little known, it seems worth while reviving his idea and combining it with Münzer's.

² Diodorus 16. 90. 2 says *περὶ Σούεσσαν*

(Σούεσσαν Siganus). For difficulties about this campaign see Beloch, *Römische Geschichte*, p. 373, De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, ii. 275 ff. One thing is clear: it was believed in Horace's time that a major battle had taken place in the triangle Minturnae-Sinuessa-Suessa.

³ Taurus was consul for the second time in 26 B.C.; the book was published in 20.

P.I.R.². In a grammatical fragment, *G.L.* vii. 35 (Keil), the manuscript reads *abnesti fusti grammatici liber est ad assinum pollionum*. Usener's emendation *Aufusti* is accepted by Keil and Funaioli, but Haupt's *Aristi Fuscī* (cf. *Opuscula* 2. 69) explains the corruption more simply. In *Satires* 1. 10. 83 ff. Aristius Fuscus and Asinius Pollio are mentioned in the same context as people who approved of Horace's poems. Admittedly, as Funaioli points out (*Gramm. Rom. Frag.*, p. 507), writings by Aristius are not mentioned elsewhere.

I. 13. 1 ff.

ut proficiscentem docui te saepe diuque
Augusto reddes signata volumina, Vinni,
si validus, si laetus erit, si denique poscet.

Horace is sending his collection of poems to Augustus; the bearer is one Vinnius (the manuscripts give no authority for the spelling *Vinius*). Ps.-Acro and the superscription in the manuscripts call him Vinnius Asellus (cf. 8 f. *Asinaeque paternum cognomen vertas in risum*). Ps.-Acro on l. 8 calls him C. Vinnius Fronto, but this may be a mistaken identification with some other person.

The elder Pliny mentions a centurion called Vinnius, a man of spectacular strength, who served in Augustus' praetorian guard: 'at Vinnius Valens meruit in praetorio divi Augusti centurio, vehicula culleis onusta donec exinanirentur sustinere solitus, carpenta adprehensa una manu retinere, obnixus contra nitentibus iumentis, et alia mirifica facere, quae insculpta monumento eius spectantur' (*N.H.* 7. 82). Horace emphasizes the weight of his parcel of poetry (l. 6); he says to his Vinnius *viribus uteris per clivos flumina lamas* (l. 10). Sufficient point is provided by the man's nickname Asina or Asellus, but it would add to the joke if the famous strong man were meant. Such an identification is obviously speculative; this note simply points to the possibility.

It is usually thought that Horace's correspondent is a humble friend of his own, and not somebody in Augustus' retinue. But this is by no means certain. Horace is asking Vinnius to make sure that Augustus is well and in the right mood, and this would not be easy for an unimportant messenger who had travelled a long journey and was far from his base. (Indeed, if Vinnius was a friend of Horace's, one might prefer to say that l. 3 does not exactly represent Horace's verbal instructions, but is put into the written epistle out of courtesy to Augustus.) But if Vinnius is a subordinate of Augustus', with regular access to him, the line suits perfectly; such a subordinate could proffer the poems immediately or withhold them as circumstances suggested. One may compare Martial's verses to Domitian's doorkeeper, in spite of the differences between the two societies: *nosti tempora tu Iovis sereni cum fulget placido suoque vultu, quo nil supplicibus solet negare* (5. 6. 9 ff.).

It may be objected that the praetorian guard was a large body of nine cohorts, each consisting of six centuries; there may not have been close contact between every centurion and Augustus. Yet one of the duties of the force was to provide a personal bodyguard for the Princeps, which travelled about with him. Augustus, who shared some of his countrymen's tastes, was amused by *minuti pueri* (Suet. *Aug.* 83); he was presumably aware of this remarkable strong man in his own praetorian guard. Vinnius is the sort of person who might even have been singled out for special duty.

Pliny's Vinnius belongs to the right place socially for Horace's slightly condescending jocularity; he looks like the type of centurion who had risen from below and reached his peak. Seeing that he is known to Pliny so long after, he must have been a familiar personality in the Rome of Augustus; his epitaph shows that he was a real 'character' of the type so much savoured by the Romans. The difficulty is that we cannot be sure that he flourished so early under Augustus as 23 B.C.; but supposing he did, then any Vinnius who is mentioned in l. 2 in connexion with Augustus, and not more explicitly defined till l. 8 (*Asinae*), might most naturally remind people of the astonishing centurion of the guard.

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SOPHOCLES, *ANTIGONE* 599–603: A POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR *KONIS*

νῦν γὰρ ἐσχάτας ὑπὲρ
ρίζας ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίπου δόμοις.
κατ' αὖ νῦν φωνίᾳ
θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων ἀμῷ κόνις,
λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν ἐρυνίς.

It is well known that several past scholars wished to emend *kónis* in line 602 to *κοπίς*. Their main ground was the awkwardness of the mixed metaphor implied by *ἀμῷ κόνις*. They were, however, judging mixed metaphors by modern European standards, and Hermann rightly demurred, while Lewis Campbell firmly retained *kónis*. Nevertheless, the emendation was upheld by Jebb (in his first edition), and Schneidewin, and also, more recently, by Mr. H. Lloyd-Jones (see *C.Q.*, n.s. vii (1957), 12–27).

A point of style, not adequately noted in the past, affords a strong positive argument in favour of *kónis*. *φάος* is subject of the first sentence (lines 599–600); *kónis* is subject of the second. The two sentences stand in contrast: 'light had been spread over the last shoot; but now dust mows it down'. We notice, further, that the two subjects are opposed in sense; 'light' (in this context the light of life and of the world above ground) is the converse of the 'bloody dust of the nether gods'. This contrast between the light of the world above ground and the darkness of below ground is well known in classical literature, and it adds much to the poetical contrast here. If we changed from 'dust' to 'chopper', we should not destroy the effect entirely; but we should lose a great deal, and we should be introducing an extraneous element. The emendation would certainly not be an improvement on Sophocles.

This is, to my mind, as conclusive an argument as could possibly be produced in favour of *kónis*. To meet various objections to *kónis*, I would add: (1) The Greeks would have had no difficulty in understanding the phrase 'Now

the bloody dust of the nether gods mows it down again'. When a warrior was slain, he fell in, and so was levelled in, this very 'bloody dust'; we may note the Homeric stock phrase *αἷματι καὶ κονίγου πεφυρμένος*. So the relevance of 'bloody dust' to the idea of 'mowing down' would have been apparent; that which had looked as if it was coming out nicely into the light, was now mowed down in the dust. There may be some kind of 'poetical inversion' involved (to use L. Campbell's term), but the sense is perfectly clear; and L. Campbell gives abundant evidence of Sophocles' freedom in the use of constructions, in the introduction to his edition of Sophocles. (2) There is no real objection to the loose coupling of *κόνις* with *λόγου τ' ἄνοια κτλ.* *λόγου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν* goes closely together as the instrumental aspect of the subject of the sentence, and hence is closely joined together by *τε καὶ*. *κόνις* represents a different aspect of the subject, and is therefore more loosely joined to the rest of the subject by a comma only. (3) But of course it is *κόνις* of the nether gods, and since *ἔρων* was also a nether god, there is some kind of connexion between the two parts of the subject. Moreover, if *κόνις* alluded to Antigone's sprinkling of the dust, well might Sophocles go on to think of all the folly of word and frenzy of wits that attended upon that act.

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A REPLY ON *AN* WITH THE FUTURE

MR. HULTON has made interesting comments (*C.Q.*, n.s. vii (1957), 139–42) on my earlier article (*ibid.* xl (1946), 1–10), from which I note that he is in favour of the construction, and also sees emphatic meaning in some examples. I am afraid, however, that I do not find his arguments convincing. Perhaps some brief remarks on them may be helpful.

It is natural that we should ask what was the meaning of *av* by itself, and tempting to suppose that it had a well-defined adverbial sense. But in fact that is highly doubtful for those stages of the language of which we have knowledge. Chantraine is surely right when he states (*Gramm. Hom.* ii. 349) that in Homer ‘le sens des deux particules *ke* et *av* est lui-même assez malaisé à définir’. We cannot indeed hope to understand the meaning of *av* apart from the context of its use in a particular type of clause (principal or subordinate), and above all with a particular mood. It is not possible to give a meaning to *av* in isolation as one may, for example, to *apa* or to *oūtw̄s*. Mr. Hulton says (p. 140 n.) that ‘though the particles [*av* and *ke*] are often used together with the subjunctive and optative, and often must be, their use and meaning and that of these moods are strictly independent and are to be studied separately’. This would lead us to suppose that in an Attic sentence such as *ei παρείη, ἀποθάνοις av*, the potential meaning of ‘he would die’ is satisfactorily conveyed by the optative alone, to which *av* adds some further modification; and therefore, that we could, if we wished, dispense with the use of *av* without serious change of meaning or abnormality of syntax. Or again, that in *ei παρῆν, ἀπέθανεν av*, the indicative *ἀπέθανεν* by itself conveys its ‘unfulfilled’ meaning!

Connected with this is the criticism (also p. 140 n.) of the customary use of the term *modal particles* for *av* and *ke*. But modal is exactly what they are: primarily they supplement the use of the subjunctive and optative moods,¹ and even become an indispensable unit in the modal expression. In Attic, to take just one example, the optative preserves its potential use as a normal rule only when *av* is associated with it.

In my article I said (p. 2) that it is the regular function of Homeric *av* to limit a statement by making it dependent on some condition, or by otherwise weakening its effect. By ‘weakening’ I meant, in relation to a future statement, that it is not stated clearly and with certainty that an event will happen; no definite condition is expressed, but the occurrence is stated to be possible, the sentence being in such a form as ‘some one may say, is likely to say’. So I took *Il.* 4. 176 *καὶ κέ τις ὡδὸς ἔρει τρώων* either (p. 2) as ‘thus will one of the Trojans then speak’, understanding by ‘then’ the fulfilment of the condition of the death of Menelaus; or (p. 3) as ‘thus may one of the Trojans speak’. Similarly I suggested that *Il.* 1. 139 *ὅ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται* might be taken in either way. It is involved in this explanation that *av* may be interpreted in two ways. In the first type of case, where there is a clear condition, we may

¹ Thus Schwyzer, *Greich. Gramm.* ii. 305, calling them *Modalpartikeln*, says of them that they strengthen the pre-existent modal uses of the prospective subjunctive and potential optative; their use was originally

optional, but then became indispensable. We may compare the use of prepositions, originally added to supplement the meaning of the cases, but eventually often indispensable.

take it as 'then, in those circumstances'; in the second it is modal and we translate it by modifying the verb, making it potential. Mr. Hulton tries to draw a rigid line between these meanings, but I do not think that possible. Take the sentences 'If I am not forbidden, I shall go'; 'In certain circumstances I shall go'; 'I shall possibly go, may go'. There is here progressively greater lack of definition, but any of the sentences may be appropriately spoken in the same situation.

Mr. Hulton's own translation of *ἀντί* is varied, and even seems to be self-contradictory. Thus (p. 139) 'in that case', 'in the relevant circumstances'; but also (*ibid.*) 'in general', and (p. 140) 'in any case': and this, too, apparently irrespective of the type of clause and verb involved, which we are elsewhere bidden to examine as a separate item. Of these meanings the one that has general support is the first, defining some particular circumstance or condition (so Chantraine, Schwyzer). But then Mr. Hulton makes use of this to explain cases where sentences with *ἀντί* and the future have emphatic meaning: he says (p. 141) that 'if the positive *ἀντί* means "in certain instances", the negative *ἀντί* means "in no instances"'. This is far from the truth. The negation of 'in certain instances' is a limited one: 'in certain instances he will come' is turned by negation into 'he will not come in certain instances', to which a reasonable addition would be 'but he will come in other instances'. Hence it does not do to interpret Plato, *Rep.* 615d οὐδέ *ἀντί* ηγέτη δεῦρο as 'there is no possibility that he will come', with the added comment 'all conditions and possibilities whatever being excluded' (p. 141). All that is excluded on such a reading of *ἀντί* is his coming *in certain instances*. Again, with the interrogatives Mr. Hulton proposes a similar approach to emphatic meaning, and the same objection applies. The fact is that the negative and the interrogatives are so strengthened by the addition of an indefinite adverb such as *ποτέ* 'at any time', *πως* 'in any way', etc.: thus οὐ *ποτέ* 'not at any time', τις *ποτέ* 'who ever . . . ?'. But I have seen no evidence that *ἀντί* can be put on the same footing; and if on the other hand we start from the meaning 'in certain instances', as is proposed, we shall certainly not reach the desired conclusion.

THE END OF THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES¹

INTRODUCTION

So many scholars nowadays believe that the final scenes of the *Seven against Thebes* as we have them have been considerably distorted and interpolated that some may not be aware that such an opinion was first expressed little more than 100 years ago. The first scholar to do so was A. Schöll, who afterwards recanted (1 and 2); the first to discuss the question in detail was J. Oberdick (5), who acknowledges a hint from R. Westphal given as early as 1858. But the first to recommend this view to a wide audience was Theodor Bergk. As early as 1857 he briefly outlined his thesis (3); and in the third volume of his *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* (8) he offered a detailed treatment which was the most influential before that of Wilamowitz.

Why was the question first raised only in 1848? In that year J. Franz had published for the first time the didaskalia to the *Seven* in the Medicean manuscript. This showed that this play was not the second of the Theban trilogy, as before that date had been generally supposed; it was the third (cf. now the similar didaskalia to the *Oedipus* in P. Oxy. 2256 fr. 2). This is what aroused the suspicions of Bergk and the rest. How was it possible, Bergk asked (8, pp. 302–3), for a new issue, that of Polyneices' burial, to be raised so near the end not merely of the *Seven*, but of the Theban trilogy? It is important to realize that, historically speaking, this argument lies at the root of the whole modern discussion of the problem.

Bergk went on to argue that after the anapaestic lines (861–74) by which Ismene and Antigone are introduced they remain silent for a suspiciously long time during a long sequence of choral lyric. Throughout that sequence (875–1004), the indications of speaker given by the manuscripts are defective and suspicious. If the manuscripts can be trusted, one of the sisters first gives utterance at 933; but it may well be that they cannot, and that a sister speaks for the first time only at 961. Bergk remarked (8, p. 304, with n. 78) that there is a marked difference of tone and treatment between 875–960 and 961–1004; the former passage consists of continuous choral lyric, the latter of a kind of 'lyric stichomythia', in which two speakers lament the brothers in alternate lines or half-lines, with occasional interpositions by the Chorus.

Bergk concluded that Ismene and Antigone had been introduced into the text by a post-Aeschylean producer influenced by the highly popular *Antigone* of Sophocles. He thought this might have been Aeschylus' son Euphorion, who as we know won four victories with his father's plays after his father's death (Suidas, s.v. *Αἰσχύλος*, printed in Wilamowitz's edition, p. 14). The anapaests

¹ I must thank P. Maas, D. L. Page, K. J. Dover, and G. S. Kirk for the help they have kindly given me with this paper. The responsibility for what is said in it is all my own.

The numbers found after the names of scholars refer to the bibliography given at the end of the article. Wilamowitz's article of 1903 (18) is quoted as *S.B.B.*, and his

book of 1914 (28) as *A.I.* The bibliography relates only to the problem of the authenticity of certain parts of the final scenes. My references to Aeschylus are in terms of the numbering of lines in G. Murray's Oxford text (2nd ed., 1955), which in some places differs from that of Wilamowitz and others.

at 861–74, the lyric stichomythia at 961–1004, and everything from 1005 to the end of the play were ascribed by Bergk to the interpolator.

This theory met with a certain measure of support; but the case for it was not substantially developed till 1903, when Wilamowitz treated of the topic (18). Wilamowitz gave excellent reasons for showing that it is rash to cut out lines 961–1004: the passage contains markedly Aeschylean features, and has notable resemblance to *Pers.* 1002 ff. But Wilamowitz assigned this passage to the Chorus; the sisters he rejected, cutting out 861–74 and the whole final act from 1005. Three years later Max Wundt replied to Wilamowitz with a detailed and, despite some defects, useful examination of the problem (20).

Wilamowitz returned to the topic in his book *Aischylos: Interpretationen*, published in 1914 (28). He declares that anyone who still doubts the spuriousness of the passages in question is 'unteachable'; but none the less offers a new treatment of the problem which, owing chiefly to the need to meet Wundt's criticisms, is a good deal more adequate than the earlier one. This section of Wilamowitz's book will be examined in detail in the present article.

Since 1914 Wilamowitz's views have been accepted (sometimes with modifications) by the majority of scholars; for example by P. Mazon, Gilbert Murray (though in the second edition of his text, 1955, he removed the brackets from 861–74), D. L. Page, Eduard Fraenkel, and Max Pohlenz. Some have treated the alleged interpolations with a fine contempt. Carl Robert (30), who, however, keeps the anapaests at 861–74, is an extreme example. 'Auf Grund dieses wundervollen Dramas', he writes (op. cit., i. 375 f.), 'hat dann ein armer Schächer — man denkt unwillkürlich an Morsimos oder einen aus seiner Sippe — das jämmerliche Machwerk fabriziert, das wir jetzt als Schluss dieses Dramas lesen. Seine Unechtheit ist so oft und mit so schlagenden Gründen erwiesen, ist für jeden mit etwas Stilgefühl und poetischem Sinn begabten so sonnenklar, dass es überflüssig scheinen könnte, auf die Sache noch einmal einzugehen. . . .'

But not everyone has agreed with Wilamowitz. H. Weir Smyth in the Loeb *Aeschylus* has not bracketed the lines (cf. p. 131 of his *Aeschylean Tragedy*); neither has M. Untersteiner. Theodor Zieliński, Walter Nestle, and Wilhelm Schmid were not convinced. Bruno Snell in 1928 (40) offered some good arguments for hesitating to condemn the passages in question. In particular, he argued that the language of the play cannot be shown to be 'unaeschylean'. More recently S. C. Manginas (65), together with much that I cannot accept, has assembled a great deal of useful evidence of the same kind. But even if it could be shown that the language of the alleged interpolations was similar at every point to that of the unquestioned works of Aeschylus, their authenticity would not yet have been established. A skilful forgery is always possible; and Wilamowitz and his followers believe these lines to have been forged at a date when a convincing imitation should have been possible. Further, they attach far less importance to their arguments from language than to their arguments based on the context and the general character of the play, and these general arguments have not yet been subjected to a careful scrutiny.

The first part of this article will examine the arguments against authenticity that are based on the subject-matter of the parts in question and on their relation to the general theme of this play and (as far as can be determined) of the trilogy. It will not be possible for me to assess these arguments without going

in some detail into certain of the major problems of the trilogy. In the second part I shall deal with certain subsidiary arguments; in the third I shall go through the part of the text under discussion, commenting where this is necessary. I shall discuss those expressions which Wilamowitz and others have thought could not have been used by Aeschylus; but I shall assemble no evidence to prove the Aeschylean character of the language in general. Much evidence of this nature can be found in the articles of Snell and Manginas and in the commentaries (especially those of Wecklein (16), Tucker, and Groenboom); my article is in any case alarmingly long; and for the reasons I have given the assembly of such evidence cannot help much in deciding the question at issue.

I. CAN A NEW ISSUE BE RAISED LATE IN THE PLAY?

All Wilamowitz's arguments must be discussed in detail. But first of all we must examine an argument which Wilamowitz does not explicitly restate, yet which seems to have been present to his mind. This is an argument which lies, historically speaking, at the root of the whole controversy; the argument, originally put forward by Bergk, that it is impossible for a new issue, that of the burial of Polyneices, to be raised just as the play, and with it the trilogy, is drawing to its close.

Now since we possess only one other play which is the last of a trilogy, we should to some extent be on our guard against allowing this general argument to exert too strong an influence upon our judgement. Wundt (20, p. 364 f.) has some sensible remarks on the danger of forcing ancient dramas into accordance with modern dramatic notions. But let us examine it not in general terms, but as it appears when applied to the actual context, as it is by Wilamowitz. The content of the play, he says (p. 88), rules out the final act. Oedipus has promised his sons enough of the country's soil to make a burial-place (732). After their death, this is repeated by the Messenger (818); no one can doubt that this is what they will get. Why are the bodies brought on, if not to share a common funeral? That is what the Chorus assume (914); the whole lyric lamentation presupposes that their fate is to be the same. Polyneices has indeed claimed that he has Justice on his side (639 ff.), and Eteocles has denied that claim. But in the sight of Aeschylus their guilt is equal. One grave is to receive them (1003). How can it then be said of Polyneices that he only returned evil for evil (1049)? No one can deny that these arguments have considerable force; and anyone who defends the authenticity of the scene in question will have to answer them.

A. Danger of basing one's answer to this question upon a priori assumptions.

First, when Wilamowitz says that the content of the play rules out this scene, he is being too hasty. True, the curse of Oedipus makes it certain that the brothers are to share a common grave; true, in the play as we have it the action of the Theban state threatens to thwart the curse in this respect. But in the outcome this threat is not successful in preventing Polyneices' burial. The scene between Antigone and the Herald ends with Antigone declaring roundly that she will bury Polyneices (1052). 'Be self-willed if you wish,' replies the Herald, 'but I forbid you.' But the play concludes with one part of the Chorus going to bury Eteocles and the other half going to bury Polyneices; and it has

been inferred that if the government had forbidden Polyneices' burial, this would have been impossible. But this is not necessarily so. The natural implication of the text as we have it is that the Herald forbids the burial; but that in the teeth of his prohibition, Antigone carries out her promise of burying the body, and one-half of the Chorus goes with her to help her. From that we must certainly infer that there will be trouble for Antigone afterwards; and some readers will object that it is intolerable that the audience should be bothered with having to make this inference. What happens to Antigone later, they will say, is something outside the play; and it is against the canons of tragedy that the audience's attention should be distracted in this direction.

It is quite true that in the *Eumenides*, the only other play in our possession which is the third of a trilogy with a continuous theme, there is nothing comparable to this. But this hardly justifies us in laying down a general rule that no third play of a trilogy ever looked forward to episodes in the legend dated later than the play's concluding episode. Existing plays do in fact contain many such allusions to the future. I need scarcely rehearse the numerous tragedies that contain prophecies and curses; I will content myself with quoting an instance very similar to this. In the *Oedipus Coloneus* (1405 f., cf. 1435), Polyneices solemnly requests his sisters to make sure his body gets a fair burial; and at the end of the play (1769 f.), Antigone asks Theseus to have her and Ismene conveyed to Thebes, so that they may try to prevent the impending conflict. That foreshadowing of Antigone's heroic action heightens the pathos of the final scene; and so also in the *Seven* the foreshadowing of the price Antigone will have to pay for burying her brother heightens the pathos of the double funeral. I shall show presently that there is good reason to believe that the play contains two allusions to the Epigoni, and that l. 828 affords no good reason for supposing that Aeschylus chose in this trilogy to ignore their legend; see pp. 87 f.

But even a reader who allows that what I have said is reasonable may protest that the introduction, so late in the trilogy, of what he feels to be the new issue of Polyneices' burial has a disturbing effect. He may insist that the effect is so disturbing that even at the risk of pressing too far an argument which (if he is prudent) he admits to be subjective, he cannot credit Aeschylus with having intended it. To judge of how much force lies in this contention it will be necessary to investigate the relation of this scene as it stands to what goes before it. This investigation will require a detailed discussion of some of the main problems of the trilogy; a discussion which must be undertaken before the problem of the end of the play can be adequately tackled.

B. *The two interlacing themes of the Seven*

Wilamowitz clearly marked the two themes whose interlacing runs all through the surviving play and no doubt runs through the trilogy. *Septem adversus Thebas*, he wrote in 1895, 'bipartita est; coniunxit enim Aeschylus interitum Labdacidarum, rem vere tragicam, cum epica fabula, quae Septem ducum cladem celebrabat, neque defendi possit, si quis Aristoteli et Lessingio confisus actionis unitatem neglexisse crimini ei dederit' (*Ind. lect. aestiv. Göttingae*, 1895; now in *Griechische Verskunst*, 1921, 199). He himself clearly felt much sympathy with the criticism of the play which he puts into the mouth of his hypothetical champion of the unities. 'Die Sieben haben es überhaupt nicht

'erreicht', he wrote two years later (*Hermes*, xxxii. (1897), 390), 'die zwei Stoffe, die Rettung Thebens und den Untergang des sündigen Hauses, miteinander zu verschmelzen.' 'Sein ganzes Drama', he says at *S.B.B.* 438 f., 'hat zwei ganz disharmonische Grundmotive. Die eine ist die Oidipodie, die delphische exemplificatorische Geschichte von dem Ungehorsam des Laios, dem Fluche des Oidipus, dem Untergange der sündigen Brut. Das hat mit dem Wechselmorde der Brüder sein Ende. Das andere ist die siegreiche Verteidigung Thebens gegen die Argeier, der Untergang der Sieben. . . . Hier ist Eteokles der hochherzige Retter des Vaterlandes, der untadelige Held.' This doctrine is repeated at *A.I.* 67 f.: 'Die Zwiespältigkeit der Überlieferung, die den Dichter zur Schöpfung seines Eteokles geführt hat, geht durch das ganze Drama.' Wilamowitz feels the poet has combined two separate traditions, and with scant success. Only in the short scene in which Eteocles declares his resolve of challenging his brother does he find 'ein wahrhaft dramatisches Leben' (*S.B.B.*, l.c.); cf. *A.I.*, l.c.: 'Tragisch ist nur die kurze Abgangsszene des Eteokles.'¹

C. The action of the trilogy

Aeschylus certainly worked together two different themes; but whether or not he combined two different traditions is not to be determined with certainty. In the absence of sufficient material, the attempts of Bethe, Robert, and others to reconstruct the ancient Theban epics can hardly command assent.² But even supposing that he did, I believe he has combined the two with more skill than Wilamowitz will allow.³

About the first two plays of the trilogy we know little; few fragments have been preserved.⁴ But we know that the ruin of the sons of Oedipus was pre-ordained from the time of Laius, who defied the thrice-repeated warning of Apollo that he could preserve the city only by dying without offspring (*Th.* 748–9 *θυγάκοντα γένεται ἀτέρ σώζειν πόλιν*). Laius perished at the hands of the son whom he had exposed to escape the prophecy. For a time the city was threatened with deadly peril by the Sphinx, after whom the satyr-play that accompanied the trilogy was named (see also *Th.* 776–7). But for the time being the menace was averted through Oedipus. Then once more the curse upon the royal house threatened the city with disaster. First it struck at Oedipus, who after learning the truth about himself blinded himself. Then Oedipus cursed his sons; they were to divide their inheritance with iron, and neither was to enjoy more of it than a share in his father's tomb.

The brothers' offence against their father (785 f.) seems unlikely to have been thought of as a cause of guilt in general. Did they incur guilt through their quarrel with each other? We do not know how the brothers quarrelled in Aeschylus' version. It seems clear that Eteocles drove Polyneices out of Thebes,

¹ The following abbreviations denote the following works, to which frequent reference is made in the next section of my paper: Klotz = O. Klotz, *Rhein. Mus.* lxii (1917–18), 616 f.; Solmsen, *T.A.P.A.* = Friederich Solmsen, *T.A.P.A.* lxviii (1937), 197 f.; Solmsen, *H. and A.* = id., *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, New York, 1944.

² E. Bethe, *Thebanische Heldenlieder* (Leipzig, 1891); Robert, op. cit. i. 149 f.

³ Cf. B. Daube, *Die Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon* (Zürich, 1938), 89, n. 74.

⁴ See Robert's discussion, 30, i. 252 f.; Klotz, 621 f.; Solmsen, *H. and A.*, 189, n. 48. L. Deubner's conjecture (*Abh. Pr. Akad., Ph.-Hist. Kl.*, 1942, no. 4, 40 f.) that the story told by Σ Od. 11. 271 comes from Aeschylus' *Oedipus* is attractive, but uncertain; other possible sources could be named.

as in Sophocles (*O.C.* 371 f.) and Euripides (*Phoen.* 69 f., etc.)¹ In the extant play as it is preserved, Antigone claims that Eteocles was the aggressor in their quarrel; Solmsen's caution (*T.A.P.A.*, 200, n. 8) seems to me well justified. (1049 *παθών κακῶς κακοῖσι ἀντημείβετο*. Cf. 998–9, on which see p. 107.) This line of course comes from the part of the play whose authenticity is in question; its authority therefore is not binding on those who refuse to accept that authenticity. Robert (pp. 30, 271 f.) has no doubt that Aeschylus followed the same version as Hellanicus fr. 98 Jacoby (ap. Σ Eur. *Phoen.* 71, p. 259 Schwartz). According to this story the brothers agreed that Eteocles was to have the kingdom, while Polyneices was to live elsewhere, taking a large share of the family property, which included the necklace and the chiton of Harmonia. But Robert offers no positive reason for assuming that this was also Aeschylus' version. For all we know, Aeschylus may have used the same story as Pherecydes (fr. 96 Jacoby, quoted in the same scholion), according to which Eteocles drove his brother out by force.² But even if Aeschylus represented Eteocles as the aggressor, it is clear that he derived a compensating moral advantage from his position as the defender of Thebes against the Argive invaders whom his brother had brought against her. In any case Oedipus' curse rested on both alike. What is significant is not any individual guilt incurred by either, but the inherited guilt of both as members of the accursed race. It is possible that Aeschylus made the brothers guilty in different ways. But it is most unlikely that either's total guilt outweighed the other's.

From the point of view of the city, Eteocles was a hero and Polyneices a traitor. From that of any other members of the royal house Polyneices might well seem the less guilty of the brothers. In the eyes of the Erinyes, both were equally accursed.

We come now to the extant play. In the prologue and in his reply to the Messenger's first speech, Eteocles is all the patriot king defending his country against an invader whose brutality is heavily stressed.³ He knows that he him-

¹ P. Oxy. 2255, frs. 9, 10, and 11 are in the same hand. In fr. 9 we read *Ἰκαδμόν*; in fr. 10 *ἔγεικεσθαι φασι*. (Lobel quotes Hesychius *ἔγεικεν· ἔγειβαλεν*), in fr. 11, col. i, 3 *δελφόν*. This may well come from the *Oedipus* (part of a hypothesis [in a different hand] of which appears as 2256, fr. 2 in the same volume [P. Oxy., vol. xx]; Cf. ib., frs. 1 and 4, and see Snell, *Gnomon*, xxv [1953], 438). Polyneices' friends may then have said Eteocles had cast him out; cf. *Th.* 642 f.

² Cf. Jacoby on Pherecydes, l.c. (F.G.H. i a, p. 417): 'Die gewaltsame Vertreibung, allerdings zeitlich verschieden gesetzt, scheint die Vulgata in Epos und Tragödie gewesen zu sein.'

³ See Solmsen, *H. and A.*, 219, n. 156 with literature. But the barbarism of the Argives is exaggerated by some scholars. Tydeus and Capaneus stand out in this respect; and though they are more representative of the rest than Amphiarau, it is worth noting that Adrastus, the commander, is not said to be as impious as they are. 170 *ἐτεροφύνωφ στρατῷ* has long been cited as evidence of the Argives' *unhellenic* character.

Pauw, Hermann (at one time), and Tucker emended the adjective; Wilamowitz (*A.I.* 98) concludes that unlike the Thebans (72–73) the Argives do not speak Greek; and W. Kranz (*Stasimon*, p. 78) and Ed. Fraenkel (*S. B. Bay. Akad.*, 1957, Heft 3, 28) suggest that Aeschylus was transferring to the mythical Argives threatening Thebes a characteristic of the Persians who in his own lifetime had threatened Athens. There is no reason to credit the poet with so strange a confusion. ΣΜ (*τῷ μὴ θουατάζοντι*) saw the point; it is natural to infer that the Thebans spoke the Theban dialect and the Argives the Argive. For Aeschylus' awareness of dialectal differences, Wecklein-Zomarides, ad loc. quote *Ch.* 563–4, where Orestes warns Pylades that while impersonating Phocians they must speak Phocian dialect; vid. Groeneboom, ad loc. Again, *ἐτερόφωνος* may, like *ἀλλόθροος*, have meant little more than *ξένος*. The arrogant Argives show some un-hellenic traits; but in spite of Tydeus' Aetolian origins, they are not un-hellenic. K. J. Dover aptly reminds me that in English country districts, people still refer

self is doomed; but he implores the gods that the city, at least, may be preserved:

μή μοι πόλιν γε πρυμνόθεν πανώλεθρον
ἐκθαμνίσητε δηγάλωτον, Ἐλλάδος
φθόγγον χέονσαν, καὶ δόμους ἐφεστίους.

Throughout the scene in which he tries to calm the excessive agitation of the Chorus, Eteocles appears in the same favourable light; so, too, in the long scene in which he replies to the Messenger's speeches about the enemy champions and gives orders for a Theban champion to oppose each of them.

But as the scene continues, it becomes ever clearer that the seventh and last enemy champion will be Polyneices; and we know already (282) that the seventh Theban champion will be Eteocles himself. Weir Smyth has well pointed out (*Aeschylean Tragedy*, p. 140) that the scene derives much of its dramatic force from this circumstance. From this moment Eteocles' whole tone changes.¹ His reply to the Messenger's seventh speech contrasts sharply with the calm assurance of his earlier answers:

ὦ θεομανές τε καὶ θεῶν μέγα στύγος,
ὦ πανδάκρυτον ἀμὸν Οἰδίπον γένος·
ἄμοι, πατρὸς δὴ νῦν ἀραι τελεοφόροι.

Next comes his violent rebuttal of Polyneices' claim to have justice on his side, echoing but contrasting with the calmer refutation of Amphiaraus (580 f.). Amphiaraus has blamed Polyneices for bringing foreign enemies against his own city; Eteocles blames him for being in the wrong in the brothers' own personal conflict. It is far from certain, and indeed it is unlikely, that the audience is meant to feel that Eteocles is in the right. Nor is it necessarily meant to feel that he is in the wrong: Άρης Άρει συμβαλεῖ, δίκα δίκα. Finally the king proclaims his intention of himself standing at the seventh gate to meet his brother. The Chorus (677 f.) does its utmost to restrain him from what according to Greek religious notions was an impious act. Even heroes who were linked by no closer bond than that of guest-friendship would say to one another ἔγχεα δ' ἀλλήλων ἀλεώμεθα καὶ δι' ὄμιλον (Z 226). Deliberately to challenge one's own brother will be a pollution which can never be wiped out (682). Eteocles remains deaf to their entreaties. Let the race of Laius perish (689–91); the Curse of his father sits near his tearless eyes, telling of the prize he is to gain before his own death follows (695–7). What is that prize? the killing of his brother. The Chorus implore Eteocles to make a last attempt to escape the curse by sacrificing to the gods (698 f.); but he replies that by now the gods have become indifferent to his fate (702). The gods, the Chorus protest, may be appeased, just as Phoenix made the same protest to Achilles (I 497 f.). But Eteocles, like Achilles, remains obdurate; the curse of Oedipus has come upon him, and the prophetic dream that has warned him of approaching doom must be fulfilled (709 f.). Like Agamemnon at Aulis,² he has no choice; like Agamemnon, he is a victim of the *παρακοπή* which the gods send upon their victims. Is it indeed his purpose, the Chorus finally asks,

to natives of other parts of England as 'foreigners'.

¹ Cf. W. Kranz, *Stasimon*, p. 65.

² See D. L. Page, in the Introduction to Denniston-Page, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* (Ox-

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to shed his brother's blood? When evil is given us by the gods, Eteocles replies, we cannot escape their gift. Here the dialogue ends, and the Chorus enters upon that great ode which resumes from the beginning the story of the curse upon the house of Laius.¹

From that ode we learn (746) that Laius had thrice been ordered² by Apollo to preserve the city by dying without issue; Laius defied his order; Oedipus grew up to slay him, and the Sphinx came to Thebes. Oedipus saved the city from the Sphinx, and for a time was honoured by all as her preserver. But now the curse threatens to bring down the city together with her rulers:

δέδοικα δὲ σὺν βασιλεῦσι
μὴ πόλις δαμασθῆ. (764-5)

The Messenger appears, and sets at rest the fears of the Chorus (792 f.): 'The city has escaped the yoke of servitude. The boasts of the mighty warriors are fallen; the city enjoys calm weather, and amid the many buffets of the storm she has not let in the flood' (793-6). At six of the seven gates all has gone well (799). That is all we learn of the fates of the seven champions, and it is all we need to learn. So as to further his aim of depicting graphically the peril that threatens Thebes and leading up skilfully to the great scene of Eteocles' declaration that he will meet his brother, Aeschylus has put to good use these colourful figures of the epic myth; but now that they have served his purpose, in a single line he sweeps them off the board. The seventh gate, the Messenger continues, the lord Apollo himself has taken, fulfilling upon the race of Laius the curse their ancestor brought on them by his foolishness.

In the anapaests that begin at 822 and in the ode that follows, we once more find compared and contrasted the parallel fates of the city and the ruling family. 'Am I to rejoice and utter the ὁδολυγή', the Chorus asks, 'at the preservation of the city? or am I to weep for the unfortunate, the evil-starred leaders in the war?' (825 f.). The curse of Oedipus is fulfilled (840 f.). Two problems arising from this stasimon are intimately linked with one of the central questions of the play, which must be dealt with before we can go further. For reasons which will presently become apparent, it must be dealt with historically, beginning from the treatment of Wilamowitz.

D. Did Aeschylus in this trilogy look forward to the expedition of the Epigoni?

Wilamowitz felt that the stasimon 822 f. gave the clearest indication of the looseness with which Aeschylus had combined two disparate traditions. The Curse, he thought (*A.I.* 95) had been resolved with the death *without issue* of the two brothers. But danger still threatened the city; the tradition of the *Thebais* was that the unsuccessful expedition of the Seven was followed in the next generation by the successful expedition of the Epigoni. To the tradition of the *Thebais* he assigned the story (*Th.* 745-6) that Apollo thrice commanded

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Laius to keep the city safe by dying without issue; for this clearly pointed to the final destruction of Thebes by the Epigoni (*A.I.* 95–96). There must have been another tradition, he argues, of an oracle warning Laius that, if he had a son, that son would kill him and that his family would die out; ‘also ist zuzugeben, dass der Dichter zwei eigentlich unvereinbare Geschichten nebeneinander berücksichtigt hat’ (*A.I.* 82).

Robert (30) tried to defend Aeschylus against the reproach of confusion implied in this account. He argued (i. 264 f.) that Eteocles voluntarily devoted himself to death for the sake of the city. Eteocles knew that Apollo had ordered Laius to save the city by leaving no son. This implied, Robert held, that once the accursed race had perished, the curse was at an end. His theory obliged him to deny that the play contained any allusions to the legend of the Epigoni; and the case for such a denial, in his book very imperfectly made, was far better stated by Klotz (616 f.). At this point we must examine the textual problems around which the question of the possible references to the Epigoni revolves. It will be convenient to start by setting out the three passages in question:

- (1) 827–8 *ἡ τοὺς μογεροὺς καὶ δυσδαιμόνας
ἀτέκνους κλάυσω πολεμάρχους;*
 μένει
- (2) 902–3 *τε κτέαν' ἐπιγόνοις . . .*
- (3) 840–4 *ἔξεπραξεν, οὐδὲ ἀπέίπεν,
πατρόθεν εὐκταία φάτις,
βουλαὶ δ' ἀπιστοὶ Λαὸν διήρκεσαν.
μέριμνα δ' ἀμφὶ πτόλιν.
θέσφατ' οὐκ ἀμβλύνεται.*

Wilamowitz held that (1) ruled out the existence of Laodamas and Thersander, the sons of Eteocles and Polyneices, and with them the existence of the Epigoni (*A.I.* 82). (2) and (3), on the other hand, seemed to him (83 f.) to imply a belief in the Epigoni-tradition. He explained the apparent discrepancy by means of two imperfectly combined traditions, each of which had originally its separate oracle.

The view of Robert and Klotz requires that the apparent allusions to the Epigoni in (2) and (3) shall be explained away. Klotz argued (617–18) that in (2) the word *ἐπιγόνοις* is used in the general sense of ‘later generations’, and does not refer to the Epigoni of the legend, as Wilamowitz (*A.I.* 83 f.) had held. Wilamowitz (l.c.) had translated (3) as follows: ‘Des Vaters Fluch hat sich durchgesetzt, und des Laios Ungehorsam hat seine Folgen gehabt. Nun sorge ich um die Stadt; Orakel werden nicht stumpf.’ If this rendering is right, the Chorus would be looking forward with foreboding to the city’s inevitable destruction in the future. But Klotz (619 f.) takes it differently. By comparing Eur. *Hec.* 894 f. and *Rhes.* 547 f., he shows that *μέριμνα* need not mean only anxiety for the future, but can refer to sorrow in the present; *ἀμφὶ πτόλιν* he takes in the restricted local sense; and *θέσφατ'* *οὐκ ἀμβλύνεται* he thinks refers simply to the accomplishment of the oracle by the deaths of the two brothers.

Having in this way disposed of Wilamowitz’s arguments for references to the Epigoni, Klotz is able to reassert with greater confidence Robert’s view¹ that Eteocles sacrifices his life to save Thebes, because he knows that once the

¹ For literature see Klotz, p. 617; Solmsen, *T.A.P.A.*, p. 205, n. 28; id., *H. and A.*, 219, n. 155.

accursed race of the Labdacidae is extinct, the city will be safe. This view is now less generally held. It has been refuted by Friedrich Solmsen,¹ who clearly states the main point in these words (p. 206): 'There is in fact not the slightest evidence in the play that the king's combat or death has any effect upon the fate of Thebes. There would have been ample opportunity, in the messenger's report and elsewhere, to point out a causal connection between Eteocles' death and the victory of Thebes; but Aeschylus has not availed himself of such opportunities.' Solmsen's valuable article gives sound arguments in favour of the view, adopted in the summary of the play I have just given, that from 653 on Eteocles acts under the influence of the Erinyes (l.c., 200 f.).

The last part of Solmsen's article (207 f.) seems to me less convincing. Klotz's view had the great advantage of giving the play a comprehensible dramatic framework, and rescuing the poet from the imputation of having flung together two conflicting traditions in the careless way Wilamowitz supposed. Solmsen has exposed a weakness that is fatal to Klotz's theory; nor is this the only one, as I shall argue presently. But what general view of the plot does Solmsen arrive at? 'What may be inferred from the chorus', Solmsen says (p. 207; he means 822 f.), 'is that the city was originally involved in Laius' fatal mistake, and that there is still a chance of the city's becoming involved in the last phase of the curse which destroys its dynasty. However, in the end it becomes clear that the city has escaped, and the obvious interpretation of this fact is that Aeschylus held that the curse when coming to a head should be confined to the family and not affect the city. Eteocles is doomed, guiltless though he be; but it was repugnant to Aeschylus' moral and religious feeling that the curse and the catastrophe should include the city.' He still believes that the family curse is inevitably effective with the members of the blood-stained *gens*, that is to say, he has not yet struggled through to the solution reached in the *Eumenides*; but at least he decides that the fate of the city should be determined by other factors.'

Solmsen's argument here is exposed to the same objection which he has levelled, with devastating effect, at that of Klotz. The curse, Solmsen tells us, hangs over both the dynasty and the city. The blow falls: the dynasty is extinguished. We expect to hear of the destruction of the city. But it does not happen. Why not? It was 'repugnant to Aeschylus' moral and religious feeling' that it should. 'There would have been ample opportunity', we cannot help remarking, with an echo of Solmsen's own words, 'to tell us what his moral and religious feelings were, but Aeschylus has not availed himself of such opportunities.' It is true that Eteocles has prayed the gods that the city, at least, may be spared; it is true that the horror of the annihilation of a Greek city has been strongly stressed; but why does no one explain to us, at the end of the play, that the gods have decided to grant Eteocles' prayer?

Further, Solmsen evidently holds that (3) contains a reference to a threat for the future; but what he thinks about (2) he does not tell us. The familiar tradition was that that threat not only existed, but was afterwards realized. Does Solmsen agree with Klotz that this play contained no reference to the Epigoni? It seems so. But Solmsen thinks that as late as 843-4 'there is still a chance of the city's becoming involved in the last phase of the curse which

¹ In *T.A.P.A.*, l.c.; cf. B. Daube, *Die Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon* (Zürich, 1938), 88 f. Solmsen was following up the article of O. Regenbogen, *Hermes*, lxviii (1933), 63 f.

destroys the dynasty'. Could this have been suggested without the audience thinking of the Epigoni?

Solmsen would reply to this criticism by drawing attention to *ἀτέκνος* in (1); we are categorically informed, he would say, that the dynasty is altogether at an end. How is this consistent with his belief that (3) points to further danger to the city? Solmsen would not agree with Wilamowitz that the poet combined two incompatible traditions. He takes refuge in the unconvincing supposition that, though (3) points to further trouble, it does not point to the Epigoni. About (2) he says nothing.

Can we accept Klotz's suggestion that *ἐπιγόνοις* in (2) can be taken in the general sense of 'those born after'? The absence of any actual occurrence of this rare word in this sense does not rule out the possibility; and *ἐπιγυνόμενοι* is certainly so used in Homer. But the only instances before the fifth century (except Hecataeus fr. 30 Jacoby, where the word applies to the Heracleidae) all refer to these particular Epigoni. *Ἐπιγόνοι* is the name of an epic, or of a part of the *Thebais* (see Robert, op. cit. i. 188 f., etc.). It was the name of a play of Aeschylus (see Nauck, *T.G.F.*² 219). It is used by Pindar (*Pyth.* 8. 42) and Euripides (*Suppl.* 1224)¹ of these particular people. If not quite certain, it is at least highly probable that in this particular play it must mean them.

Is this probability strengthened by an examination of (3)? Klotz is entirely right in arguing that *μέριμνα* need not refer to future anxiety; and *ἄμφι πτόλων* could certainly bear the local sense that he assigns it. Nor is his view of *θέσφατ' οὐδὲ ἀμβλύνεται* easy to refute. Klotz takes it as a general statement; 'oracles lose not their edge'; the truth of this general statement is certainly exemplified by the death of the brothers, which the Chorus has just heard of. At the same time, Klotz has not shown that Wilamowitz's interpretation of this passage as an expression of anxiety for the future is impossible.

What makes strongly in favour of Klotz's view of (2) and (3) is its removal of the apparent glaring inconsistency with (1), which Wilamowitz cheerfully accepts and Solmsen simply refuses to face. Yet by removing the inconsistency Klotz has arrived at a view of the plot and of the fate of Eteocles which Solmsen has decisively refuted.

At this point it becomes necessary to reconsider (1), and to ask whether the assumption, common to all parties in this dispute, that we are told that Eteocles and Polyneices died childless is in fact a safe one. *ΣΜ ad loc.* offers two explanations of *ἀτέκνος*; the second is the usual one, but the first is *ἐπὶ κακῷ τεχθέντας*. This explanation found some favour among the early editors. Johann Müller wrote, 'Male natos, filios tamen uterque habebat', and he drew attention to the common tradition that Eteocles was the father of Laodamas and Polyneices of Thersander. Butler (p. 211 of his commentary) and C. G. Haupt (*ad loc.*) reproduced this note.² But in modern times only Verrall has taken the word in this sense. He gives no argument in support of his interpretation; which is dismissed by Wecklein-Zomarides (i. 300) with the remark that one might ascribe this meaning to the word in the phrase *τέκν' ἀτεκνα*, but hardly in the phrase *ἀτέκνος . . . πολεμάρχος*.

We know that *εὐπαι*, *εὐτέκνος*, *καλλίπαι* may mean not only 'having fair offspring', but 'consisting in fair offspring'; see Ed. Fraenkel on *Ag.* 762 and

¹ *ἐπίγονοι* Brodaeus; *ἴκυονοι* codd. Even if *ἴκυονοι* is right, it must have been intended to suggest *ἐπίγονοι*.

² Butler mistakenly put a comma after *tamen*.

Pearson on Eur. *Phoen.* 1618. By analogy, we should expect that ἀτέκνος (and ἀπαις) could mean 'ill begotten' or 'unfortunate in one's relations to one's parents'. I can find no actual instance of either word in such a sense. At *Eum.* 1034 παιδες ἀπαιδες probably means 'childless children' (see Groeneboom, ad loc.). It is conceivable that S. *Tr.* 911 καὶ τὰς ἀπαιδας εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν οὐσίας might be explained as meaning 'the existences that henceforth would be those of unfortunate children', i.e. the existence of Deianeira's children; but this locus vexatus can hardly be cited in support of anything.

These analogies offer a certain measure of support to the possibility that ἀτέκνος is meant to mean 'unfortunate in the filial relationship'.¹ But this interpretation is not confirmed by any exact parallel; and in the absence of one I do not think it more than possible that it is correct. None the less, I think it not only possible but probable that ἀτέκνος does not mean what it is generally supposed to.

After μογερούς καὶ δυσδαιμόνως we would expect a third emotive epithet describing the brothers. A word meaning 'childless' could in some contexts have an emotive force. But here it is surprising to find this word, with its factual reference, conjoined with the two purely emotive epithets that precede it. And the suspicion deepens when we remember that the fact in question is one of major importance to the poet's whole treatment of the theme. Only that member of the audience who has his wits sufficiently about him to take in at once this vital word with its momentous implications will be insured against taking (2) and (3) as references to those Epigoni whom (1) gives our sole evidence for eliminating—unless Wilamowitz is right in holding that the poet mentions them in two places and carelessly rules them out in a third. These considerations do not induce me to conclude that the alternative explanation of ἀτέκνος which I have considered must be right. But they do convince me that it is unwise to build heavily on a word to which considerable doubt attaches, and that for reasons quite independent of the important problem in regard to which this word has been considered so significant.²

Suppose we assume that ἀτέκνος was corrupt, or did not mean 'childless', a number of the difficulties which we have noted would be removed or lessened. We should not have to believe, with Wilamowitz, that the poet carelessly combined incompatibles in a way scarcely paralleled in tragedy. We could decline to follow Klotz in taking (2), and perhaps (3) also, in an unnatural

¹ Supposing this interpretation of ἀτέκνος were right, it would be more likely to refer to the brothers' unfortunate relation with their father than to their incestuous birth.

² The resolved longum (-ōvās) preceding the disyllabic biceps (ārē-) is unusual. See the treatment of this anomaly in 'Marsch-anapäste', by J. D. Denniston on Eur. *El.* 1319; other scholars who have dealt with it cite examples from 'Klaganapäste', which are irrelevant. Fr. 91 is suspect; the only Aeschylean instance which counts is *Eum.* 949 ὅ τάδ' ἀκόντε, πόλεως φρούρου . . .; Weil's χάρας may be right, but this parallel should restrain us from laying too heavy a stress on this metrical peculiarity. Sophocles has no instance, Euripides only one solid one

(*Ion* 226): *Tr.* 101 and *El.* 1319 are easily emended. *Hec.* 145 involves a proper name; *El.* 1322 has a full stop after φίλαρε; at *Tr.* 127 ἵεπάν is probably disyllabic. Hartung tentatively suggests ἀνδρας (see his 1902 ed., p. 81; cf. his 1885 ed., ii. 83). Neither suggestion is convincing. There is slightly more to be said for the possibility that ἀπέκνος arose out of two variants ἄκνος and ἀπέκνος: the metrical consideration indicates that ἄκνος would be the likelier to be correct. ἀπέκνος occurs nowhere in manuscripts, but is convincingly restored by Verrall at Eur. *Hel.* 1321; his conjecture is accepted by P Maas, *Epidaurische Hymnen*, p. 144. ἄκνος occurs only in Plutarch, *vit. C. Gracchi* 19.

sense, and in insisting that when Apollo told Laius he must die without issue and preserve the city, he meant that even if Laius disobeyed him the city would be safe the moment the House of Laius was extinguished. We would be free to agree with Solmsen that there is not the slightest warrant in the text for thinking that Eteocles' death saves the city; but unlike Solmsen we should be able to explain why the city is saved on this occasion, in spite of being threatened by the curse.

'But can Aeschylus', some people will exclaim, 'really have brought the trilogy to an end at this point? If this is right, the Theban saga is incomplete; Eteocles and Polyneices are dead, but we are reminded that the Epigoni will come, and we are left anticipating the future destruction of Thebes.' These people will protest that such a notion is inconsistent with the basic principles of an Aeschylean trilogy. Let them remember that their knowledge of these principles is grounded on a single instance; that of the one complete trilogy that survives. What do they suppose a poet who wrote trilogies upon continuous themes would do if he happened to have fastened upon a slice of epic saga too big for comprehension in a single trilogy? The Theban trilogy of Aeschylus covers three generations of the Labdacids. But every well-informed person knew that there had been a fourth. What was Aeschylus to do about it? There was no room for it in this trilogy; we know that in fact he included a play called '*Emiyovoi*' in another trilogy, and that the foundation of the Nemean games and the Athenian campaign against Thebes to compel the burial of the Seven formed the subject of a third. What was Aeschylus to do about this well-known subsequent episode? Poets were free to take considerable liberties with the myths at their convenience. But can we really feel certain that Aeschylus' 'dramatic principles' would have obliged him to take no notice in this play of this familiar legend? And would the single word *ἀτέκνοντες* at l. 828 have made it clear to the audience that for the time being they were to forget about the Epigoni?

E. Conclusion of Chapter I

Modern scholars in their concern with 'the tragic' and 'the dramatic' are apt to draw too sharp a line between early tragedy and its original and exemplar, the epic. Their modern prejudice that a great play must concentrate on the 'dramatic' treatment of a moral problem blinds them to the indifference to modern morality and modern notions of the dramatic that is displayed by ancient poets.¹ So far as we know, there is not the slightest reason why Aeschylus should have conformed to modern (or at the earliest Aristotelian) pre-conceptions about 'unity' by omitting all reference to those events which according to the well-known tradition followed on the action depicted in his play.

It seems to me that throughout the unchallenged portion of the play the poet may well have combined two different traditions, as Wilamowitz thought,

¹ I made the same point with regard to modern views of Aeschylus' theology in an article 'Zeus in Aeschylus', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, lxxvi (1956), 55 f., esp. p. 65. It may be significant that several of the contemporary scholars who have done most to popularize this view of Aeschylus are dis-

tinguished authorities on the Greek philosophy of the fourth century and later. Those who see archaic poetry as one of the cultural phenomena 'leading up to' later philosophy are in danger of reading into it ideas derived from that philosophy (or from later ones) which in fact have no place there.

but that if he has done so, he has done so with no little skill. If it can be shown that these two motives are continued and adequately developed in the play's traditional conclusion, the case against that conclusion's authority will seem a good deal weaker. Let us next consider whether this is in fact the case.

In the end the curse of Oedipus is fulfilled in every detail, as we have always known it would be; the two brothers are buried together in the grave of Oedipus (see p. 96 below). But for a time a serious obstacle arises. If the quarrel between the brothers is seen from the viewpoint of the Theban state, Eteocles appears as the heroic protector who has lost his life in keeping off the foreign enemy, Polyneices as the traitorous renegade who has brought in the invader. It is not surprising that the state decrees that Eteocles shall be buried with due honour and Polyneices shall be cast out.

Nor is it surprising that the lamentation over the brothers' bodies and their final burial should be included within the action of the play. When a hero of epos or of tragedy dies, he commonly receives the honour of a formal lamentation, in which his own relations, particularly the female ones, must take part; after that he receives a proper funeral. The omission of either or both of these ceremonies was a grave matter. In the *Agamemnon* the Chorus wish to lament for Agamemnon; but Clytemnestra tells them it is not their business (1541–59). Lamentation is the business of near relatives, and in this case the person to whom the duty falls happens to be the killer. She will perform the burial, *οὐχ ὑπὸ κλαυθμῶν τῶν ἔξ οἰκων*. Only after the death of his murderers does Agamemnon receive his due lament from Orestes: *νῦν αὐτὸν αἰνῶ, νῦν ἀποιμάζω παρόν* (*Cho.* 1014). Still more important is the matter of burial. The classic instance is the *Ajax*; considering what we know of ancient religious feeling in the matter, it is not surprising that almost half the play is occupied with the dispute over the hero's funeral. Just as the *Iliad* ends not with the death of Hector, but with his funeral, so a tragic poet who described the *κατατροφή* of a hero would normally end his play not with his death but with his burial.¹

Wilamowitz believed, as I do, that the story of Polyneices' burial by Antigone came from the ancient epic tradition (*A.I.* 92; cf. p. 96 below). If that is true, and if Aeschylus kept to normal practice and included the funerals of his heroes in his play, it would have seemed strange for him to make no allusion to the tradition about Antigone. The absence of any such allusion would seem yet stranger if one were to remark how excellently it would lend itself to the poet's purpose of exploiting the interaction between the fate of the city and the fate of the house of Laius. In the sight of Thebes Eteocles is a patriot and Polyneices a traitor; in the sight of the Erinyes both are equally accursed; but in the sight of their surviving kinsfolk both are equally dear, and neither must be cheated of the grim inheritance, *τάφων πατρόων λαχαι*, which Oedipus has bequeathed them. Antigone challenges the decree of the government that has been made public by its herald. The city and the royal house are joined in a conflict; a conflict which is no sudden improvisation, but a natural culmination of tendencies which we have seen in motion from the beginning of the play. Nor is the episode allowed to get out of hand. The stichomythia ends with Antigone flatly proclaiming her resolve to bury Polyneices and the herald flatly prohibiting the burial. Then the Chorus divides, and one half accompanies Antigone as she goes to bury Polyneices in defiance of the herald's order. I will

¹ See Schmid-Stählin, *t. ii.* 215, n. 2.

say more about the final anapaests later (see p. 111). If we allow that the poet meant to pursue the fate of the brothers not only to the time of their deaths, but to that of their burial, it is hard to see what more appropriate working-out of the plot he could have found.

That concludes my discussion of Wilamowitz's main general argument against the authenticity of the scene. In the next section of this paper I shall deal with certain subsidiary arguments.

II. MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST AUTHENTICITY

A. Δῆμον πρόβουλοι

The action of the last act, Wilamowitz writes (*A.I.* 89), is itself full of contradictions. A new government, consisting of *πρόβουλοι*, appears upon the stage, and a herald announces its decision to forbid the burial of Polyneices. Wilamowitz in 1903 strongly stressed (*S.B.B.* 438) the argument that the expression *δῆμον πρόβούλους* (1006) implied a type of democratic rule that could not have been imagined in an epic context by Aeschylus. In his book this opinion is less prominent; but it has been repeated since by several scholars, notably by Robert (30, pp. 376 f.) and by Pohlenz (66, p. 46).

It seems hardly necessary to cite evidence to show that in an epic or early tragic context the word *δῆμος* need not carry all its fifth-century connotations. Even in a Homeric kingdom there is a *δῆμος* and a *βουλή*. No one has yet denied that the *Supplices* is by Aeschylus on the ground that the *δῆμος* figures in it as a political entity. A *βουλή* of elders is very probably mentioned in the *Agamemnon* (see Denniston–Page on 883–4); and the Chorus of the *Antigone* consists of the members of such a one. In the case of the king's sudden death, power might well revert to such a Council pending the confirmation in office of his successor.

This is undoubtedly the earliest use of the word *πρόβουλος* except that at *Ag.* 386, where the sense is quite different. We find it next at Herodotus 6. 7, where the twelve Ionian cities dispatch *πρόβούλους σφέων αὐτῶν* to the Panionion and at 7. 172. 1, where *πρόβουλοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀραιημένοι ἀπὸ τῶν πολέων* assemble at the Isthmus. It is important to note that in both these passages it is followed by a genitive. They are not, therefore, instances of the quasi-technical use found first at Aristophanes, *Ach.* 755, and later in Aristotle's *Politics*, of the standing committees that in some Greek states examined measures before they were formally proposed to the people (see A. Andrewes, *Probouleusis* [Oxford, 1954]). In these passages of Herodotus the word means 'persons to take counsel on behalf of . . .'; and the same is true at *Th.* 1006. It is most important to observe that the members of the new government are called not *πρόβουλοι*, as Wilamowitz's and Pohlenz's manner of referring to the passage might imply, but *δῆμον πρόβουλοι*. That means 'men who take counsel on behalf of the people' (*ΣΒ τοῖς βουλευομένοις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δῆμον*); it means the same as *Καδμείων . . . προστάταις* (1025). It is a perfectly natural way of referring to an epic council of *γέροντες* of the kind that is in question. Its presence in this scene affords no argument whatsoever against its authenticity.

Neither, I must remark in passing, would the presence of the members of the new government upon the stage, which Wilamowitz thinks (*A.I.* 89 n. 1) is implied by *τῷδε* at 1025, though he abstains from using this argument against the scene's authenticity. This would be no argument against authenticity;

compare the extra Chorus of *θεραπαινίδες* in the *Supplices* and the *προπομπόι* in the *Eumenides*. (But Italie (62, on 1025, p. 130) is right in pointing out that it is not quite certain that the members of the government are present. *τῷδε . . . τέλει* might mean 'the government which I represent'.)¹

B. Reasons for Eteocles' burial

We are nowhere told, Wilamowitz complains (*A.I.* 89), that the new government is new, nowhere that Eteocles was king until a few hours before. Both these facts must have been evident to the most wooden-headed among the audience. Eteocles is to be given an honourable burial, Wilamowitz says, not because he was king, but because he has died an honourable death on the field of battle. What better reason, I ask, could be given for giving even a king an honourable burial than that he has died fighting for his country? and here the statement is made in order to show the reason for giving one brother one treatment and the other another. This declaration of the herald and the manner of its expression are, as Snell (40, p. 91) has observed, very much in Aeschylus' manner,² and bring out clearly what I have already argued is the only significant difference between the brothers from the point of view of Thebes and her citizens.

C. The sisters

Against this decree, Wilamowitz continues (l.c.), a sister protests. We are not told her name, he says. True, it appears in the text only at 862 and among the names of speakers in the manuscripts only at 947 (where there is much to be said for rejecting it; see p. 105) and in the present scene; but to say we are not told it is to beg the question. Antigone says that she will bury Polyneices with her own hands. How does she know, Wilamowitz asks, that she will have to? In the event she is to find plenty of helpers. But unless Antigone insists on the burial, there will be no burial. True, part of the Chorus finally accompanies her. But she does not yet know that anyone will do so; and though they say *συνθάψομεν* (1068), the chief responsibility will of course belong to Antigone. In the *Thebais* she may very well have buried Polyneices herself (see p. 96); and if the dramatic structure of this play requires that half the Chorus shall finally accompany her, that does not necessarily mean that Aeschylus meant deliberately to depart from the tradition in this respect.

We cannot understand, Wilamowitz argues at the top of p. 90, why the 'Probouloî' give in. They do not give in; they flatly forbid the burial. But Antigone chooses to defy them; and the audience knows she does so at her own peril (see above, p. 93).

Wilamowitz next complains that Ismene says nothing in this act. In fact there was nothing much for her to say. But there may have been another reason for her silence. Wundt (20, p. 362) had argued that as this play, produced in 467, was presumably meant for two actors, Ismene must have left the stage after 1004 in order that the actor who played her part may come on again at 1005 to play the Herald. In view of the complicated division of parts

¹ Italie (on 1053, p. 133) argues that *ἀπενέπω δ' ἔγώ* in that line implies that the other members of the government are not present.

² 1009: Wakefield's conjecture *στέγων* is

indefensible, and despite Verrall, Tucker, and H. D. Broadhead (*C.Q.* xlvi [1950], 121), nothing is wrong with *θάνατον εἴλετ'* *ἔν πόλει*: cf. X 110 *ἡὲ κεν αὐτῷ ὀλέσθαι σύκλειῶν πρὸ πόλης*.

between actors which some tragedies (particularly the *Oedipus Coloneus* of Sophocles) seem to involve, I do not think this is impossible. On the other hand, Ismene's part in the lyric scene preceding this may well have been sung by a παραχορήγμα, as Weil (p. 20), first suggested.¹ E. B. Cadel's ingenious distribution of parts in the *O.C.* (*C.Q.* xxxv [1941], 136 f.) requires us to assume that in lines 1096 and 1555 of that play Ismene is represented by a mute, and this mute may as a παραχορήγμα have sung Ismene's lyrics in the final scene (as had first been suggested by W. Teuffel in *Rh. Mus. N.F.* ix [1854], 136). No solid argument against the authenticity of the scene seems to me to emerge from these considerations.

D. *The departure of the Chorus*

In what direction, Wilamowitz asks (l.c.), do the two sections of the Chorus with the two bodies leave the stage? Are the brothers to be buried together, in the tomb of Oedipus, or will Polyneices be buried outside the city? He says that the two Hemichoria must leave the stage in different directions; and he insists that this not only marks off this act from the rest of the play, but introduces presuppositions that are impossible for Aeschylus.

I cannot feel sure which presuppositions Wilamowitz means; but I take him to be arguing that, if the two Hemichoria leave the stage in different directions, that implies that they are bound for different destinations. We have in fact no means of knowing in which directions the two processions march. But suppose Wilamowitz is right in thinking that they march in different directions (and that is certainly the most symmetrical arrangement), I cannot feel sure we would be safe in inferring that they are taking the bodies to different places. It has been stated earlier that both brothers are to be buried in the tomb of Oedipus (914), and the text as the manuscripts present it contains nothing to prevent us from supposing that they are.

E. *Alleged dependence upon Sophocles, Antigone*

In his article of 1903 (*S.B.B.* 438), Wilamowitz had followed P. Corssen (15) in assuming that in Aeschylus' version of the legend the House of Laius must have become extinct with the deaths of the two brothers. In his book (90) he drops it; and with it Corssen's view that the story of Antigone's burial of Polyneices must have been invented by Sophocles. Wilamowitz quotes Apollodorus *bibl.* 3, 78 f.: Ἀντυγόνη δὲ μία τῶν Οἰδίποδος θυγατέρων κρύψα τὸ Πολυνείκους σῶμα κλέψασα ἔθαψε καὶ φωραθεῖσα ὑπὸ Κρέοντος αὐτὴν ἐν² τῷ τάφῳ ζῶσα ἐνεκρύψθη.

Wilamowitz argues (90–92), reasonably enough, that this probably reflects the epic tradition. Both the two sisters figure in the account of Pherecydes (fr. 95 Jacoby ap. Sch. on Eur. *Phoen.* 53, p. 257 Schwartz); Ismene for certain, and probably Antigone also, were mentioned by Mimnermus (fr. 21 Bergk ap. Hypoth. II to Sophocles, *Antigone*); cf. Robert, 30, p. 181.

Wilamowitz concedes in his book (92) that the Antigone who buries her brother probably comes from the *epos*. But the Antigone who carries earth in her robe to sprinkle upon her brother's body, and thus carry out a token burial is, he insists, an invention of Sophocles; and this is enough to prove the

¹ Also Wecklein (16), p. 11; Italie (62), p. 14, n. 3, etc.

² αὐτὴν ἐν is my emendation: αὐτῆν [sic] Cod. R, αὐτὴν A, αὐτοῦ Wilamowitz.

dependence on Sophocles of the last scene of the Seven as it is preserved in our manuscripts.

If this assertion is correct, it is strange that the interpolated scene does not follow its model more closely. Why does the interpolator sacrifice a fine dramatic opportunity by operating with a Council and a Herald instead of introducing the formidable Creon?¹ Why does the Herald not make it clear that anyone who buries Polyneices will be put to death? In the *Antigone* this is made clear almost from the start (35–36). True, it has been suggested (by Mayerhöfer, 22, p. 14)² that this omission is due to the carelessness of the interpolator; for Antigone refers to the risk she will run by defying the order of the government (1028). But it would surely be clear from the start that anyone who defied such an order must expect to run some risk. In Sophocles the threat of death is an important feature; why is it absent here? If the scene is genuine, its absence is easily explained; the episode is not to be allowed to get out of hand. If the scene is modelled on the *Antigone*, the absence of this feature is not explained so easily. Cf. Wundt, 20, pp. 358–9.

Further, it was pointed out by Wundt (p. 360) that the reasons given in the two plays for the refusal of burial to Polyneices are not the same. In the *Antigone* the reason is that the enemies of one's country are the worst of all enemies (182 f.). In the *Seven* the reason given is a religious one. Eteocles, the defender of his country, died *ἱερῶν πατρών . . . ὅσος ὁν μομφής ἀτέρ* (1010); Polyneices, the traitor, *ἄγος . . . καὶ θανὼν κεκτήσεται θεῶν πατρών* (1017–18). Therefore Eteocles has the right to burial in Theban soil, a right denied to Polyneices, who would pollute it by his presence. This again seems a distinct difference in the two accounts.

Wilamowitz contends (p. 92) that the Antigone who sprinkles dust upon her brother's body is Sophocles' invention; and if this is true, the dependence of the last scene of the *Seven* upon Sophocles would be established. We must note, however, that it is not generally agreed that the Antigone of the *Seven* does carry earth. She tells the Herald what she intends to do at 1037 f.:

τάφον γὰρ αὐτὴ καὶ κατασκαφὰς ἔγω,
γυνή περ οὖσα, τῷδε μηχανήσομαι,
κόλπῳ φέρουσα βιωσίνου πεπλώματος.

1037 αὐτὴ Pierson (αὐτῷ codd.).

What is Antigone going to carry in her robe? A scholion in M reads: *τῷ τοῦ βιωσίνου πέπλῳ κόλπῳ τὴν γῆν παρακομίζοντα, ως ἐπιβάλλειν μέλλουσα, διὰ τὸ ὄρνττεων μὴ δύνασθαι*. Casaubon agreed with the writer of this scholion that the word to be supplied as the object of *φέρουσα* was *γῆν*. His view did not win

¹ This difficulty occurred to Robert, who tries to deal with it by the suggestion that 'Kreon bei Aischylos nicht als Schwager des Oidipus vorkam, sondern nur als der greise Vater des Megareus erwähnt war' (30, p. 376). There is no evidence whatever in favour of this supposition. Robert refers us to p. 262 of his book, where he maintains that Creon is referred to in the *Seven* (at 474 f.) in a way which shows that he cannot have been imagined as the brother of the queen and the later regent. Is this because

he is mentioned as of the race of the *σπαρτοί*? This proves nothing of the sort; nor do Robert's remarks on p. 247 strengthen his case.

² I cannot agree with this writer (I.c.) that it is 'ganz unverständlich' that Antigone 'so heftig antritt ohne dass ihr jemand ein Unrecht oder eine Beleidigung zugefügt hat'; they have forbidden the burial of her brother. Nor do I agree that *Th. 1027* is 'offenbar eine Reminiscenz an *Ant.* 45'.

immediate acceptance; but since Butler revived it, it has held the field until recent times. Verrall, Tucker, Mazon, Weir Smyth, and Italie have all accepted it. If it is right, one must suppose that from the words *τάφον . . . καὶ κατασκαφὰς* in 1037 one can supply the notion of 'earth' in 1039. This is not altogether impossible, but it seems to me very difficult. Another view was taken by Stanley and Schütz, was revived by Kohl (33, p. 212), and is accepted by Groeneboom in his commentary (ad loc.). These scholars hold that the object to be supplied is 'Polyneices'. Grammatically this is much easier; but is the sense it yields a possible one? Can Antigone have spoken of carrying a full-grown warrior *κόλπῳ . . . βιωσίνου πεπλώματος?*

κόλπος often means 'fold'; and if that were its meaning here, the sense suggested for the line would be impossible. But it originally meant 'the hollow between the breasts'; from this sense both the meaning 'fold' and the meaning 'bosom' derive. When a person carries a child *ἐν κόλπῳ*, that means 'in his (or her) bosom'; cf. Z 467, *Hym. Cer.* 187, and see F. Studniczka, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der Altgriechischen Tracht', *Abh. des Arch.-Epigr. Seminars der Univ. Wien*, 1886, 96 f. Antigone could not have carried Polyneices 'in her arms' as one carries a child. But she may have thought of laying his head upon her shoulder, putting her arms round him, and thus dragging him along the ground.

In support of this view Groeneboom (p. 253) adduces the passage of Apollodorus quoted above on p. 96. He might have found more helpful the following passage of Pausanias (9. 25. 2): *καλεῖται δὲ ὁ σύμπας οὐτος (τόπος) Σύρμα Ἀντιγόνης· ως γὰρ τὸν τοῦ Πολυνείκους ἄρασθαι οἱ προθυμομένη νεκρὸν οὐδεμίᾳ ἔφαινετο ῥωτώνη, δεύτερα ἐπενόσοεν ἔλκειν αὐτὸν, ἐσ δὲ εἰλκυσό τε καὶ ἐπέβαλεν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἐτεοκλέους ἔξημμένην τὴν πυράν.* We meet with this tradition again at Statius, *Theb.* 12. 411 f., where Antigone has the help of Polyneices' wife Argeia. But in the picture described by Philostratus, *imag.* 2. 29 she is alone. Local tradition may well have corresponded with the local epic, and there is some ground for believing that this story may have come from the *Thebais*. It is not inconsistent with the story that the bodies of the Seven were burned on seven pyres (Pindar, *Ol.* 6. 15; *Nem.* 9. 24, with Σ ad loc., pp. 158-9 Dr.); nor with the story that the flames that burned the bodies of Eteocles and Polyneices refused to mingle (see Callimachus fr. 105 with Pfeiffer, ad loc.).

If Antigone is thinking of a symbolic burial, to be effected by sprinkling a handful of earth, why should she talk of carrying earth in a fold of her garment? For a symbolic burial the slightest quantity would suffice; in Sophocles Antigone carried the earth in her hands (429). Further, the Antigone of the *Seven* believes that her action will protect her brother's body from the wolves (1035-6). Groeneboom (p. 253) has pointed out that a symbolic burial would not have this effect. Another reason against the symbolic burial is that the word *κατασκαφὰς* must surely refer to the burial below ground either of the body or of the ashes.

Supposing that a symbolic burial is not referred to, how can we suppose Antigone intends to give her brother funeral rites? If she means to bury him, it is odd for her to tell the Herald that she will carry earth in her robe. She will not need to. But if Antigone means that she will somehow contrive for the body to be burned and the ashes to be buried underground, as was the custom, everything in the text can be explained. *τάφος* can mean tomb, but its first

meaning is simply 'funeral rites'; see L.S.J. s.v. She will contrive to get him funeral rites (*τάφον*) and burial (*κατασκαφάς*): she herself will lay his ashes below ground. This gives what is, in spite of the very real difficulty presented by l. 1039, on the whole the most convincing explanation of the text. And since burning followed by burial was in fact the usual method of disposing of the dead in the heroic age, it is fair to assume that the audience would have understood it in this sense. Further, it seems probable that in this matter Aeschylus was following the tradition of the Theban epic.

Wilamowitz's next argument for the dependence of this scene on Sophocles is concerned with the figure of Ismene. He alleges (p. 93, top) that the sisters are neither named nor distinguished in the last act, and that the ascription of certain lines to Ismene in the manuscripts is untenable. 'Untenable' is going a little too far; but I allow that the ascription in M and other manuscripts of 933 f. and 951 f. to Ismene carries little weight. The lyric stichomythia 961–1004 was beyond doubt written for the two sisters (see below, p. 105); but this, like the anapaests in which Ismene is named (862), is cut out by Wilamowitz. So far, then, his argument has made no advance.

Next, he says that 'in the epic' Ismene was the lover of Periclymenus (this depends on a probable emendation: the text of the second hypothesis to the *Antigone* says Θεοκλυμένῳ) and was killed by Tydeus; this rests on the evidence of the fragments of Mimmnermus and Pherecydes quoted on p. 96 above. We cannot even *prove*, Wilamowitz continues, that Ismene figured in the epic at all; 'eine Person, die nichts zu tun bekommt, kann die Sage nicht brauchen'. 'Wie soll man sich's anders vorstellen', he goes on, 'als dass Sophokles sie in die Antigone eingeführt hat, weil er diese Folie brauchte, und dass sie ihm dann für den zweiten Oedipus zur Verfügung stand?' I need hardly point out that Wilamowitz has not proved that Ismene did *not* figure in the *Thebais*; nor has he proved that, if she did, she played in it the same part that she did in the accounts of Mimmnermus and Pherecydes. When he asks how can one help supposing that Sophocles was the first to use her as a 'foil' to Antigone, we must reply that we can very well help supposing it, because there is no evidence whatsoever for doing so. Wilamowitz tries to confirm his speculation by arguing that the last words of Antigone's great final speech (891 f.) imply that she is the last of her race. Sophocles, he thinks, has forgotten all about his hastily vamped-up minor character. This argument involves ascribing to Sophocles a degree of carelessness which goes beyond anything we can say for certain that he or any tragedian was guilty of; it also involves a psychological explanation of that carelessness which is not convincing. And in fact Antigone's words prove nothing of the sort. She says that many of her family have gone down to Hades; and she continues:

ἀν λοισθία γὰρ καὶ κάκιστα δῆ μακρῷ
κάτειψι, πρίν μοι μοῖραν ἐξήκεν βίον.

The words need not mean that she is the last of her family: *λοισθία* is surely predicative, so that the meaning is that Antigone will presently be the last of the Labdacids to have gone down to Hades, and also the most unfortunate in the manner of her descent.

F. Conclusion of Chapter II

That concludes my examination of the subsidiary arguments from content set out on pp. 89–93 of Wilamowitz's book. On 94–95 he reinforces these by

linguistic arguments designed to show that the text itself betrays the hand of an interpolator. There is little doubt that Wilamowitz ascribed less importance to these than to his arguments from content. The passages athetized contain a number of singularities; but it would not be easy to prove these more numerous or more singular than those contained in many other passages of Aeschylus of equal length. It is significant that no one ever challenged the authenticity of this scene before we learned in 1848 that this was the last play of the trilogy. Wecklein in a balanced survey of the problem, by no means antagonistic to Wilamowitz's view, maintains that 'die sprachliche Form der Schlusspartie . . . sich durchaus als äschyleisch erweist' (16, p. 11). Wilamowitz cannot be refuted by showing that the style and language have much in common with the unquestioned parts of Aeschylus; for it is part of his hypothesis that their author aimed at that effect. Snell (40) has already done the valuable work of analysing the incidence of the rarer words and showing that so far as the vocabulary goes the passages in question may well be by Aeschylus; his article has at some points been supplemented by Manginas (65). I will not reproduce what they have said; but will go through the athetized portions of the text, commenting on what seems to be most important, and especially on those features which seem to Wilamowitz to show the hand of an interpolator. In the course of this running commentary I shall explain why I feel certain that lines 961–1004 were written for the sisters.

III. LINGUISTIC AND STYLISTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST AUTHENTICITY

A. *The anapaests of the sisters* (861–74)

In the anapaests at 861–74 Wilamowitz finds a number of anomalies. ἀμφίβιλως (863) is called 'intolerable in Aeschylus' at *S.B.B.* 448, 'unaeschylean' at *A.I.* 94; Groeneboom and Van Veen (58) agree. Certainly the word occurs nowhere else in tragedy. But ἀμφιβολος is found in this play (298) and at Eur. *Ion* 1490 and *Tro.* 538; and ἀμφιβόλως itself is found as a variant in codd. V and R at *Pers.* 904. For the sense compare ἀμφιλόγως in that passage and ἀμφιλέκτως at *Th.* 809. If a new Aeschylean text were printed tomorrow with the word ἀμφιβόλως, the event would hardly cause a stir. Cf. Wundt (20), p. 370.

864 ἐρατῶν ἐκ βαθυκόλπων στηθέων is blamed on the ground that the deep fold of the garment that covers the lovely breast has nothing to do with the lament that breaks forth from that breast. But L.S.J. takes βαθύκολπος to mean 'with deep, full breasts'. If this is correct, the expression would mean 'their deep-breasted chests' which makes good sense. Again, if βαθύκολπος means 'having a deep hollow between the breasts' (cf. p. 98), the sense would be quite normal. The attachment of two epithets to one noun is no great rarity; and for the placing of the preposition between them, cf. 680 πάνδοκον εἰς ἀφανῆ τε χέρους.

But Wilamowitz is right in saying that, while it is natural to say γόνων ιέναι (*S. Aj.* 628) or κωκυτὸν ιέναι (*ib.* 851, *E. Med.* 1176), ἄλγος ιέναι is an awkward and unusual turn of phrase. It will not do to say with Manginas (315) that ἄλγος ἐπάξιον is equivalent to ἄλγος ἐπάξιον. οἴκρος can of course mean 'a cry of pity'; but there is nothing to prove that ἄλγος can mean 'a cry of pain'. It follows that ἄλγος may not be the object of ησειν. How else might we provide an object? Schütz did so by putting a full stop after 'Ισομήνη

and no stop after ἀδελφοῖν. But it is easier to keep the usual punctuation and to supply an object for ησεων from θρῆνον in the preceding sentence. Schütz took ἀλγος ἐπάξιον as in apposition to θρῆνον. I should prefer to take it as 'in apposition to the sentence'; 'an agony in proportion to their loss'. This does not seem to me specially unlike Aeschylus.

866 πρότερον φήμης is rightly said by Wilamowitz (*A.I.* 95) to be a strange way of expressing the apparent sense 'before the sisters speak'. πρότερον with a genitive used like πρό is found in Herodotus, but nowhere except here in early poetry. And instead of φήμη ('speech', 'rumour', 'oracle'), one would expect a word meaning 'cry', 'lament'. But apart from the oddity of the expression,¹ there is another reason for suspecting that the text is not sound. A scholion in M reads: δίκαιον ἡμᾶς προκατάρχεσθαι ὡς προακουσάς, ὑπακοέων δὲ ἔκείνας. There is also a late scholion at p. 395 Dindorf (perhaps Thoman: see G. Zuntz, *The Political Plays of Euripides*, p. 131 f.) that reads: ἡμᾶς δὲ δίκαιον πρότερον τῶν παρθένων κατάρχεσθαι τοῦ γύναι, χάριν τῆς φημισθείσης φήμης τῶν βασιλέων, ἵαχεν τε καὶ βοῶν, κτλ. The writers of these notes surely had before them a text in which there stood between φήμης and τὸν something which is now missing; and in view of the oddity of the expression πρότερον φήμης it is likely that this text was the true one. Weil in his Giessen edition of 1862 was the first to observe this: he postulated a lacuna between 866 and 867. Sidgwick in his Oxford text of Aeschylus (1899, cf. his commentary, Oxford, 1903, pp. 58–59), inserted after φήμης the words *⟨τῶνδε κλυούσας⟩*. This would give the sense: 'And it is right that we who have heard the news before they did, should follow them in singing . . .' (or 'should sing on this occasion'). But this insertion does not suffice to make the sense of the text correspond with that of the two scholia. The scholion in M means, 'It is right that we, who have heard the news before they did, should begin the lament, and that they should answer us.' The word προκατάρχεσθαι here (cf. κατάρχεσθαι in the Thoman note) arrests one's attention. From Homer's time κατάρχεσθαι is used in the technical language of religion to denote the formal beginning of a ceremony. It is also used of beginning a song; see Eur. *Hec.* 685, *Or.* 960, *Her.* 750, 891, and Lobel on *Corinna*, *P. Oxy.* 2370, fr. i. 11. προκατάρχεσθαι is used of beginning a sacrifice by Thucydides 1. 25. 4. It would be rash to insist that this verb *must* have stood in the text here; it is used in Hellenistic Greek of initiating other formal proceedings, such as wars or battles. But the word is unusual enough to warrant the suspicion that it did; especially in view of the apparent paraphrases in the scholia. No supplement designed to fill this gap can pretend to anything like certainty. But *exempli gratia* I suggest that the original text probably reads something like this:

ἡμᾶς δὲ δίκη πρότερον φήμης
⟨τῶνδε κλυούσας προκατάρχεσθαι.
 κείνας δὲ πάλιν
 τὸν δυσκέλαδόν θ' ὕμνον Ἐρυνός
 ἵαχεν Ήδα τ'
 ἔχθρὸν παιᾶν ἐπιμέλπειν.

If this is right, the Chorus will have begun the lamentation and the sisters followed later. This not only corresponds with the indications of the manu-

¹ Robert, too, thought it corrupt (*Oidipus* ii, p. 129, m. 89); cf. Schmid-Stählin, p. 214, n. 3.

scripts of the *Seven*; it follows the procedure observed during the lamentation for Hector in the last book of the *Iliad*. There the lament is begun by hired singers; after them follow the women of Hector's family, Andromache, Hecuba, Helen.

οἱ δὲ ἐπεὶ εἰσάγον κλυτὰ δώματα, τὸν μὲν ἔπειτα
τρητοῖς ἐν λεχέσσαι θέσαν, παρὰ δὲ εἰσαν ἀουδοὺς
θρήνων ἔξαρχους, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες (Ω 719–21).¹

Here the Chorus will correspond with the ἔξαρχοι, Ismene and Antigone with the women of Hector's family. Bergk cannot have realized this when he wrote (8, p. 303): 'Hier geschieht also das Unglaubliche, dass die Schwestern lange Zeit hindurch während des umfangreichen Chorliedes sich stumm und völlig theilnahmlos verhalten.' With the use of δίκη cf. Ag. 259 δίκη γάρ ἔστι . . . τίεν γυναῖκ', Cho. 150 ὑμᾶς δὲ κωκυτοῖς ἐπανθίζειν νόμος: with ὑμον 'Ερινύος cf. Eum. 331 ὑμος ἐξ 'Ερινύων, Ag. 992 θρῆνον 'Ερινύος: with Άτα παιᾶν' cf. Ag. 645 παιᾶντα τόδ' 'Ερινύων, Ch. 151 παιᾶνα τοῦ θανόντος, Eur. Alc. 422. And with the sense of ἐπιμέλπειν that results from this interpretation cf. ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες at the end of the passage of the *Iliad* cited above. The problems these suggestions are an attempt to solve had been raised long ago by Weil and Sidgwick, and have nothing to do with my views about the authenticity of this passage. But if my suggestions are on the right lines, then this passage yields no evidence against Aeschylean authorship.

871 δυσαδελφόταται is not unusual: Manginas (65, p. 318) has compared *Suppl.* 67 δυσμάτορος κότου, 1064 γάμον δυσάνορα, Ag. 1319 δυσδάμαρτος . . . ἀνδρός. The sentence in which this word occurs seems to Groeneboom and Van Veen 'pretentious'; it is certainly awkward; and it has no real parallel in Aeschylus. But can we feel sure that Aeschylus could have written it? I have heard two of the most distinguished living Greek scholars contend stoutly that he could not; so the question must be gone into at some length.

The word *στρόφος* presumably means the same as *στρόφιον*, a band tied around the breasts over the garment; this form of the word is nowhere else transmitted, but was restored with very great probability by Scaliger at *Suppl.* 457: ζωι στρόφους (*στρόβους* codd.) ζώας τε, συλλαβὰς πετλῶν. It seems from the use of *στρόφιον* in comedy that this band was a standard article of female dress; so 'all that wear the *στρόφος*' probably means 'all women', and not 'all high-born women' (as Tucker supposed).

Can we suppose Aeschylus capable of using the idiom whereby instead of saying 'all women', a writer says 'all who wear skirts', etc.? Such expressions are found in the poetic or archaic literature of many languages, not least in Hebrew. They are not particularly common in Greek: but this idiom (and also the very similar one whereby instead of saying 'all women' one says 'all skirt-wearing women') occurs occasionally in the epic and (rather less often) in other early poetry. The boundaries of the type are vague; an exhaustive list cannot be offered; but it is worth setting out a number of them. The letter appended is to indicate whether they belong to the type "All who wear skirts": "all women" (A) or to the type "All skirt-wearing women": "all women" (B). The reader is warned against supposing that any of these is a

¹ Quoted by Wundt, 20, pp. 367 ff. and *legomena zu Aischylus Tragoedien* (1864), by several others since R. Westphal, *Pro-* p. 145.

parallel to the case I am discussing; they are set out here only because they are similar to it in one respect.

P 446-7 πάντων ὅσσα τε γαίαν ἐπὶ πνείει τε καὶ ἔρπει (A)
 Σ 38 θεαὶ . . . πᾶσαι ὅσαι κατὰ βένθος ἀλὸς Νηρηΐδες ἡσαν (B)
 A 566 ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ (B) cf. E 571, Θ 451, Σ 429
 Θ 221 τῶν ἄλλων . . . ὅσσοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σῖτον ἔδοντες (B)

With P 446-7, compare the following instances of type B:

Hes. Theog. 582 κυνάδαλ' ὁσ' ἥπειρος πολλὰ τρέφει ἡδὲ θάλασσα
 Hymn. Aphr. 5 ἡμέν ὁσ' ἥπειρος πολλὰ τρέφει ἡδὲ θάλασσα
 Cypria fr. vii. 12 Allen (= 6. 12 Kinkel) θηρὶ', ὁσ' ἥπειρος αἰνὰ τρέφει
 Hymn. Cer. 365 πάντων ὄπόσα ζώει τε καὶ ἔρπει.

With Θ 221 (itself of type B), compare the A type instances at Simonides fr. 4. 16 Diehl = fr. 5. 17 Bergk εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός.

With A 566 cf. Aesch. P.V. 121 τοῖς πᾶσι θεοῖς . . . , ὄπόσοι τὴν Διὸς αὐλὴν εἰσοιχνεῦσιν¹ (B). This (closely modelled on the epic) seems to be the only other Aeschylean example of either type. But Aeschylus has two instances of the commoner idiom by which instead of 'all mothers' the poet says 'all women who have borne children': these are at Th. 926 πρὸ πατῶν γυναικῶν ὄπόσαι τεκνογονούντων κέκληνται and P.V. 411 ὄπόσοι τ' ἑποικον ἀγνᾶς Άσιας ἔδος νέμονται . . . θητοῖ.

Further, the practice of accompanying the mention of any race, group, or society with an allusion to some distinguishing characteristic is not foreign to the style of Aeschylus. At *Suppl.* 952-3 the Argive king tells the Egyptian herald that he will find the Argives are real men, not beer-drinkers (like the Egyptians). In the same play (761) Danaus points an unfavourable comparison between these two countries by contrasting their national diets, corn and papyrus. Stylistically similar, though less homely, is the characterization of Persia and Greece by means of their national weapons at *Pers.* 147:

πότερον τόξου ρῦμα τὸ νικῶν | ἡ δορικράνον | λόγχης ἰσχὺς κεκράτηκεν; |

Moreover, the periphrastic expression found here seems to be in sense a variation upon a not uncommon type of conventional epithet. In epic and choral lyric women are often called εὐζωνος, καλλίζωνος, βαθύζωνος. The last of these adjectives appears twice in Aeschylus, as a conventional epithet of Persian women at *Pers.* 155 ὁ βαθυζώνων ἀναστα Περσῶν ὑπερτάτη, and as a conventional epithet of all women at *Ch.* 169 τίνος ποτ' ἀνδρὸς ἡ βαθύζωνος κόρης; Its meaning is not at first sight obvious; observe, for example, the uncertainty of Pearson on Soph. *Ichn.* 237. But it seems probable that Σ on γ 154 is right in his explanation of the meaning (though not in his implication that only barbarian women adopted the style in question): τοῖς γὰρ ὑποδύταις αἱ βάρβαροι γυναικες μέχρι βάθους ἐπούρουσαι χρῶνται. If this is right, the sense will be 'with dress falling in deep folds', an effect which would be produced by

¹ G. S. Kirk complains that this instance is irrelevant, since the Olympians were not the only gods; but I doubt whether the poet

means to distinguish them from the χθόνιοι in this place.

the wearing of the girdle; cf. *εὐζωνος*.¹ Such an effect would also be produced by the wearing of the *στρόφος*, which is mentioned together with the girdle at *Suppl.* 457, quoted above.² I therefore believe the periphrasis in the text to have been suggested to the poet by this not uncommon type of epithet; 'she who *στρόφον περιβάλλεται* is the same who is *εὐζωνος, βαθύζωνος, καλλίζωνος*': Tucker, ad. loc., q.v. The expression is most unusual; whether an elegant one, I do not presume to judge. But I see no objective reason for asserting that it cannot have been used by Aeschylus.

873-4 δόλος οὐδεὶς μὴ 'κ φρενὸς ὄρθως με λιγαίνει sounds to me like an archaic expression. It recalls the use of *ἀδόλος* to mean 'true' or 'sincere' which is found in early poetry and in the archaic language of treaties; see D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, p. 76, and for *ἐκ φρενός* meaning 'sincerely' cf. *Th.* 918, *Ch.* 107, and the use of *ἐκ θυμοῦ* at *I* 343 and *Ag.* 48. For the aphaeresis of *ἐκ* cf. *Eum.* 830; for that of *ἐν* in Aeschylus see Denniston-Page on *Ag.* 431. *λιγαίνει* is not found elsewhere in tragedy; but cf. *λ* 685. It is common for mourners to lay special stress on their sincerity, as at *Ag.* 1550, *Th.* 919. So much for the anapaests.³

B. The lyric scene (875-960): Indications of speaker

The lyric scene which follows falls into two very distinct sections; the four strophic pairs from 875 to 960 and the 'lyric stichomythia', with occasional interruptions by the Chorus, at 961-1004. Bergk cut out everything from 961 to the end of the play as an interpolation; Wilamowitz regarded 874-960 as Aeschylean, but as written for the Chorus and not for the two sisters. Of these opinions Bergk's is the more easily defensible; for I believe it can be established as certain that whoever wrote 961-1004 meant the amoeban parts of this passage for the two sisters.

Throughout this section the indications of speakers given by the manuscripts are incomplete and unsatisfactory: 'canticum paragraphis aut ἡμιχ. et χορ. notis nec satis plene nec satis recte distinctum in codd.': Wilamowitz, p. 117.

Before 875 and 879 M has *ἡμιχ.* and a paragraphus; before 881 and 886 it has a paragraphus only. It seems unlikely that the first hemichorion sang the whole strophe 875-80 and the second the whole antistrophe 881-7. More probably Hemichorion A sang 875-8 and Hemichorion B the corresponding lyrics 881-5, while the two runs of anapaests, 879-80 and 886-7, belong to the whole Chorus. Suppose the sisters were present in this scene, it is even possible that the anapaests are theirs; one recalls that in the parodos of the *P.V.*, in the Cassandra scene of the *Agamemnon*, and in the exodus of the *Eumenides*, the anapaests of actors answer the lyrics of the Chorus.

In the second strophic pair (888 f.), M has paragraphi before 888, 895, and 900; it has none before 907, but if there should be one before 895, there should be one here also. Here again we are in doubt. Does 888-94 and 900-6 belong

¹ *βαθύζωνος* is explained in LSJ as 'deep-girded', a word I cannot understand; but I suppose it is meant to mean the same thing.

² Σ B thinks that *στρόφος* means 'girdle': a possibility which cannot quite be ruled out: Sidgwick in his commentary ad loc. adopts this view. If this were right, the ex-prseion would be still closer to *εὐζωνος* or *βαθύζωνος*.

³ Surprisingly, these anapaests satisfy the strict aesthetic standards of Robert, who keeps them but gives them to the Chorus (30, p. 379). He argues that without them the anapaestic passages at 879-80 and 886-7 would seem strangely isolated. But this argument is not worth much; cf. the only slightly longer anapaestic passages at *Cho.* 1007-9 and 1018-20.

to the two Hemichoria and 895-9 and 907-10 to the whole Chorus? This seems the likeliest alternative; but it is possible that Hemichorion A sings 888-94 and 900-6 and Hemichorion B 895-9 and 907-10; it is even possible that some part of the lyrics was sung by the sisters.

In the third strophic pair (911 f.), M has paragraphi before 911, 915, and 926; before 923 it has not only a paragraphus, but the direction $\dot{\eta}\mu\chi$. Again we are confronted with a similar ambiguity. The likeliest alternative is that the two Hemichoria sing 911-14 and 923-5 and the whole Chorus 915-22 and 926-32; but it seems possible that Hemichorion A sings 911-14 and 923-5 and Hemichorion B 915-22 and 926-32. Again we cannot quite rule out the possibility that the sisters took part.

In the fourth strophic pair (933 f.) M introduces the sisters. Before 933 it has $'I\sigma\mu$. It has no paragraphus before 937, but it has one before 941; and before 947 it has $\lambda\nu\tau$. Before 951 it has $'I\sigma\mu$. again; before 953 no note. Suppose M were right in giving 933-40 to Ismene: then is 941-6 sung by the Chorus? Or by Hemichorion A? Or by Antigone? An examination of the antistrophe may help us to decide. M gives 946-50 to Antigone and all the rest of the antistrophe to Ismene. One might infer from this that 933-40 were sung by Ismene and the rest of the strophe by Antigone. Is this possible? M has a paragraphus not before 937, but before 941. But there is good reason to think that the paragraphus before 951 should be balanced by one before 937. For if M's paragraphus before 941 were right, there would have to be one before 954 to balance it; and there could not be a paragraphus in the middle of a sentence. It seems, then, that 937-46 and 951-60 are continuous lyric passages. If we could trust the note before 951 in M, we would assign them to Antigone and Ismene respectively. But it is obviously very far from certain that the sisters figure in this scene at all.

If the sporadic indications of singer given in the first three strophic pairs are even approximately correct, these three pairs are sung by Hemichoria, and perhaps some parts are sung by the whole Chorus. Analogy would suggest that the fourth strophic pair belonged to the same singers; so that even if we suppose or assume that the indications given in the manuscripts are roughly correct, these indications themselves make against the sisters having any part even in the fourth strophic pair. It seems to me likeliest that this too belongs to the Chorus. Perhaps the two Hemichoria sing 933-6 and 947-50 and the whole Chorus 937-46 and 951-60. But again other possibilities cannot be ruled out. The final words of this section $\kappa\alpha\ \delta\nu\o\iota\kappa\ \kappa\rho\atilde{t}\rho\iota\kappa\alpha\ \tilde{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\zeta\epsilon\ \delta\alpha\iota\mu\omega\iota$ are hardly to be construed as an indication that the $\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omega\iota$ has 'left off' for good. He has left off so far as Eteocles and Polyneices are concerned; but these words do not rule out the possibility that he may yet plague another generation of their family.

C. *The lyric stichomythia (961-1004): Indications of speaker*

Wilamowitz is right in holding that there is no proof that the sisters sing any part of the lyrics between 875 and 960. But what of the lyrics between 961 and 1004? These are divided among the sisters by the manuscripts; but again the indications of singers are defective. M divides the lines only by paragraphi; only before 961 and 968 it has $'I\sigma\mu$. These indications are not consistent with each other. The former would imply that Ismene is the first speaker throughout the stichomythia; which would be natural if she had spoken

first at 934 f., as M makes her. Yet since Victorius all those editors who have accepted the assignation of these lines to the sisters have made Antigone speak first and Ismene follow. Victorius seems to have done so quite mechanically. Right down to 960 he took M's indications of speaker at their face value; so that he gave 934-40 to Ismene, 941-6 to the Chorus, 947-50 to Antigone, 951-60 to Ismene. Then at 961 he gave *παιθεῖς ἔπαισας* to Antigone. Stanley followed Victorius; Schütz, who divided 874-60 between hemichoria, followed his predecessors in assuming that Antigone, and not Ismene as M indicates, was the first speaker throughout the 'lyric stichomythia', and Hermann and later editors followed him.

Does the internal evidence help to show whether this is right or no? Schütz's observation that Ismene's utterances refer as a rule to Eteocles and Antigone's to Polyneices has been generally accepted, and with good reason. Schütz believed that *παιθεῖς ἔπαισας* at 961 supplied a definite reason for making Antigone speak first. In Eur. *Phoen.* 1407 f., Eteocles strikes the first fatal blow; a scholion in M on 980 (969 in Wecklein), possibly influenced by Euripides, says of Eteocles *πρῶτος γὰρ κατέκτανε τὸν Πολυνείκη*, and it is possible that this was the tradition of the epic and that both tragedians followed it. But even if we could feel sure of this (as we cannot), we would have no warrant for assuming that the first half of 961 must have been addressed to Eteocles. For the strict temporal implications of the two aorist participles *παιθεῖς* and *κατέκτανόν* cannot reasonably be pressed. When an aorist participle stands next to an indicative of narration in past time, it need not imply priority of time; see K. W. Krüger on Thuc. 2. 68. 2, W. W. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (1897), section 150, p. 52, Kühner-Gerth, i. 197 f. (cited by Fraenkel, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon*, p. 208, q.v.).

961 therefore yields no evidence that Antigone is the first speaker; and lines 989 f. yield some indication that she is not. It may at first sight seem natural for Antigone to speak 991 *ἔπει κατῆθες ἐς πόλιν*, which is obviously addressed to Polyneices. But the speaker of this line is taking up what is said in 990, and the subject of the sentence in 991 is supplied from that of 990. Therefore the subject of the sentence in 990 is likely to be Polyneices. From this it follows that the subject of the sentence in 989 is likely to be Eteocles; and if 989 is addressed to Eteocles and 990 to Polyneices, it is probable that 989 is spoken by Ismene and 990 by Antigone. Further, it is suitable that 998-9 should be spoken by Ismene, since these lines are manifestly addressed to Eteocles. True, they convey a measure of reproach (cf. Antigone's utterance at 1049, if that is genuine), and therefore might seem more appropriate in Antigone's mouth. But we cannot be sure that Ismene too might not have uttered them. It is generally recognized that part of the answer to this speech, relating to Polyneices, is missing; I do not care to try to restore it; but I suspect that it contained the name of Polyneices, and that the Byzantine reading *πολυπονύματε* may be right. At l. 1000 the manuscripts have *ἴώ, δαιμονῶντες ἐν ἄτῃ*. This does not bear to the following l. 1002 *ἴώ, ποῦ σφε θήσομεν χθονός*; the same symmetrical relation which has so far obtained between every successive pair of speeches in this section. Line 1002 is related in this way to 1003, which answers the question it has asked; 1001 is a comment on what has gone before. Line 1004 *ἴώ, ιώ, πῆμα πατρὶ πάρεινον* resembles 1001 in being a comment on what has gone before, and also in being not an iambic dimeter, but a pherecrateus.¹

¹ The exclamation *ἴώ ιώ* is *extra metrum*.

I would keep the manuscript reading in 1001, and would assign 1001 to the Chorus, 1002 to Ismene, 1003 to Antigone, and 1004 again to the Chorus. Then the lyric stichomythia will have a kind of clausula of its own. First the two singers, who have so far uttered only half-lines or single lines at a time, each utter a speech of two lines (998–1000); this is followed by a choral comment, whose metre is not the iambic dimeter but the pherecrateus. The singers then utter one line each, and a second choral comment, again in the form of a pherecrateus, follows.

D. *Was the lyric stichomythia written for the sisters?*

In my discussion of this scene so far I have assumed that the two main speakers are the sisters, as the manuscripts imply. But nothing I have mentioned so far supplies any certain evidence for accepting their testimony. Is it not possible that the lines assigned to the sisters really belong to the leaders of two hemichoria, as Wilamowitz held? If they are genuine, lines 996–7 enable us to decide this question. In modern texts, 994–7 read as follows:

—ἰώ πόνος—ἰώ κακά.
—δώμασι—καὶ χθονί¹
—πρὸ πάντων δ' ἐμοί
—καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον γ' ἐμοί

It is important to realize that the paragraphus before *kai* in 995 was inserted by Hermann. Its insertion removes a real difficulty. After the repeated ephymnion (986–8), we have first four iambic dimeters, delivered by each singer in turn (989–92). We then (whether or not we follow Wilamowitz in transposing 983 and 993) have two iambic dimeters, one half pronounced by each speaker in turn (993–4). Then comes l. 995. It is followed, if the manuscripts can be trusted, by two dochmiae metra, one to each speaker (996–7). Now if 995 is given to a single speaker, it destroys the symmetry. It could, indeed, count as a third dochmiae metron. But three is an odd number; and in this very symmetrical passage that would be anomalous. We should have to suppose that a fourth dochmiae metron had dropped out; or else to remove one or all of the existing three. C. G. Haupt (see p. 300 of his edition of 1830) cut out 996 as a marginal explanation of 997; 995 and 997 thus balanced one another. Hartung, Weil, Kirchhoff, Wecklein, Tucker, and Mazon followed suit¹ and so did Wilamowitz in 1903 (*S.B.B.* 444).

But in his edition of 1914 Wilamowitz dealt with l. 995 by Hermann's simpler expedient of dividing it between two speakers. Now if it is thus divided, it can hardly be a dochmiae metron symmetrical with 996 or 997 or both; for each of these, if genuine, must belong to a single speaker. If Hermann's paragraphus is accepted, as I think it ought to be, it is best to regard it as consisting of two creticas equivalent to iambic metra, and to write δώμασι<ν>. It will then continue the sequence of iambic monometers that precede it.

Wilamowitz (p. 122) has the following note on 997: 'totum versum delet A, solet hic aut proximus deleri, sed praecipius dolor nulli convenit nisi sororibus, neutri tamen potior. recte sensit Herm. apparent utrumque versum histrionis esse.' Wilamowitz regarded 995 as a dochmiae metron (see his section of the app. crit. headed 'Numeri'); and metrically it would have suited him best to expel only one of lines 996–7, as he had done eleven years earlier. But he was

¹ S. Srebrny, *Critica et exegētica in Aeschylum* (Torun, 1950), cuts out 995–7.

too honest not to recognize that *both* lines must have been written for the sisters; he therefore kept both in his text, but pronounced in his apparatus that both were by the 'histrio'. Now Wilamowitz calls 995–8 dochmias metra. I have already argued that 995 is probably iambic; and the same is true of 998. It is therefore likely that 996–7 form two isolated dochmias metra; but that supplies no reason for cutting them out. Dochmias may well occur amid iambics of this sort; cf. 971 = 982 above. Apart from the difficulty of reconciling these lines with Wilamowitz's theory, there is not the slightest reason for deleting them. When Wilamowitz writes 'neutri tamen prior', I suppose he is implying that neither sister would have claimed that she felt greater grief than the other; but it is idle to deny that in their grief and excitement Aeschylus might have allowed them such a hyperbole. Wilamowitz agrees that these lines were written for the sisters; that is all he has against them. If we accept them, we must conclude that 960–1004 were written for the sisters.¹ Bergk's case would not be affected, since he ascribed this passage to the interpolator; but Wilamowitz's case would, since he thought it was by Aeschylus. I find it strange that in *A.I.* Wilamowitz does not mention that his theory necessitates this arbitrary decision.

E. Antigone's scene with the Herald (1005–53)

Bergk and Wilamowitz are at one in condemning everything from 1005 to the end of the play. Some of their reasons for doing so have already been discussed; but there are other criticisms of detail that I must mention. Wilamowitz claimed in 1903 (*S.B.B.* 437) that P. Corssen (15) had shown the last scene of the *Seven* to be dependent on Euripides' *Phoenissae*; he did not repeat this claim in his book eleven years later, but Corssen's arguments deserve some mention. What do they amount to? Euripides' Creon says *Πολυνείκους νεκὺν ἐκβάλετ'* *ἀθαπτον* (1629–30); his Antigone says *ἔγώ σφε θάψω, καν̄ ἀπενιέπη πόλις* (1657).² In the *Seven*, the Herald says *τόιδε Πολυνείκους νεκὺν ἔξω βαλεῖν ἀθαπτον* (1013–14), and Antigone says *ἔγώ σφε θάψω* (1028). Wundt (20, pp. 363 f.) has dealt with this feeble argument as it deserves. But even in 1914 Wilamowitz could still write (*A.I.* 94) that *Th.* 1014 must be based on *Phoen.* 1630. He argues (in the footnote on that page) that whereas the *throwing out* of Polyneices' body was a feature of the *Phoenissae*, because in that play his corpse was cast outside the city boundaries as that of a traitor, that conception could play no part in the *Seven*. But in the *Seven* as we have it both bodies had been brought back to the city; if the Government has its way, that of Polyneices must presumably be cast out again. This argument proves nothing.

1016 *εἰ μὴ θεῶν τις ἐμποδὼν ἔστη δορὶ τῷ τοῦδ'* is called 'Flickwerk' by Wilamowitz (*A.I.* 94). Is it *τῷ τοῦδ'* coming at the end of the sentence that worries him? For the frequency of a stop at this point in the line see the long list of Aeschylean passages given by W. Headlam, *On Editing Aeschylus*, pp. 5 f., especially pp. 11 f., where Verrall's perverse view of this passage is well

¹ It cannot seriously be argued that any member of the Chorus can have claimed that to her above all others the death of the royal brothers was a grief, nor that any other member can have capped this preposterous claim by one equally preposterous. Wilamowitz saw this. It is odd that Wundt, who on p. 369 refers to this passage, missed this

point. But the standard text was then that of Wecklein, who prints l. 996 only in the apparatus.

² Dover points out that it would be more reasonable to use this to argue that the *Phoenissae* was echoing the *Seven* than vice versa.

refuted. *τοῦδ'* must surely refer to Polyneices, and not to Eteocles as Verrall and Tucker thought.

1021 *ἀτίμως τούπτιμου λαβεῖν* is given by Wilamowitz as an example of the general proposition that, 'Die gesuchten Antithesen weisen jeden Gedanken an aischyleischen Ursprung ab, fordern die Entstehung nach Euripides'. The first instance of a 'gesuchte Antithese' that comes into my head happens to be *Th.* 695-7: *φίλον γάρ ἐχθρά μοι πατρὸς μέλαιν'* Άρα | ξηροῖς ἀκλαύτοις ὅμμασιν προσούζανε | λέγοντα κέρδος πρότερον ὑστέρου μόρον. But they are a common feature of the style of Aeschylus; see the long list given by C. F. Kumaniecki, *De Elocutionis Aeschyleae Natura* (Cracow, 1935), 59-67. Is the play on the different senses of *τυμή* in *ἀτίμως* and *τούπτιμου* thought odd? It is no odder than that between the different senses of *κῆδος* at *Ag.* 699 f. or that between the different senses of *ὅμμαιοι* at *Th.* 940. Manginas (328) draws attention to the use of *ἀτίμως* at *P.V.* 919 and to that of *τάπτιμα* at *Pers.* 823.

1022 *τυμβοχόια χειρώματα* means 'the action of the hands that pile up the barrow'. *χειρώμα* derives from *χειροῦθαι*, not from *χείρ*, so that the *abusio* is a notable one; see the literature quoted by Ed. Fraenkel, *Agamemnon*, iii. 619. But if Sophocles can use *ἀχείρωτον* to mean 'not made with hands' (*O.C.* 698 *φύτευμ' ἀχείρωτον αὐτοποιού*), there is no reason to doubt that Aeschylus can have been guilty of using *χειρώμα* in such a way. Cf. I. A. Schuursma, *De poetica vocabulorum abusione apud Aesch.* (Amsterdam, 1932), pp. 66, 101.

1023 *προσσέβειν* is noted by Wilamowitz as a singularity. So it is, if it is taken to stand to *σέβειν* as *προσένχομαι* stands to *εὔχομαι*. But I think it likelier that Verrall is right in taking it to mean 'grant him the additional honour of ὁξ. οἰμ'.

1025 *τέλος* meaning 'magistratus' is indeed unusual, as Wilamowitz calls it. *οἱ ἐν τέλει* is a common expression, and Thucydides calls the magistrates *τὰ τέλη* (1. 58. 1; 4. 15. 1; 86. 1; 88. 1; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2. 6. 4). But *τέλος* seems to be unique; and we have to ask whether its uniqueness is of the sort that helps to throw doubt upon the Aeschylean authorship of the passage that contains it. A point here to Wilamowitz; but not, I think, a very strong one.¹

1027 *ἢν* is an unusual form in Aeschylus. But it occurs at *Pers.* 708; it may be right at *Ag.* 1347, where the manuscripts have *ἄν*; and there are 26 instances in Sophocles. Hoffmann-Debrunner, *Geschichte der griechischen Sprache*³, i. 116, rightly warn us against concluding from the invariable use of *ἴαν* in the 'Kanzleisprache' of Attic inscriptions that *ἢν* is not an Attic form.

1032 follows rather awkwardly on 1031; it is strange that Wilamowitz and his followers have not pointed this out. Paley deleted it as an interpolation, and it could conceivably be one.

1033-4 are strongly criticized by Wilamowitz (l.c.): 'Darin ist ἄκοντι ganz leer, nur um der Antithesen willen gesetzt, ist συγγόνω φρενί an sich preziös gesagt, schlecht, weil συγγόνω jeder zunächst zu θανόντι zieht. Den euripideischen Klang sollte niemand in der Anrede an die eigene Seele verkennen.' Aeschylus is full of antitheses like *θέλοντα*' *ἄκοντι*: cf. *P.V.* 19 *ἄκοντά σ'* *ἄκων* (Snell), *ibid.* 192 *σπεύδωντα* *σπεύδοντι*, 218 *ἐκόνθ' ἔκοντι*, 671 *ἄκουσαν ἄκων*. *θανόντι* *ζῶσα* recalls *Ag.* 819 *ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσι. συνθηγσκουσα δὲ σποδός, κτλ.* *S. Ant.* 871 *θανὼν ἔτ' οὖσαν κατήναρές με*: cf. *El.* 808, *Tr.* 1163, etc.; see

¹ G. Italie, *Index Aeschylus*, 294, bottom, thinks *τέλος* in Aeschylus can mean 'turban, coetus', which if true might be relevant here.

But *Pers.* 47 is an instance of the well-known military sense, which is different, and fr. 151 is too corrupt to count.

Kumaniecki, l.c. οὐγγόνῳ φρενὶ is no more 'precious' than several of the many Aeschylean combinations of φρενὶ with adjectives that are to be found on p. 321 of Italie's *Index Aeschylius*; and cf. 811 ἀδελφᾶς χεροῖ, S. O.T. 1481. I should at once take ζῶσα not with οὐγγόνῳ, but with θανόντι, which is not only antithetic in sense, but precedes it in the sentence. The address to the ψυχή is certainly the earliest in tragedy; cf. W. Schadewaldt, *Monolog und Selbstgespräch* (1926), p. 53, n. 1. Now it is by no means certain that there is any address to the ψυχή. P. Maas (ap. Snell, 40, p. 91) pointed out that one might well read κοινωνεῖ and take ψυχή as nominative (as Headlam must have done: see p. 107 of his translation). 'Das ζῶσα daneben', wrote Snell, 'ist nicht leer, sondern schön und bedeutungsvoll, da es auch die ψυχή der Gestorbenen gibt.' To me this way of taking the line seems distinctly preferable. But even if it is rejected, the frequency in Homer and in early lyric of addresses to one's own θυμός, καρδία, etc. (see D. L. Page on Eur. *Med.* 1056), seems to me to show that this argument against the passage has very little force.

1036. Wilamowitz objects to 'die hohlbäuchigen Wölfe'; but if an empty bed may be called 'hollow' (*Soph. Tr.* 901 κοῦλα δέμνα), why not an empty wolf's belly?

On 1037-40 see above, p. 97. Wilamowitz (l.c.) objects to μηδέ τῷ δόξῃ πάλιν so soon after 1036 μὴ δοκεσάτῳ τινί. But there are many similar repetitions in Aeschylus.

Everything from 1041 to 1046, if it is an imitation, must be agreed to be a good one. 1047, though, has never been satisfactorily explained. But Wilamowitz (l.c.) was surely right not to use it as evidence against authenticity. The unusual verb διατετίμηται at once recalls fr. 265 διαπεφρούρηται βίος and Pers. 714 διαπεπόρθηται τὰ Περσῶν πράγματα'. The use of the preverb δια- in these places strongly suggests that here also it has the meaning 'utterly', 'to the end', so that the verb means 'he has received his τιμή right to the end (or "in full measure") from the gods'. If this is right, interpretations like that of Wilamowitz ('adhuc Polynicus causa a deis quidem non est diiudicata') and Headlam ('Yes, for his condition is not yet beyond honour in the sight of the gods') are ruled out. With this important point established, let us approach the question of the negative. The manuscripts have:

ἢδη τὰ τοῦδε οὐ διατετίμηται θεοῖς.

S M paraphrases τὰ περὶ τῆς τιμῆς τούτου ὑπὸ θεῶν κέκριται, which has led some to infer that his text did not have οὐ.¹ Tucker and Italie have rightly seen that one has only to print the sentence as a question to remove the apparent contradiction with the scholiast's paraphrase. But this involves a serious difficulty of word order; can ἢδη really precede οὐ? I know of no such instance, and would therefore remove οὐ. What, then, will the sentence mean? The Herald has said to Antigone, 'Will you honour with a funeral the man the city rejects?' Antigone replies, 'Already his τιμή has been dealt him in full measure by the gods.' The notion of τιμή can hardly be intended in the same sense by Antigone as it has been by the Herald. I think Antigone is taking up the Herald's word τιμήσεις, and deliberately using the same word in a different sense. Verrall understood διατετίμηται in the light of the use of τιμή to mean 'reward', 'penalty', 'punishment'; cf. the similar play upon this word at 1021, discussed on p. 109 above. Antigone's reply will then mean, 'Already

¹ Murray mentions H. D. Broadhead's τούτου.

the gods have dealt him his full punishment'; that punishment is death, and does not include the deprivation of burial.

F. *The final anapaests (1054–end)*

We come now to the final anapaests. It is odd that Wilamowitz says nothing about the quantity of the ε in ὠλέσατε at 1056. The lengthening of a short final vowel before a word beginning with a mute and a liquid is very rare in tragic lyrics or anapaests. The question is discussed by Ed. Fraenkel in Appendix E to his *Agamemnon* (iii. 826); he rightly points out that Elmsley's expedient of reading ὠλέσατε is not completely justified by ὠλέσσας at Soph. *Aj.* 390; nor is *Eum.* 829 κατανασσαμένη, which Elmsley quotes (in his note on what in his notation is Eur. *Med.* 814), a real parallel.¹ There are several lyric passages in which lengthenings of this kind are hard to remove; *Cho.* 606 πυρδάῃ τινὰ πρόνοιαν is a notorious instance; and see Fraenkel for others. But this lengthened ε is a real singularity. Is it the kind of singularity that shows the hand of a late-fifth-century or fourth-century 'diaskeuast'? I should be much less surprised to meet it in genuine Aeschylus.

The last of the anomalies remarked by Wilamowitz (*A.I.* 94) is at l. 1075. The verb ἐρύκω is found nowhere else in Aeschylus; but it is common enough in Homer, and occurs at Soph. *Tr.* 121, *Ph.* 1153, Eur. *Her.* 317, *Heracl.* 691. The aorist with temporal augment is not found elsewhere before Xenophon; but besides ἐρυξα Homer has ἡρύκακον.

In the final anapaests the assignations of lines to speakers are again defective. M gives 1054–7 to a hemichorion; and in M and most other manuscripts paragraphi stand before 1057, 1062, 1066, and 1072. There is no reason why the paragraphus before 1057 should not stand; an invocation prefixed with ω̄ may well stand as a sentence on its own, so that it is quite possible that there should be a full stop after οὐτως at the end of l. 1056. We find, then, the following five groups of lines marked off by paragraphi:

A 1054–6 B 1057–61 C 1062–5 D 1066–71 E 1072–7.

A seems to preface the whole passage; C seems like an answer to B and E like an answer to D. A is given by M to a hemichorion; but it seems at least as likely that this introductory invocation was uttered by the whole Chorus. Who, then, deliver B, C, D, and E? Some manuscripts give B to a hemichorion, others to Ismene. C is given to a hemichorion by some manuscripts; no manuscript gives C to Antigone, but if B is correctly given to Ismene, then there would be some reason to suspect that C might belong to Antigone. If we could be sure that Ismene was an actor's part, the participation of the sisters would be almost ruled out, since the actor who had played first Ismene and then the Herald would have had to change again to play Ismene at the end. But I have already explained why I think Ismene was played by a παραχορίγμα (p. 96).

The speaker of B is willing but afraid to bury Polyneices. The speaker of C declares that it is intolerable that he should not be buried. The speaker of D (a hemichorion, according to the manuscripts) says, 'We will bury him'. The speaker of E says, 'We will go and bury Eteocles.' C answers B and E answers D; but the relation between C and D is less obvious. C says the prohibition is

¹ If one had to emend the passage, I should prefer to Elmsley's conjecture that of Burges: ὠλέσατ' ε<κ> πρυμνόθεν. But the irregular caesura, though attested in Aeschylus, is not a thing to introduce by emendation.

intolerable; D boldly declares the intention of defying it. It is conceivable that the paragraphus between C and D should not be there, and that both form a long speech by a single speaker; but considerations of symmetry indicate that it would be rash to remove the paragraphus.

The speaker of B uses the first person singular; the speaker of C does not use the first person; the speakers of D and E use the first person plural. It would be unwise to insist that it follows from this that B and C are the utterances of single speakers and D and E the utterances of more speakers than one. But the tenses used indicate that this is possible, and the assumption is in accord with the sense of the words themselves. Who, then, speak B and C? Not, I think, the sisters; ll. 1063-5 look more like the words of some other person urging that Antigone deserves support than the words of Antigone herself. That is why I suspect that B is delivered by the leader of Hemichorion A and C by the leader of Hemichorion B. Then D is delivered by the whole of Hemichorion B in unison and E by the whole of Hemichorion A. But this whole train of argument can command little objective force.

The reasons given by the two Hemichoria for their actions are exactly those we should expect, if my remarks about the double motive running through the play are not without foundation. 'Both alike', says the second hemichorion, 'are mourned by the family; and the city approves now one man's Dike, now another's.'¹ The former speaker is probably the leader of Hemichorion A, and the latter the leader of Hemichorion B. The speakers can hardly be the sisters, as ll. 1064-5 sound like the utterance not of Antigone herself, but of another person urging that Antigone deserves help. But the first hemichorion goes to bury Eteocles, and its last words are a fitting reminder of the heroic Eteocles of the first part of the play.

To sum up, the last section of the play contains a number of awkwardnesses and singularities. We have to ask ourselves whether these are of such a nature as to disprove, or to throw serious doubt upon, its Aeschylean authorship. We have also to ask whether the awkwardnesses and singularities would by themselves have supplied a case for athetesis even without the arguments based upon the content of this part of the text which were discussed in the first part of this article.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. Intrinsic improbability of the substitution of an actors' rehash for part of the play

How likely is it that an actors' copy which had undergone such drastic changes should have displaced the authentic text in the Alexandrian edition? We know that Lycurgus carried a proposal that official copies of the plays of the three great tragedians should be preserved (Plutarch, *Vit. X Oratorum* 841 f.). We may well agree with D. L. Page (*Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*, 2) that 'it is unfortunately improbable that this law had any permanent effect'. But we know that about the year 330 official copies were made, presumably by intelligent persons; and even if we prefer not to believe Plutarch's story of how the original master-copy prepared by Lycurgus and

¹ Wilhelm Nestle, *Class. Philol.* v (1910), 138 = *Griechische Studien* 204 thinks this shows 'sophistic influence', and finds here another argument in favour of Wilamowitz's

view. Pohlenz (66, p. 46) thinks that young women cannot have been allowed to criticize the government. I see little force in these arguments.

deposited in the Athenian archives came to Alexandria, it seems likely that these official texts were among the copies of the plays on which the Alexandrian scholars based their editions. Two other tragedies are commonly held to have come down to us in a distorted form: the *Iphigenia in Aulis* and the *Rhesus*. The *Iphigenia* was not completed by its author, and therefore had no existence except in the form in which it was produced; it would not therefore supply a good parallel to the alleged instance of the *Seven*. Those who believe that the *Rhesus* is a fourth-century tragedy that displaced the genuine *Rhesus* of Euripides may hold that this instance supplies a parallel. Even if the *Rhesus* is spurious, the two cases are not quite similar; but as I have never seen reason to suppose that the *Rhesus* was anything but an early work of Euripides, I am not persuaded that it has any relevance.¹ Sporadic actors' interpolations are one thing, the replacement of a famous play by an actors' rehash of it is another. We know, too, from the *Frogs* that this play was well known towards the end of the fifth century. Certainly the thing is not impossible; but it would be a good deal more singular than any of those who have asserted it have paused to remark.

B. Subjective character of arguments for Athetesis

I have said little of the intrinsic merits or demerits of the passages in question. They certainly contain many awkwardnesses and several singularities. But I am not convinced that they contain more of either than may be found in many passages of equal length whose authenticity has not been challenged. Aeschylus is not always a polished writer; if it were permitted to acknowledge this fact, his characteristic excellencies would be better appreciated and the characteristic difficulties his text presents would seem slightly less formidable. The moment a passage of Aeschylus comes under suspicion, an eminent scholar like Carl Robert can feel free to indulge in the entertaining piece of literary criticism quoted on p. 81 above. Had Robert been able to discuss with equal lack of inhibition, say, the scene in which the Chorus of the *Agamemnon* debates whether they should enter the palace and find out whether a murder is taking place, he would, I suspect, have gone far beyond the Aristophanic Euripides in the severity of his criticism. Nothing could be further from my purpose than to depreciate Aeschylus. But to realize that Aeschylus is one of the greatest poets of the world it is not necessary to believe that his religion is profound or that his style and language are elegant and polished. It may even be argued that only a writer whose morality is archaic and whose style is harsh and unpolished could have written poetry possessed of the particular excellencies in which Aeschylus has never been surpassed and seldom equalled.

For so long a while has it been possible, and even meritorious, to discover every kind of infelicity in the athetized scenes of the *Seven* that it is difficult to approach the question with an unbiased judgement. To me they seem to contain, together with the imperfections I have spoken of, much fine poetry, particularly in the final anapaests. But I lay little stress on this feeling of mine; for we know so painfully little about Aeschylus² that I do not believe that the subjective impressions of any living person upon so delicate a question can be followed with much confidence. That is why I have tried so far as possible to

¹ Dr. W. Ritchie of the University of Sydney is soon to publish a thorough examination of the problem of the *Rhesus*.

² The publication of part of a hypothesis

to a play of the Danaid trilogy (*P. Oxy.* 2256, fr. 3, now printed as fr. 288 in my appendix to vol. ii of the Loeb Aeschylus) has lately reminded us of this.

focus attention on the ascertainable facts that bear upon this problem. Other scholars with more confidence in their feeling for style than I will very likely produce a new defence of the athetesis; and it is possible that they are right. A convincing forgery is always possible; these parts of the play certainly have their singularities, which the athetizers have done valuable service in exposing or provoking others to explain; and I would not think for a moment of claiming that the whole play was *undoubtedly* genuine. But unless the athetizers are able to adduce objective evidence a good deal more convincing than has yet been brought forward, I shall continue to think, as I do now, that to talk as if it were certain, or anything like certain, that the final scenes were an actors' rehash is to go very considerably beyond the conclusion that is warranted by the known evidence.

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PLINY ON ICARIAN SHORES

SOME suggestions are here made for improvement of the text and understanding of Pliny's Eastern Aegean geography. The editions studied for the purpose are Detlefsen's special edition of the geographical books (Siegl's *Quellen und Forschungen*, vol. ix, Berlin, 1904) and Mayhoff's Teubner vol. i (1906).

The citations of MSS. readings given below are normally taken from Mayhoff's apparatus, which (though not necessarily more accurate) gives a fuller coverage than Detlefsen's. The MSS. are cited by the letters given them in Mayhoff's edition and the Budé Pliny book i (1950), pp. 37 f. One further MS., hitherto not collated in the geographical books, is here cited. Following Campbell, who first drew attention to it,¹ I cite it as c. This MS., formerly in the Phillipps collection in Cheltenham and now in the Pierpont Morgan Library² (M. 871), is assigned to Lorsch and said to be of the first half of the ninth century. It seems thus to be somewhat older than A and E, and in that case is the oldest known surviving MS. of the geographical books.³ The MS. c belongs to the main class of MSS. represented in the geographical books by DFR, and (as Campbell observed) is closest to F; unless the second-hand corrections in F and c are very much more extensive than is assumed, it seems that F must after all be independent of D. But c (as it stands) has also a great deal in common with a, and at times lends support to readings of E.⁴ It thus helps to bridge the gulf between the 'families' of DFR and of E; in the Greek geography these 'families' seem to be inextricably crossed, and the alliances of the MSS. are by no means constant.

The forty-five sections of Books 4 and 5 in which I have examined c and its relationships provide a slender base on which to appraise the various MSS.—the more so since the critical apparatus in the existing editions are recognized to be very imperfect. But while it cannot comprehend the overall pattern, close study within a limited field can show something of the detailed texture; and within this narrow compass a brief remark on the MSS. may perhaps be in place. In the sections here examined it seems fair to assert that D is the steadiest MS. E, though nowadays held in ill repute, seems to preserve many good readings and merits closer study. The MSS. mentioned up to this point are all classed by modern editors as *recentiores*. A, commonly—if only by courtesy—ranked as *uetustior*, also preserves much that is good; but in these sections it is very deficient, and where it survives it does not seem fully to justify the great confidence that all modern editors have placed in it. If this is true of A, it must apply with greater force to the second-hand corrections in

¹ *A.J.P.* lvii (1936), 113 ff. (the second MS. there discussed, in the Bodleian, is not relevant to the present study); D. J. Campbell, *C. Plini Secundi Nat. Hist. Liber Secundus*, pp. 92 ff. I am indebted to Mr. A. N. L. Munby, who informed me of the present whereabouts of c and of the date (c. 830–40) assigned by Prof. Bischoff.

² Whose authorities kindly supplied a microfilm for my use. The MS., being very

clear, and appearing in the photographs to be little encumbered in this part by later corrections, can generally be read without difficulty in this way.

³ It is not clear on what grounds Ernout decides that Campbell, 'in the enthusiasm of his discovery', overrated the importance of this MS. (Budé ed., book i, p. 32).

⁴ Campbell noted that it often agrees with Ea.

E, F, and R (or at least in E and R);¹ for in these sections their claim to represent the *uetustiores* rests on little more than intermittent evidence of a connexion between them and A, in virtue of which they are used to correct the text where A is missing. Many of their corrections have rather the appearance of conjectures, and a more critical examination of these second hands seems to be a necessary preliminary to a modern recension of the text. There seems to be justice in Kroll's observations in *R.E.* s.v. 'Plinius d. A.' (1951), col. 432 f., where he deplores the prevailing mechanical division into *uetustiores* and *recentiores* and regards selection of readings on their merits as preferable to rigid adherence to a particular tradition.

To take the mainland first, in Pliny's order:

(5. 104 ff.) The editors give 'regio Bubassus. oppidum fuit Acanthus, alio nomine Dulopolis. est in promunturio Cnidos libera . . . (105) ab ea Doris incipit. sed prius terga et mediterraneas iurisdictiones indicasse conueniat'. After the account of the inland *conuentus* the text continues (107) 'Doridis in sinu Leucopolis, Hamaxitos, Eleus, Etene. dein Cariae oppida Pitium, Eutane, Halicarnasus'.

'Eutane' is evidently the 'Eutiana' of Mela 1. 84 and the Rhodian deme of the *Εὐθηνία*; and as such it seems to be situated towards the head of the Ceramic Gulf near Cedreæ (see now Bean-Cook, *B.S.A.* lii. 62 ff.), which fits the position in Pliny. 'Etene' (eutene E²R²) is likely to be the same place, but spelt with a difference sufficient to prevent Pliny suspecting that they were identical.² Fraser and Bean have justly protested against the accepted identification of the otherwise unknown *Sinus Doridis* with the gulf south of Cnidian territory; Pliny is passing on up the coast from Cnidus (*Rhodian Peraea*, p. 70, n. 1). But, equally, it is true to say that the Cnidian Peninsula is too narrow to be describable in terms of settlements on the one coast and then on the other, and its sheer northern shores lack habitation; so that it is impossible to conceive of the north side only as having settlements in Doris. The explanation is perhaps that Pliny regards the whole Cnidian territory (but not the Carian Chersonese) as Dorian, and passes direct from the Bybassus region (which is now located round the head of the Gulf of Rena, *Rhod. Peraea*, p. 65) to Cnidus itself; after that he cites the places on Cnidian territory, proceeding—if he had any clue to their geographical arrangement—from the tip of the peninsula, *a qua Doris incipit*. 'Doridis in sinu' is then perhaps not to be envisaged as a specific geographical term corresponding to the actual configuration of the coasts, but rather as equivalent to 'in gremio Doridis'; this would fit with Pliny's general conception of this Doris in 5. 103, 'Caria mediae Doridi circumfunditur, ad mare utroque latere ambiens'. Acanthus can then, if Pliny's testimony merits consideration, most naturally be assigned to the Bybassus region; and Leucopolis, Hamaxitos, and Elaeus will have lain on the Cnidian Peninsula. The second name can be related to the grand trunk road that ran from New Cnidus to Old Cnidus, and perhaps beyond (*B.S.A.* xlvii. 179 ff.); a possible, but hazardous identification by similarity of name is offered by Mezcit (pronounced *Anglice* 'Mejjit'), a

¹ The corrections in F are fewer and seem sometimes more responsible than the others.

² Urlichs, *Vindiciae Plinianae* (1866), pp. 80 f., would excise the name 'Euthene' (i.e.

Etene) from the text. If the MSS. had actually read 'Euthene' the observation would be valid.

hamlet lying near the south coast of the Triopian Peninsula below Döseme. Elaki (Ela), now Reşadiye (*ibid.* 171 n. 1, 173 ff.), may be the successor of Elaeus, whether by survival or renewal of an appropriate name.

The name 'Pitaium' in 107 is printed in all texts as having MS. authority. But its claim to such authority does not seem to bear investigation. It has been preferred by the editors on the ground that, as a correction in E, it derives from the '*uetustiores*'. But Mayhoff noted that some of the corrections in E are by a late hand (E³) and are not above the suspicion of correction in the light of the earliest printed books; and he cites 'Pitaium' here as E³. If Mayhoff had made this discovery earlier and realized its implications, he might have made a considerable number of changes in his text. Two important instances of false conjectures by this late hand occur in adjacent sections. In 106 'Orba' (abl.) is corrected to 'Orga' (which corresponds to the form given by Strabo); but curiously the name Orbas has the authority of Dio Chrysostomus, and Jan restored 'Orba' to the text. In 108 the MSS. reading 'Otrus(a)' is changed (E³) to the well-known name 'Orthosia', which all editors print; but L. Robert has shown that the reference is in fact to the obscure Otrus in Phrygia and has recognized that 'Orthosia' is nothing other than an emendation of Hermolaus Barbarus at the close of the fifteenth century (*Villes d'Asie mineure*, pp. 157 f.). 'Orga' in 106 likewise bears the mark of Hermolaus Barbarus, and so does 'Pitaium' in 107;¹ so also does the false 'Ceramicum' in Mela at this point (see *B.S.A.* lii. 63). Hermolaus Barbarus prided himself on having made five thousand corrections in the text of Pliny alone. Through the chance that they were written as corrections into the MS. E, many of his false emendations remain unquestioned in our texts of Pliny at the present day, stamped with the authority of the '*uetustiores*'.

The emendation 'Pitaium' in 107 is at first sight attractive; for it seems to be confirmed by Steph. Byz., *Πιτάου πόλις* [*πόλις add. Holsten*] *Kaplas*, ἀπὸ *Πιτάου*. *Πιτάος δὲ Φρύξ*, *Μίδου φίλος κτλ.* But in view of its origin Pitaoupolis is more likely to have been at the other end of Caria; and—what is more serious—the territory under consideration here is Rhodian incorporated Peraea, and it is now clear that there was no Pitaium or Pitaoupolis among the demes there. The passage of Stephanus is surely not confirmation of the emendation but the authority on which it rests. The MSS. give: matium DF⁴ca(?) ; //iacum R¹; piatum E¹F²; piacum R². These readings resemble those of 5. 116, 'ab Epheso Matium aliud Colophoniorum et intus ipsa Colophon' (E²; piatum E¹DR¹c; spatia R²; spatiuum F²), where 'Matium' is restored with certainty on account of 5. 115, 'in ora autem Matium, Ephesus Amazonum opus'. The name Matium is relatively common in Pliny's Greek geography, and it possesses a peculiar spectral quality which renders it immune to the objection that no town of that name ever existed here. On the coast between the Cnidian isthmus and Erythrae there are four places named by Pliny which are otherwise totally unattested: they are Naryandos in 107, which is almost certainly false in this context (see below, p. 120), the Matium–Pitaium of 107, Matium in 115, and Matium in 116.² It seems therefore that 'Matium' is an appropriate reading here.

¹ See Mayhoff's apparatus ad locc. I have not been able to refer to Hermolaus's *Castigatones Plinianae*.

² 'Troezene, Phorontis', named after Ceramus at the end of a list of inland places

(109), are new names in this context. Since Halicarnassus, Myndus, and Theangela all claimed Troezen as their mother-city, it is likely that Ceramus did so too; and the pair of names cited here may owe its presence in

Apart from the case just discussed (107) the name Matium occurs at least five times in Pliny (at Ephesus, at Colophon, at or near Knossos in Crete, twice on the Pontic coasts). Outside Pliny it is unknown. This, on statistical grounds, rules out any possibility that Matium is a normal place-name.¹ Older scholars and editors for the most part assumed that Matium represents the Greek *μαντεῖον* and altered the spelling of the name according to their taste. There are obvious objections to this explanation, and one can feel little confidence that, if it is right, Pliny recognized the meaning of the word. Platon, in dealing with the Cretan Matium (4. 59), has proposed a most attractive explanation that Pliny's 'Matium, Heraclea' is a misunderstood rendering of the Greek phrase *πολισμάτιον Ἡράκλεια*, and he attempts to explain the Matiums at Ephesus and Colophon in the same way.² But the mention of Ephesus as being (or having once been) a *πολισμάτιον* is not altogether convincing, and it is notable that at least three of Pliny's Matiums coincide with very notable (though not all oracular) sanctuaries. Platon's explanation is excellent, both in itself and in its approach to the problem of Pliny's errors; but the old equation with *μαντεῖον* still has claims to consideration. If 'Matium' is to be read instead of 'Pitaium' in 107, the reference may be to the *πολισμάτιον* Euthenae, or alternatively to a sanctuary, perhaps the celebrated healing one of Hemitheia at Kastabos (Diod. 5. 62–63, Fraser-Bean, *Rhod. Peraea*, pp. 24 ff.), which I imagine to have been at Spratt's site on the Arin (Eren) Dagh east of the Cnidian isthmus (Fraser-Bean, op. cit., p. 44).

Farther up the coast there is one point where the reading of the word 'ma(n)tium' in Pliny's text would resolve a crux: (5. 121) 'fuit et Grynia, nunc tantum portus, olim insula adprehensa'. The word 'olim' is Jan's emendation of MSS. 'soli' (which seems meaningless) and is no doubt right. Yet the passage is still unintelligible. If Gryneum is still a port (as Pliny's words most emphatically imply), how can it be defunct? And why is the island *formerly joined up*? The site is indeed a peninsular one of the well-known type selected by the earliest Greek settlers on this coast, providing sheltered anchorage at the isthmus, and Pliny was well aware that peninsular sites of this sort had once been islands—he cites examples in 2. 204—but 'olim' is then quite out of place. In any case Gryneum was not in historical times a place or port of any consequence such as to merit special remark—witness its tribute of 1,000 drachmae in the Athenian empire; and in Hellenistic times it ceased to be a city and became a dependency of Myrina. Where then did Pliny get the idea that Gryneum was a port? We do not possess the Greek authors that he cites in his bibliography. But *Γρύνεον Ἀχαιῶν λιμήν* (*ἐν τούτῳ λέγονται Ἀχαιοὶ βουλεύσαθαι ἐπὶ τὸν Τίλεφον πότερον στρατεύειν η ἀπίστεν*) (Ps.-Scylax 98) provides an answer:³ Gryneum was, in olden time, a port, the harbour being

cited below; it may also be noted that the Matium of 6. 10 (see below, p. 120) must have been a very considerable place if it incorporated the Pontic Comana (for which see Strabo's description, 12. 557–60).

² *Κρητικά Χρονικά* i. 20 f.

³ It may be objected that *Ἀχαιῶν λιμήν* is not in fact in apposition to *Γρύνεον* here; but this can only be ascertained by research of a kind that was alien to Pliny, and in fact Klausen in his edition of 1831 still printed the words as being in apposition.

¹ The recurring argument that Mation is a place-name in the sense of 'minute' has been disposed of by Platon in the article

sheltered by the island joined up to the mainland. But in Pliny's day there was no town left at Gryneum, but only the great oracular temple of the Attalids occupying the site of the old city: 'fuit et Grynia, nunc (tantum) *ma(n)tium, portus olim insula adprehensa*'. If the name Matium, wherever it occurs, is to be understood in the sense proposed by Platon (i.e. πολισμάτιον), the restoration of the word in the text here at Gryneum loses some of its attractiveness; but, whatever the sense, it gains strong support from the parallel passage in 6. 10 (Pontus, by the mouth of the Thermelon), where the accepted text is 'fuit oppidum eodem nomine et alia quinque, Amazonium, Themiscyra, Sotira, Amasia, Comana, nunc Matium'.

To return to 5. 107: Bean and I have argued that the names 'Th(e)a(n)gela' and 'Termera' are transposed, since the errors in the passage are thus removed (*B.S.A.* 1. 144); if this is correct, the mistake is likely to be Pliny's own, and 'Termera libera' no longer requires the obelus that historians have with good cause given it.

In this passage all editors read 'Medmassa' (D(?), *Barbarus*; *mednassa codd. rell. u. omn.*), relying on Steph. Byz. s.v.; but the ethnic *Μαδνασῆς*, which is constant in the Athenian tribute lists, confirms the general MSS. reading.¹ Editors of ancient geographers do not normally count the tribute lists as evidence; yet for the names of places which (like Madnasa) disappeared in the first half of the fourth century B.C. they are documents of first-class importance. In Strabo's account of the Mausolian synoecism here (13. 611, καὶ τῆς Πιαιδίας ἀποτεμέθαντι πολλήν) the emendation *Μελησίας* for *Πιαιδίας* (*A.T.L.* i. 537, n. 5) is unnecessary; Strabo has already commented on the presence of these Leleges in Pisidia (12. 570).

In a list of towns after Myndus 'Nariandos, Neapolis, Caryanda' is read in the texts. 'Caryanda' here appears to be a conjecture of Hermolaus Barbarus; for Mayhoff's apparatus shows E as reading 'saryanda', and the other MSS. have 'aryanda' (or ari). The reading in c is 'naryandos neapoly saryanda', and the initial s here and in E is no doubt an extension of the termination of the preceding name, so that 'aryanda' can be regarded as the universal reading of the MSS. The text of Mela at this point (i. 85) reads 'Aruanda, Neapolis', and without any doubt Pliny was following Mela here.² Whether Mela wrote 'Aruanda' or 'Caruanda' may be argued. But it seems clear that Pliny read the name with initial a in his copy of Mela and wrote it so, and the reading 'Caryanda' here can only be justified on the principle that it is an editor's duty to correct the author's mistakes.

(109) 'Labrayndos' (for 'Hynidos') after 'Stratonicea libera' was suggested by Jan in his critical note and may be read with certainty; 'libera labrayndos' is (with slight variations) read in RFca.

(110) (Mt. Tmolus) 'uitibus consito conditis', read by the Loeb editor, appears to be a conflation, not of two readings with MS. authority, but of the MSS. reading (the single word 'conditis') and a Renascence conjecture ('uitibus consitus' E³). The reading of the first hands here seems quite correct and is followed by Jan and Mayhoff.

¹ Cf. L. Robert, *Rev. phil.* 1936, p. 279.

² For this Neapolis see Bean's and my remarks in *B.S.A.* 1. 158. The name Naryandos is quite unknown in the Halicarnassus region, but *Napuañðeis* are known in the

region of Stratonicea (*ibid.*, p. 160, n. 315). The name seems out of place in Pliny's list here and may possibly have entered the text during dictation as a result of confusion in the author's mind over Mela's 'Aruanda'.

(112) 'Posideum promunturium et oppidum, Oraculum Branchidarum appellatum, nunc Didymei Apollinis' (Mayhoff): there seems never to have been any settlement at C. Poseidion, but the sanctuary at Didyma housed a village (Strabo 14. 634), and the punctuation in Pliny should perhaps be altered to give this sense.

(113) (R. Macander) 'ad decumum a Mileto stadium lenis inlabitur mari'. This statement is discredited in recent works and sketch-maps where a position is given, in the vicinity of Myus fifty stades distant, for the river mouth in antiquity. But here Pliny is right. The river must have flowed in its old bed under Priene, and in Hellenistic times was pushing its pointed delta southwards across the gulf toward Miletus (cf. Philipsson in *Milet*, iii. 5, p. 10). The 1 : 100,000 map there shows that an arm of the old bed reached to within 1,500 metres of Miletus, so Pliny's statement is not necessarily even inaccurate. His statement well explains the dispute between Priene and Miletus over the εἴσπλος (*Inschr. v. Priene*, no. 111, lines 129, 146).

(114) 'iuxta fugitiu[m] conditum, uti nomen indicio est, Phygela fuit—et Marathesium oppidum'. But Phygela, from the post-classical *testimonia* (cf. Tomaschek, *Zur hist. Topographie v. Kleinasien im Mittelalter*, pp. 34 f.) and (in my view) the visible remains at Kuşadası, seems not to have passed into a decline; and Mela mentions Phygela (but not Marathesion) as existing. Editors should therefore punctuate 'Phygela, fuit et M.'; cf. 116, 'Lebedos, fuit et Notium oppidum', which is rightly so punctuated.

(115) 'fons in urbe (sc. Epheso) Callipia': the editors read 'Callippia'; Gelenius read 'Calliope'. The insistence of the MS. tradition on a single *p* deserves attention, since (if any faith is to be placed in the collation of the MSS.) it is unusual for all the authoritative MSS. to be in agreement in a simple orthographical error of this sort. Reference to Strabo reminds the reader that Callinus was the famous poet of Ephesus; possibly we should read 'Callicinia'. For fountains in Pliny that are named after people cf. 4. 25, 'Oedipodia' (in Boeotia), 3. 89, 'Archidemia' (at Syracuse; the Ionic form of the name is surprising at Syracuse, if Pliny's spelling counts for anything in such a matter; and the person is unknown. Perhaps a slip for 'Archimedia'?).

There is much to the north of Ephesus that is unsatisfactory in our texts; but the true readings are especially elusive here, and the Cayster forms the boundary of the present study. We turn now to the islands adjacent to Icarian shores. Pliny names an immense number of islands here. Many of the names must refer to barren islets and rocks; some of the names are inadvertently duplicated, and some may be erroneously placed in their contexts. The list of islands 'in Ceramico sinu', greatly exceeding the number of islands that exist in that gulf, no doubt relates to the cluster of islets and rocks off the tip of the Myndus Peninsula.¹ Names of islands off the coast between Cnidus and N. Ionia, which are known from other sources but do not appear in our texts of Pliny, are worth collecting and bearing in mind: Istrus (off Cnidus, Steph. Byz. s.v.), Aspis, also called Arconnesus (near Teos, Strabo 14. 643), Psyra (off Chios), and Bacchium (off Phocaea, Livy 37. 21). When relatively few names of islands are known from the other sources, it would be surprising if Pliny ignored these four.

¹ See Bean's and my remarks in *B.S.A.* i. 160 f., and (on the name Lampsimandus) *B.S.A.* ii. 133 f.

(4. 69) in a list of islands, evidently in the Icarian Sea, the editors, following Hermolaus Barbarus, read 'Corassiae'; the MSS. give 'carusae' (*or -usse*). The Corassiae could well be mentioned here; they are mentioned ('Corseas') in 5. 135, but such duplication is common enough. The emendation, however, is far-fetched; and if Bean and I are right in associating the name Crusa (in 5. 134) and the [K]*pooē[s]* of the Athenian assessment of 425 B.C. with a little islet-group off Myndus (*B.S.A.* I. 161), such violent emendation of the text is unnecessary.

(4. 71) in a list of Sporades the editors print 'Azibinthia, Lanise (or Lamse), Atracia, Pharmacusa.' Pharmacusa (modern *Pharmako*) gives a location off C. Poseidion of the Milesians. North of this lay Tragia, where the Athenians intercepted a Samian convoy setting out from the port of Miletus (Thuc. I. 116. 1). 'Tragia, Pharmacusa' can thus be read with every confidence.¹ This violates the word-division in the MSS., for which editors feel great reverence. But the MSS. are full of false word-divisions. A classic example of such perpetuated error is the 'Asca(n)diandalis, Amela(s), Noscopium' of our texts in 5. 101 (Lycia), which was still printed in the most recent text of Pliny some years after L. Robert resolved the group (with no more change than that of *i* to *y*) into 'Cadyanda, Lisa, Melanoscopium'—of which the first two are well-known Lycian cities (*Villes d' Asie min.* pp. 161 ff.); and it is worth noting that here *c* at least does not read 'ascand-' but divides 'cyanaeas cанд-'.

Before '(a)tragia' the name 'lamse' is read in A, and 'lanise' is a correction in F; DcaE read 'lamre', and of course the initial *a* of 'atragia' must be carried back. 'Lamp̄ea' (Greek *Λάμπεια*) is a possible emendation; but there is an island Lampsia somewhere off the Myndus Peninsula here (5. 134), so 'Lampsia' is perhaps the best reading. A and F² show 'azibinthia', the remaining MSS. 'aioantho', 'aiohanthro', and 'aichantho'. The Donkey Island off Miletus, which may or may not be the ancient Tragia, is commonly so called (Gaidaronesi), but its proper name is Agathonesi (Gatonisi in older writers);² if this name is a survival from antiquity, Ακανθό(νησος) may be the name that Pliny read (and perhaps copied as AICANTHO). This is admittedly conjectural. But Azibinthia, sanctified by the authority of the '*uetustiores*' and printed in the texts without any mark to indicate doubt of its correctness, is a *vox nihili*. So too are Lanise (and Lamse), Thetaedia (which follows immediately in sequence in A and our modern texts), Machia (F²E², *edd.*) eight lines above, Noscopium, and many others. Such names as never were nor could be have entered the indexes and thus plenish the stock of names available for comparisons and identifications; some have found a place in encyclopaedias and maps, and for lack of a timely obelus are condemned to haunt for ever the limbo of classical geography.

(5. 132) our texts read (Rhodes) 'uocitata est antea Ophiusa, Asteria, Aethria, Trinacrie, Corymbia, Poeeessa, Atabyria ab rege, dein Macaria et Oloessa'. In the fourth name ADcE, which represent the better half of the MS. tradition, read 'trinacriæ' (*or -atriæ*), and (with slight variations) 'combira' is the MS. reading of the next name; 'Corymbia' is an emendation of Hermolaus Barbarus (corimbia E³): perhaps we should read 'Trinacria et Ombria'. 'Poeeessa',

¹ Lest it should appear that Hermolaus Barbarus was always wrong, I remark here that he read 'Tragia'.

² So too the little island of Kalolimno, used as a grazing ground by the Calymniots, is commonly called Gaidaronesi.

if Mayhoff's apparatus is correct, is Hermolaus Barbarus's emendation of MSS. 'peteessa'; it is of course possible that this is right, *ἔστι δέ τις νῆσος μέσον ἀλί πετρήσσα* (*Od.* 4. 844). On account of the unique semantic interest of the name Pliny's Oloessa is dignified by an article of twenty-one lines in *R.E.*; A reads 'et oloissa', but the general reading of the other MSS. is 'aetholoessa', which suggests rather 'Aethaloessa' (Aethalia is a well-known island name, and a river near Scepsis was called Aethalocis).

(133) 'praeterea sunt (?) circa Rhodum' introduces a long list of islands: 'Teutlusa' (Mayhoff); 'Teutlussa' Detlefsen), the modern Seskli (*Σιφλία* and *Σεύκλια* in the Greek portolans, Delatte 250, 312), is mentioned in Thuc. 8. 42, whence it is cited by Steph. Byz. s.v. The modern word *σέσκη(ου)λος* is the ancient *σεῦτλον* (Attic *τεῦτλον*), and the name Seskli here is evidently descended in direct survival from the ancient name. The form *Σευτλοῦσσα* would naturally be expected in East Aegean waters, and the MSS. here read 'Seutlusa' (-ussa). 'Teutlussa', which is another emendation of Hermolaus Barbarus, ceases to be tenable when it is realized that Stephanus' sole authority for the name is the Attic writer Thucydides. It must rank as a correction of the author, and not of the MSS. The same is true of other current readings, e.g. (140) 'Arginusae', where the 'argennusae' of the MSS. needs no correction (136), 'Pelinnaeum' with one *l* (4. 15), 'Methone' (the medieval Modon), where the MSS. 'mo-' has the support of the coins and inscriptions of the place, and of Ps.-Scylax, Plutarch, Pausanias, Ptolemy, and most of the later authorities.

In the same list comes 'Calydne cum tribus oppidis, Notio, Nisyro, Mendetero'. ARFca read 'mendeteros', but it has always been assumed that the last three names here are in the ablative and are the three *oppida* of Calymna. It is true that Calymna had three demes after it was annexed to Cos in Hellenistic times, but their names were Panormus, Pothaea, and Orcatus; hence the attempt made by Bean and myself to explain the crux was directed to finding an explanation of error on Pliny's part (*B.S.A.* lii 131). The reading of *c* is 'notionistro | mendeteros', and it may be doubted whether *c* is unique in this. In any case Istros, as an island off Cnidus (see above, p. 121), would fit well here, and if this is right the other two names must be islands in the nominative: 'Notion, Istros, Mendeteros(?)'.

The second name in the above list of islands is 'Teganon' (MSS.; some editors have preferred to emend to 'Tergamon' or 'Steganos'). The name needs to be considered in conjunction with 5. 128, where the editors of Pliny read (Egypt) 'namque fallacibus uadis Alexandria tribus omnino aditum alueis mari(s), Stegano, Posideo, Tauro'. Mayhoff's apparatus shows the MSS. as reading 'mari' and divided between 'stegano' and 'steganus' (-nu F²); Detlefsen shows 'mari teg-' in both hands of E; c reads 'maris teganus'. 'Tegano' looks the most suitable reading in this position, and in fact it is read in Solinus' copy of this passage and so printed in Mommsen's edition (in the index of which the nominative is conjectured as 'Teganus'). In any case the name 'Steganos' is not easy. Pliny seems to be referring to deep-water channels giving access to the harbours, and neither a dry dock nor a roofed basin is in itself likely or would be in place here. On the other hand, the resemblance between a round harbour with its narrow fairway and a frying-pan (anc. *τηγανον*, mod. *τηγάνι*) is one appreciated by the Greeks. The old harbour town of Samos is called *Tηγάνι*, and a century and more ago L. Ross remarked on the name *Tηγάνω* as applied by Greek seamen to both the enclosed harbours of

Cnidus (*Reisen*, ii. 83); instances could no doubt be multiplied in Greek waters. The name *Tīγavov* at Alexandria must then have applied to an entry of this type. It is also notable that two of Pliny's three docks at Alexandria were known by popular descriptive names; to these may be added the harbour-name Kibotos in Strabo's description of Alexandria (17. 795).

(134) 'Pserema' (A; pserima DFcaE) is printed in the majority of modern texts since Hermolaus Barbarus's emendation 'Psyra, Mya' was abandoned. This is the present-day island of Pserimo, and the second vowel in the name is confirmed by the form '*Υψηρισμα*' in the Byzantine *Anonymous Stadiasmus* and the words *ἐν Ψηρίμῳ* long ago read by Paton in an inscription of Roman imperial date on the island (*B.C.H.* xii. 282 f.).

(135) among older names of the island Samos the texts give 'Aristocritus adicit Melamphyllum, dein Cyparissiam, alii Parthenoarrhusam (*uel sim.*), Stephanen'. The MSS. are all very erratic in this part, with the exception of E, which is shown as presenting an almost faultless text in this section. In the penultimate name A is said to read 'partenoarrhusam'; the other MSS. (including E³) are cited as varying between 'partheno-' and 'parthemo-', and between '-arusam' and '-arrusam', except for Ea which are said to read 'parthemoarūpham' (so Mayhoff; Detlefsen does not cite a, but quotes E¹ as giving 'parthenorarumpham'). Apart from Detlefsen's conjecture 'Parthenoar-chusam' (in the 1904 edition), no modern editor has attempted to make this name articulate, and the reading of E¹ has been ignored throughout. Yet it is easier to understand the corruption of *-umphā* to *-usa* than the reverse process; and c, which does not belong to the 'family' of E, here reads 'parthemo | arūfam', which appears to mark a stage in the corruption to '*-usam*' (corruption of *ph* to *f* is very common, in c at least). The reading of *-mph-* thus seems preferable and offers an intelligible solution of the crux: 'Partheno (?) a numpha' (i.e. *ἀπὸ νύμφης ὄμωνίμου*). Cf. 5. 136 (names of Chios), 'Metrodorus et Cleobulus Chiam a Chione nympha': 5. 132 (Rhodes) 'Atabyria ab rege'; 4. 58 (Crete), 'Dosiades eam a Crete nympha, Hesperidis filia, Anaximander a rege Curetum'; 3. 102, 'Iapyx a Daedali filio rege'.

(138) among islands 'iuxta Smyrnām' the editors print 'Bacchina, Pystira'. The MSS. readings, according to Mayhoff, are: bacchiua DF (and add c); bachina R, -iua E, -ciua a; pycira R; pistyra E³, -scyra E¹ (and add c), -scira a; spinpiscira dT; spnpscyrā (-pys- F) DF. Bacchina and Pystira are unknown names and barely intelligible; but the island of Bacchium off Phocaea, known from Livy (above, p. 121) would be entirely in place here. If 'bacchiu' is restored, the succeeding letters would fit the island of Aspis, known from Strabo, which is appropriately situated near Teos (above, p. 121) and not elsewhere cited by Pliny. Whether the remaining known island not cited by Pliny, Psyra off Chios, is to be restored in the remaining letters is more conjectural.

Finally, a word on the Icarian Sea. Detlefsen in the 1904 edition gives (4. 71) 'Cyclades et Sporades ab oriente litoribus Caricis Asiae, ab occidente Myrtois Atticae, a septentrione Aegaeo mari, a meridie Cretico et Carpathio inclusae. . . .' In this passage 'Caricis' has no MS. authority: icarii F¹E²; icaris F²; iacarii A; sicarii DcE¹; schariai R. The shores of Attica are called Myrtoan because the sea which washes them is the Myrtoan Sea (4. 19). The Aegean Sea bounds these islands on the north, the Cretan and Carpathian

Seas on the south. The sea which washes the mainland shores of Asia on the east here, corresponding to the Myrtoan on the west, was known from Homer onwards as the Icarian (see in particular Strabo's definition of the Icarian and adjacent seas, 10. 488). 'Icarii', which is evidently to be understood from the readings of DFcE, is therefore the appropriate reading. In Strabo's description of the Icarian (10. 488) the editors have lacerated the text at the point where Mt. Kerketeus is said to be in Icaria; for the massif of Kerketeus, which forms the east bastion of the Corseae (Fourni) Strait, is actually in Samos. But Strabo in fact confirms his own error by making Icaria (and not Samos) the eastern shore of the Corseae Strait (cf. also 14. 636).

In Greek prose a sea—a particular sea, like the Icarian—is a *πέλαγος*, being a limited tract of water having definite position and extent. Boundless or undefined open sea—the Main, or the Deep—is a different concept; the Greek for this is *νότος*.¹ The Icarian Sea then is a *πέλαγος*; but to the mariner who approaches it through the ring of the Cyclades, where in good visibility he may normally espy half a dozen islands at one moment, the open, shelterless Icarian is *πόντος*. All editors of Ps.-Scylax (58, after a list of Cyclades) print *αὐται μὲν αἱ Κυκλάδες νῆσοι ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτας ἔτεραι νῆσοι αἰδε πρὸς νότον* (or *νότον*) "Ιος . . . , Αμοργὸς . . . , Ικαρος. The word *νότος* does not fit well here; for these islands lie rather to the east than the south, and the author of the periplus is well informed in his Aegean geography. But in any case it has no authority; *νότον* is an emendation by Isaac Voss of the MSS. *πόντου*, which was presumably rejected by him on the ground that these islands are all in an equal degree surrounded by salt water. The text surely reads *ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτας ἔτεραι νῆσοι αἰδε πρὸς πόντον*: "Ιος κτλ.: the islands whose names follow lie towards, on the side of, the open sea (for Ps.-Scylax' use of the word *πόντος* cf. also 112 d). If *πόντος* is right here, it is wrong in the Homeric epigram 4, where modern editors print (line 6) *Αἰολίδα Σμύρνην ἀλυγεῖτον ποντοτίνακτον*. Smyrna was indeed *ἀλυγεῖτων*: but it was surrounded by shoal water and lay at the head of a long gulf thirty miles from the open sea, so that it could not well be spoken of as 'smitten by the main'. *Ποντοτίνακτον* is Pierson's beautiful but inappropriate emendation of MSS. *ποντιάνακτον*, which must be replaced in the text. *Ποντιάνακτος* (i.e. η ἀνάσσεται τῇ Ποντίᾳ, for the passive use cf. Od. 4. 177) is a *hapax legomenon* (as also, to be sure, is Pierson's *ποντοτίνακτος*). But the epic language of this Cymæan epigram, in keeping with the evident need to outdo Mimnermus, is peculiarly adventurous; and the epithet gains support from what is known of the cults of Smyrna.²

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¹ For *πόντος* in classical prose writers cf. Hdt. 1. 174. 2 *τῆς χώρης τῆς σφετέρης τετραμένης ἐς πόντον, τὸ δὴ Τριόπιον καλέεται*, where the distinction is made between Cnidus in its sheltered gulf and Triopion standing out boldly into the high seas; Thuc. 4. 26. 7 *ὅποτε πνέντα ἐκ πόντου εἴη*, where it was a question of the swell coming in from the main and disorganizing the patrols off Sphacteria; Plato, *Tim.* 24 e–25 a, where the Atlantic, being bounded on the far side by Atlantis, is properly (and, I think, uniquely) called *τὸ Ατλαντικὸν*.

πέλαγος, but (in contrast to the puny Mediterranean and Pontus) is described as the True Main (*ὁ ἀληθινὸς Πόντος*); the third word for sea here, *θάλαττα* in 25 d, is simply the watery element in which Atlantis foundered. So too in prose usage the adjective *πελάγιος* means 'out at sea' in relation to the land or to a coasting route, whereas *πόντιος* means 'of the Deep'.

² I should like to thank Mr. A. H. Coxon and Mr. H. Lloyd-Jones, both of whom have kindly helped me at points in this study.

ARISTOPHANIC COSTUME: A LAST WORD

In my second article on this subject I asked Professor Webster to clarify his previous statements. My article was shown to him before publication, and his reply will be found immediately following it.¹ I will confine my remarks here to a single point, because it is simple and decisive.

The only passage in ancient literature explicitly connecting the phallus with Old Comedy is *Clouds* 537 f. There Aristophanes says that his play does not wear 'any stitched-on leather, hanging down, red-tipped, thick, to make the children laugh'. Webster, following Körte, throws all the emphasis on *καθεμένον* and interprets the passage as meaning 'the phalli worn in this play do not hang down'. Asked why so much emphasis should be placed on the word *καθεμένον*, he makes no reply. Asked why a *hanging* phallus should be particularly objectionable, he replies 'because it is a symbol of a sexually dissipated life'. Asked why children should laugh at a phallus which hangs down and not at an equally visible phallus which does not hang down, he replies 'it is funnier because it wobbles about'. (In *Greek Theatre Production* (1956), p. 66, he says 'if the actor is playing a male part, he has a phallos attached to his tights; it may be tied up, or it may dangle if obscene jokes are to be made; the two positions can be seen clearly on the Leningrad oenochoe, and Aristophanes refers to them in the *Clouds* (538)'). In *C.Q.*, n.s. v (1955), 94, he says 'a third variant was seen towards the end of the *Lysistrata*, as the commentator on *Clouds* 542 says'. All that the commentator says is *τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φάλητας εἰσήγαγεν ἐν τῇ Λυσιστράτῃ*). Webster ends with the words 'the phallos continues to be worn because it is an emblem of Dionysus'.

All these answers are at best mere assertions, unsupported by evidence. It is not evident that *Clouds* 538 refers to two positions of the phallus. It is not evident that the scholiast on *Clouds* 542 refers to a third position.

Körte's article² is the *fons et origo* of Webster's views. It is worth looking back at Körte, if only because he was sometimes fairer-minded than his disciples. Mainly he relied on faith; he believed that so shocking a practice as the wearing of the phallus would not have been endured at all if it had not been sacrosanct and obligatory. It was unthinkable that the phallus should be worn in some plays and by some characters and should elsewhere be omitted.³ Certain indecent jokes proved, he thought, that the phallus was worn. (Two of these jokes, and a third cited by Haigh, are abandoned by Webster: they 'do not come into the argument'. They prove rather to be very inconvenient for Webster's argument). Therefore, *ex hypothesi*, it was worn all the time, and by every actor. As it was attached to the padded tights, actors changing from male to female roles had a problem; and Körte suggests that the explanation may lie in the padded tights for the fact that the works of art show all the women looking as if they were pregnant.

Körte's fairness is shown in his frank admission that *Clouds* 537 f. seems to be dead against his theory: 'allen diesen Zeugnissen scheint nun eine Stelle der Wolken schroff entgegen zu stehen.' A hint from Wilamowitz suggested a way out. Eupolis (fr. 244 K.) refers to children laughing at a 'Megarian' jest; and the scholiast on *Clouds* 541, discussing another bit of stage-business re-

¹ *C.Q.*, n.s. vii (1957), 184 f.

² *Jahr. Arch.* viii (1893), 69.

³ 'Undenkbar ist es, daß Aristophanes in

einigen Stücken und bei einigen Personen den Phallos beibehalten, ihn anderswärts dagegen fortgelassen habe.'


pudiated by Aristophanes, refers to Eupolis. Körte saw in the passage from Eupolis evidence of by-play with the phallus. (There is nothing whatever to show this in the Greek; and the scholiast expressly connects the passage with something quite different, by-play with the old man's staff.) Körte chose to think that Aristophanes is repudiating such 'Megarian' buffoonery, that is, by-play with the phallus. And yet Körte could not let Aristophanes repudiate the phallus itself; noting that *καθειμένον* was placed at the end of the verse 'for emphasis', he asserted that Aristophanes was contrasting the 'hanging' phallus with the *ἀναδεδεμένον* or 'tied-up' phallus. The pictures showed that this was much less offensive: 'das aufgebundene Glied, wie es so viele Bühnen-denkmaler zeigen, ist in der That viel weniger sichtbar und anstößig.'

The phrase *σκύτινον ἀναδεδεμένον* sounds technical and convincing; but as there is no reference to this subject anywhere else in ancient literature, I can only suppose that the phrase was invented by Körte. The works of art do not, as he claims, show a 'tied-up' phallus. There are indeed numerous representations of the phallus (or *πέος*) erect, semi-erect, twisted sideways, or twisted upwards. It is a matter of opinion whether these are less or more offensive than those which show it hanging down. But nowhere have I seen any trace of the thread or string 'tying up' the phallus. There is a more obvious explanation for the various positions: the comic artist is ringing the changes on grotesque indecency.

By throwing the whole emphasis on *καθειμένον*, on the specious ground that it came at the end of the verse, Körte ignored the words which stand between *καθειμένον* and *τοῖς παιδίοις ἵν' γέλως*. Yet these words cannot be ignored. They are vivid and gross; they form the climax of the description; they come immediately before 'to make the children laugh'. But they do not distinguish one kind of phallus from another. The phallus—any phallus—is red-tipped and thick because of its nature. The children laugh because it is a visible, gross representation of the *πέος*. Aristophanes is claiming that his play does not make use of the phallus.

How is Körte's theory to be reconciled with the fact that there are indecent jokes even in the *Clouds*? Körte himself cited 653 f. as a reference to the phallus. Webster recoils from the absurdity of treating 734 as a reference to the 'visible phallus'; he says that it does not 'come into the argument because the relevant part is covered up'. But the indecency is undeniable. And yet (*ex hypothesi*) indecent jokes were ruled out; were not all the actors wearing the respectable *ἀναδεδεμένον*? If the Leningrad oenochoe does indeed show us actors dressing for a performance, one of them wearing the *καθειμένον* and the other the *ἀναδεδεμένον*, what sort of a play was it? Was one actor allowed to say what he liked while the other actor was forbidden to reply in kind?

So great a scholar as Körte would not have relied on so weak an argument if he had been able to find a better. He was anxious to find a link between the monuments and the plays. The monuments may indeed give us a notion of what was sometimes worn. But only a universal theory could avoid the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Right in the way of a universal theory stand the words of Aristophanes himself. Körte tried to explain them away. I think I have shown that his attempt was self-contradictory. But the passage still needs to be explained.



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